AIRPROX REPORT No 2025194

Date: 22 Aug 2025 Time: 1558Z Position: 5356N 00046W Location: Pocklington

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	T49	DA42
Operator	Civ Gld	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Listening Out	Unknown
Provider	Pocklington gliding frequency	NK
Altitude/FL	~2760ft	2490ft
Transponder	Not fitted	A, C, S+
Reported		
Colours	White, blue	White, blue
Lighting	None	Nav, strobe, taxi, ldg
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	2500ft	3000ft-4000ft
Altimeter	QFE	QNH
Heading	'*circling*'	NK
Speed	40kt	100-140kt
ACAS/TAS	FLARM	TAS
Alert	None	None
Separation at CPA		
Reported	20ft V/60m H	0ft V/0.5-1NM H
Recorded	~270ft/0.2NM	



THE T49 PILOT reports that they had been competing in the Wolds Gliding Club two seater competition and, following the task being scrubbed, were locally soaring from […]. While thermaling to gain height, they saw what they identified as a DA42 Twinstar pass overhead, approximately 10min later, again while climbing (thermaling) at around the same height, they saw the same aircraft this time at a similar height and it passed much closer. The pilot of the other aircraft obviously saw them (they believe) as they applied power and climbed steeply away. The competition had been NOTAMed with a 3km radius [they recall] and surface to 6000ft. [The T49 pilot opines that] if the task had not been scrubbed there could have been over 30 gliders and tug aircraft in this zone.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE DA42 PILOT reports that they have very little to contribute to this occurrence. They had been on an MEP training flight, aware of a number of NOTAMed activities in the area, including the gliding competition, when they had seen a modern sailplane [they recall]. They watched it for a few seconds, to determine its intentions, then turned away. [They believe that they may have been in receipt of a Basic Service from Humberside].

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

THE HUMBERSIDE CONTROLLER reports that they had received an email regarding a reported Airprox from 22 August 2025. As the duty APS controller at the time, they do not recall any incident taking place and nothing was reported to them by any pilot on frequency at the time or afterwards by phone.

THE HUMBERSIDE SUPERVISOR reports that they were unaware of this occurrence and, due to the time elapsed between the event and the request for information, they were unable to investigate further as no recordings were available. The controller involved has no recollection of the event.

Factual Background

The weather at Humberside Airport was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGNJ 221550Z 27010KT 240V300 9999 FEW030 19/11 Q1019=
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Analysis and Investigation

ATSI

With Humberside not being notified until over 6 weeks after the occurrence, the unit was not in a position to file any reports for ATSI to analyse and no recorded RTF was available. With the RAC also unable to pinpoint exactly which aircraft were involved, ATSI has no option but to close this without further comment.

UKAB Secretariat



Figure 1: At CPA - 1557:55 (marked with a white cross). The T49 does not show. The primary contact shown to the left coincides with an ASK21 showing 2.3NM from the DA42.



Figure 2: Image taken from an open source tracking application – the ASK21 pictured towards the DA42's 12 o'clock is at a range of ~0.5NM.

Figure 3: Image taken from pilot-provided GPS file at CPA (1557:55)

Gliding NOTAM as described by the T49 pilot:

H6663/25 NOTAMR H6119/25
Q) EGTT/QWGLW/IV/M /W /000/060/5356N00048W011
A) EGTT B) 2508180924 C) 2508241700
D) 18 0924-1700, 19-24 0900-1700
E) GLIDING COMPETITION WI 10NM RADIUS 535532N 0004740W (POCKLINGTON). FOR INFO 07503 164031. AR-2025-4837/06.
F) SFC G) 6000FT AMSL

The DA42 was tracked by radar and identified via Mode S data. The T49 was not seen on radar but was visible as an [EC device track] on the CAA's Airspace Analyser Tool. The T49 pilot provided a GPS file for their flight and the diagram at page 1 was constructed by combining the radar and GPS files.

The T49 and DA42 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the DA42 pilot was required to give way to the T49.[2]

Comments

AOPA

This Airprox highlights again the ineffectiveness of incompatible electronic conspicuity as a mid-air collision avoidance tool. It is hoped that the DfT and CAA will announce their preferred system soon. Both pilots were flying in Class G [airspace] where see-and-avoid is the primary barrier, which in this case worked.

BGA

Pocklington is one of approximately 80 permanent glider launch sites in the United Kingdom listed in UK AIP ENR 5.5 and labelled on CAA VFR charts with a "G" symbol, as shown on the chart segment in Part A. A greater density of gliders may be expected nearby at any time during daylight hours, and at any altitude up to cloudbase.

Like many gliding sites, Pocklington has a dedicated VHF radio channel, notified on VFR charts and in AIP ENR 5.5, and monitored by gliders flying in the area. If transiting nearby, a brief broadcast call on this channel using "Unattended Aerodrome" phraseology (CAP 413 Ed 23 §4.162 et seq) could help avoid conflicts and increase everyone's situational awareness.

The Slingsby T49 Capstan is a wooden two-seat glider whose prototype first flew in 1961. While modern plastic-composite two-seat gliders, such as the ASK21, are predominately white and have tandem seating, T49s typically have multi-coloured paint schemes, and the two occupants sit side-by-side in a wide fuselage. Hence it's possible that the DA42 pilot's reported sighting of a "modern sailplane" does not relate to the T49.

The EC equipment fitted to the T49, and almost all other gliders in the UK, warns of impending conflicts with similarly-equipped aircraft. This mitigates the risk of Airprox with other gliders, but basic installations do not detect aircraft equipped only with transponders or ADS-B-out, as the DA42 was in this case. However, recent versions of this EC equipment can optionally include a 1090MHz receiver, and thereby warn of conflicts with transponder and ADS-B-out-equipped aircraft. Updating glider EC hardware to include a 1090MHz receiver provides a useful additional safety barrier in airspace with a high density of transponder or ADS-B-out equipped aircraft.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a T49 and a DA42 flew into proximity at Pocklington at 1558Z on Friday 22nd August 2025. The T49 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and had been Listening Out on the Pocklington gliding frequency, and the DA42 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and recalls having been in receipt of a Basic Service from Humberside.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, GPS data, a report from the air traffic controller involved and reports from the appropriate operating

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[2] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

authorities. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board firstly discussed the actions of the T49 pilot and noted that they had been operating locally following the cancellation of a planned gliding competition task. Members noted that the T49 had carried an EC (electronic conspicuity) unit common to most gliders in the UK but which in this case had been unable to register any electronic emissions from the DA42 (**CF3**). The Board noted that the T49 pilot had been monitoring the local Pocklington radio frequency but had not held a current FRTOL (Flight Radio Telephony Operator's Licence) and that, as they had intended to operate within the airfield's immediate environs, this had therefore been the most appropriate frequency to be utilising. The T49 pilot reports as having seen the DA42 10min previously, but the Board agreed that, at the time of CPA, they had had no situational awareness of its renewed presence (**CF2**) and had been concerned by its proximity when they had sighted it (**CF5**).

Members secondly discussed the role of the DA42 pilot, recognising that they had been on a training flight and had been aware of NOTAMed activities in the area. The pilot reported as having been in receipt of a Basic Service from Humberside, but it had not been possible to secure a report from that unit due to the elapsed time between receipt of the initial Airprox report and completion of tracing action for the DA42. The Board wished to remind all pilots that, where possible, they should consider taking advantage of the highest level of air traffic service available in their operating area. In this case, as the DA42 pilot had been aware of the likelihood of increased gliding activity, they may have additionally considered monitoring and perhaps making an information call as passing on the Pocklington radio frequency (**CF1**). Members noted that the DA42 had been equipped with an electronic conspicuity unit but that, in this case, it had been unable to receive any emissions from the T49 (**CF3**). The combination of no interoperable EC or 2-way radio contact had led to the DA42 pilot having had only generic situational awareness of the presence of gliders in the area (**CF2**). The Board noted that the DA42 pilot had reported sighting and monitoring 'a modern sailplane', of which there were a number operating in the vicinity of this Airprox. However, the T49 is clearly an older model and members felt that the DA42 pilot had probably visually acquired one of the other aircraft operating in the area and deemed this to have therefore been a non-sighting of the Airprox aircraft by the DA42 pilot (**CF4**).

Board members felt that, in this case, there had been no risk of collision and that normal safety parameters in Class G airspace had been maintained, assigning this event a Risk Category E.

CF1: The DA42 pilot could have called Pocklington as they passed nearby.

CF2: The T49 pilot had no situational awareness of the presence of the DA42, and the DA42 pilot had only generic situational awareness of the presence of gliders.

CF3: The EC units carried by both aircraft had been unable to receive electronic emissions from the other.

CF4: The DA42 pilot did not visually acquire the T49.

CF5: The T49 pilot was concerned by the proximity of the DA42.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2025194			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
1	Human Factors	• Accuracy of Communication	Events involving flight crew using inaccurate communication - wrong or incomplete information provided	Ineffective communication of intentions
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			

2	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
3	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
	• See and Avoid			
4	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
5	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: E.

Safety Barrier Assessment[3]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the DA42 pilot could have considered making an information call to Pocklington as they had passed.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the T49 pilot had no situational awareness of the presence of the DA42 and the DA42 pilot had only generic situational awareness of the presence of gliders.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the equipment carried by both aircraft had been unable to register any electronic emissions from the other.



[3] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.