AIRPROX REPORT No 2025183

Date: 16 Aug 2025 Time: 1107Z Position: 5347N 00114W Location: ivo Sherburn-In-Elmet Airfield

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	PA28	C42
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	Sherburn ATZ	Sherburn ATZ
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	AGCS	AGCS
Provider	Sherburn Radio	Sherburn Radio
Altitude	1700ft	1600ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	Red and white	White
Lighting	Landing, beacon.	Lndng, taxi, strobe
Conditions	VMC	NK
Visibility	5-10km	NR
Altitude/FL	1400ft AGL	2000ft
Altimeter	QFE (1030hPa)	QFE (1030hPa)
Heading	360°	090°
Speed	103kt	NR
ACAS/TAS	Other	Not fitted
Alert	Information	N/A
Separation at CPA		
Reported	70ft V/0.1NM H	100ft V/200m H
Recorded	100ft V/0.2NM H	



THE PA28 PILOT reports that they were returning to Sherburn-in-Elmet. RW06 grass was in operation with a right-hand circuit. They joined overhead as per the requested approach and height at 2000ft, and had reported deadside and that they were descending. They had heard someone else was deadside descending but they called after the PA28 pilot and therefore should have been behind. Instead, they had joined the circuit from the west and at a lower than required joining height and cut straight across [the PA28]. They were on the [C42] pilot's right and therefore [the C42 pilot] should have given way. They saw the plane in their scan as they were about to make their right turn.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE C42 PILOT reports that they approached Sherburn-In-Elmet from the west, keeping the airfield on their right. They called 5NM west for join information, then again at 3NM west with their distance, altitude, and intention to join overhead for RW06RH. They stayed left of the field to avoid conflicting with inbound traffic. Near the airfield, with final leg traffic to the right, they saw a PA28 further out on the right. Once abeam the RW06 numbers they began descent on the deadside, still visual with the PA28, which was gaining on them. As a courtesy, they made the radio call, powered up and climbed back into the overhead to rejoin, given [the other aircraft's] higher speed.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

THE SHERBURN AIR/GROUND OPERATOR reports that nothing was mentioned or observed over Sherburn Radio's Air/Ground radio frequency at the time of the [reported] Airprox. Once on the ground, the Pilot in Command (PIC) of [the PA28] mentioned they might file an Airprox/MOR in relation to the actions of the Pilot in Command of [the C42].

THE SHERBURN HEAD OF TRAINING reports that, unfortunately, their air/ground radio operator that day was not aware of the alleged incident at the time and therefore had very limited information.

They could, however, confirm that both pilots would have been informed which runway was active, the circuit direction, the QFE and that a standard overhead join would be preferred.

Factual Background

The weather at Leeds Bradford Airport was recorded as follows:

```
METAR EGNM 161050Z 08004KT 030V110 9999 BKN013 16/12 Q1030
```

The aircraft arrival procedure for Sherburn-In-Elmet is published on the website (Figure 1):



Figure 1 – Arrival procedures as published on the Sherburn Aeroclub website indicates a Standard Overhead Join (no circuit direction mentioned).

A separate section of the website depicts 'Circuit Patterns' (Figure 2).



Figure 2 - RW06 depicted as right-hand

The UK AIP entry for Sherburn-In-Elmet is as follows:

EGCJ AD 2.22 FLIGHT PROCEDURES

1 GENERAL

a. Within the circuit, pilots should plan to avoid flight over villages and remain well clear of them at all times when flying within the ATZ.
b. On arrival/departure, avoid Leeds East ATZ to the North.
c. Non-radio aircraft are not accepted.
d. Runway in use and QFE will be passed by A/G (QNH and wind check available on request). Aerodrome elevation 26 FT.
e. Flexwing Microlights welcome (must be radio equipped).
f. Backtracking on active runways is not permitted.

2 ARRIVALS

a. Fixed wing aircraft to join overhead at 2000 FT QFE and descend in accordance with the 'Standard Overhead Join' procedure.
b. Initial contact with A/G 122.610 MHz within range 5 NM of the ATZ.
c. Helicopters route inbound at 700 FT QFE. Should it be necessary to join crossing the active runway, do so at 90° across the runway at midpoint not below 200 FT AAL.

3 CIRCUITS

a. Fixed wing: circuits are to be flown at 1000 FT QFE.
b. Helicopters: circuits are to be flown at 700 FT QFE.

4 CIRCUIT PATTERNS

a. Runway 24 - left hand: Fixed wing and Helicopters.
b. Runway 06 - right hand: Fixed wing and Helicopters.
c. Runway 28 (Tarmac and Grass) - left hand: Fixed wing (right hand Helicopters).
d. Runway 10 (Tarmac and Grass) - right hand: Fixed wing (left hand Helicopters).
e. Runway 19 - left hand: Fixed wing (right hand Helicopters).
f. Runway 01 - right hand: Fixed wing (left hand Helicopters).

The Skyway Code/Aerodrome Operations (Version 4) CAP 1535 describes the standard overhead join as follows:



Figure 3 – Standard Overhead Join

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and both aircraft were identified using Mode S data. CPA was assessed to have occurred at 1107:02 with 100ft vertical and 0.2NM lateral separation (Figure 4).



Figure 4 – Time 1107:02 CPA 100ft vertical and 0.2NM lateral separation

Further analysis of aircraft tracking software was undertaken and both aircraft were identified using ADS-B data sources. The C42 was seen to pass in front of the PA28 at 1106:50 (Figure 5).



Figure 5 – Time 1106:50 300ft vertical and 0.4NM lateral separation.

At 1107 the PA28 was seen to descend behind the C42 (Figure 6).

Figure 6 – Time 1107

The PA28 and C42 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.[2]

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a PA28 and a C42 flew into proximity in the vicinity of Sherburn-in-Elmet Airfield at 1107Z on Saturday 16th August 2025. Both the PA28 and C42 pilots were operating under VFR in VMC and in receipt of an AGCS from Sherburn Radio.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, ADS-B and GPS data, and a report from the air/ground operator. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first looked at the actions of the PA28 pilot, and noted that they reported hearing the C42 pilot's deadside position call after their own deadside and descending transmission. The Board noted that, due to the timing of the R/T calls, the PA28 pilot had expected the C42 pilot to have been behind them, and members agreed that the PA28 pilot had had inaccurate situational awareness of the position of the C42 (**CF5**). The Board observed that the C42 had passed in front of the PA28 as the PA28 had been approaching the deadside via the airfield overhead, and that the PA28 pilot had reported sighting the C42 on the deadside, ahead of them, during their scan prior to turning right on the deadside. Members agreed that the PA28 pilot had been concerned by the proximity of the C42 (**CF6**) who had stated that *'They were on the* [C42] *pilot's right and therefore* [the C42 pilot] *should have given way'.* The Board wished to highlight that perceptions of 'right of way' do not alter the shared responsibility all pilots have for collision avoidance and for maintaining a safe distance from other aircraft, as well as the requirement for pilots of joining aircraft to integrate with the established pattern of traffic.

The Board then considered the actions of the C42 pilot, and noted the pilot's statement that they had *'called 5NM west for join information, then again at 3NM west with their distance, altitude, and intention to join overhead for RW06RH'.* The Board noted that the pilot had then changed their plan by staying *'left of the field to avoid conflicting with inbound traffic'* without advising otherwise and members agreed that the C42 pilot had ineffectively communicated their intentions (**CF2**). The Board examined both the AIP and Sherburn-In-Elmet's website for their joining procedures and noted that both publications state that aircraft are to make a 'Standard Overhead Join' (SOJ) and descend in accordance with that (see

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[2] (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

Factual Background above), and members agreed that the C42 pilot had not complied with the published procedures (**CF1**). The Board also observed that the website had identified 3 separate waypoints via which to join, dependent on which direction inbound traffic were arriving from, and members agreed that Sherburn-In-Elmet's aerodrome manager might consider updating the AIP to reflect all pertinent information regarding their procedures. The Board recognised that the C42 pilot's decision to remain to the left of the airfield whilst approaching from the west had placed the C42 directly into the deadside of the traffic pattern, and members agreed that the pilot of the C42 had not only executed the published SOJ incorrectly (**CF3**) but they had also not conformed with the pattern of traffic already formed by the PA28 (**CF4**). The Board noted that the C42 pilot had not received specific positional information on the PA28 via R/T and members agreed that the C42 pilot had only had generic situational awareness of the PA28's location (**CF5**).

In drawing their discussion to a close and determining a risk category , the Board noted that both the PA28 and C42 pilots had entered the deadside of the circuit pattern at approximately the same time, and that the C42 pilot had unexpectedly joined directly ahead of, and in confliction with, the PA28 already in the traffic pattern. Members agreed that, although safety had been degraded, the C42 pilot had been monitoring the PA28's closure rate and had *'powered up and climbed back into the overhead to rejoin*' in a timely and effective manner and there had, therefore, been no risk of collision. As such, the Board assigned Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2025183			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Flight Elements			
	• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance			
1	Human Factors	• Use of policy/Procedures	Events involving the use of the relevant policy or procedures by flight crew	Regulations and/or procedures not complied with
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
2	Human Factors	• Accuracy of Communication	Events involving flight crew using inaccurate communication - wrong or incomplete information provided	Ineffective communication of intentions
3	Human Factors	• Action Performed Incorrectly	Events involving flight crew performing the selected action incorrectly	Incorrect or ineffective execution
4	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Environment	Events involving flight crew not to appropriately monitoring the environment	Did not avoid/conform with the pattern of traffic already formed
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
5	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• See and Avoid			
6	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[3]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

[3] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.

Ground Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **not used** because the Sherburn Air/Ground Operator was not required to monitor either the PA28 or the C42 aircraft.

Flight Elements:

Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because the C42 pilot did not execute a standard overhead join as required.

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the C42 pilot had neither executed the overhead join as communicated by them, nor conformed with the pattern of traffic formed by the PA28.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because the PA28 pilot had inaccurate situational awareness of the position of the C42, and the C42 pilot had only generic situational awareness of the PA28's overhead join.