


AIRPROX REPORT No 2025191

Date: 23 Aug 2025 Time: 1355Z Position: 5327N 00000E Location: 3.5NM SW North Coates

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	CTSW	Rans Coyote
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Listening Out	Unknown
Provider	Pointon	
Altitude/FL	FL019	FL017
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	White	Blue
Lighting	Strobes	NR
Conditions	VMC	
Visibility	>10km	
Altitude/FL	2200ft	
Altimeter	QFE (1020hPa)	
Heading	East	
Speed	95kt	
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	
Alert	N/A	
Separation at CPA		
Reported	30ft V/0m H	NK
Recorded	200ft V/<0.1NM H	



THE CTSW PILOT reports that normally they fly with an [EC device] displaying on an iPad, but it failed to connect on this occasion. The visibility was good with cloud at about 3000ft. Their normal practice is to dip the nose at about every five minutes to ensure that nothing is approaching from ahead. On the day, they were about to undertake this measure when the aircraft appeared, just below their port side, going in the opposite direction. The pilot opined that, if they had dipped the nose, the two aircraft would have collided. The other aircraft was blue in colour and low-winged. At the time, they presumed the other pilot was climbing having departed from a nearby airfield and had failed to see them. It was not possible to see whether the other pilot had taken avoiding action and they had no time to take any action, the first rule of aviation applied. They were not in contact with any ATC at any time during the flight, preferring to keep eyes outside the aircraft and not fiddling with the radio. They almost always fly on their own. They further noted that their [additional EC device, common to gliders] was not working and they have been since advised it was an out of date model and they have recently purchased a [different CWS].

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as ‘High’.

THE RANS COYOTE PILOT elected not to submit a report, although they indicated that they were not aware of an Airprox occurring.

Factual Background

The weather at Waddington was recorded as follows:

METAR EGXW 171350Z AUTO 04009KT 9999 OVC020/// 19/13 Q1025=

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and both aircraft could be seen and identified using Mode S information. Further analysis using ADS-B data sources indicated that neither aircraft was equipped with ADS-B Out. The Rans Coyote was displaying a 7000 squawk indicating that they were not receiving an ATIS. At 1354:14 both aircraft were tracking towards one another, the CTSW indicating FL019 and the Rans Coyote indicating FL020 (Figure 1).




Figure 1 - 1354:14

The two aircraft continued to close, with neither appearing to change course. The Rans Coyote began a descent to FL017 and CPA occurred at 1355:06, with the Coyote now below the CTSW and lateral separation at less than 0.1NM (Figure 2).




Figure 2 - CPA 1355:06

The CTSW and Rans Coyote pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.¹ If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the CTSW pilot was required to give way to the Rans Coyote.²

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a CTSW and a Rans Coyote flew into proximity 3.5NM southwest of North Coates at 1355Z on Saturday 23rd August 2025. The CTSW pilot was operating under VFR in VMC not in receipt of an ATS. The Rans Coyote pilot did not submit a report.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the CTSW pilot and radar photographs/video recordings. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first looked at the actions of the CTSW pilot. They had been conducting a local sortie at around 2000ft and members noted that the pilot had not been receiving an ATS. Commenting that there were a number of RAF stations that could have provided a LARS, and that Humberside would also provide a service in the area where the Airprox took place, members felt that this had been a contributory factor to the Airprox (**CF1**). Although the pilot mentioned that they did not like to be 'heads-in' adjusting their radio, members commented that, had they requested a Traffic Service, ATC would have been monitoring their flight to call any traffic in the vicinity. The EWS on the CTSW had not been working on the day, and again members thought that this had been significant as, if it had been functioning correctly, it should have alerted to the Rans Coyote's transponder. Without an ATS or a serviceable EWS, the CTSW pilot had not had any situational awareness that the Coyote had been in the vicinity (**CF2**), which left see-and-avoid and the final mitigating barrier. Members familiar with the CTSW commented that it actually had good all round visibility from the cockpit, therefore it had been unfortunate that the pilot had not seen the other aircraft in time to take any avoiding action, making this effectively a non-sighting (**CF3**). They noted that the final radar separation indicated 200ft but, given that the pilot described the Coyote as being much closer, at around 30ft, members thought that the processing of the radar picture had probably rounded up the altitudes so it was more likely that the separation had been closer than that indicated.

Turning to the actions of the Rans Coyote pilot, the Board was disappointed that the pilot had chosen not to participate in the Airprox process, noting that, without their report, it was not known whether the pilot had not seen the CTSW, or had seen it and had not considered it to have been a threat. However, members commented that, had the Coyote pilot seen the CTSW, it may have been prudent to have increased the separation, as the danger of flying just a few hundred feet below an aircraft whose intentions were unknown presented a risk that the other pilot may have manoeuvred unexpectedly. Indeed, the CTSW pilot had said that they had been about to dip the nose of their aircraft when they had suddenly seen the Coyote, which would have decreased the separation. Members noted that the Coyote had been squawking 7000, making it likely that this pilot had also not been receiving an ATS (**CF1**) and, given that the aircraft had not displayed on ADS-B sources, it had been probable that they also had not had an EWS fitted. Again, members urged pilots to reconsider this approach, noting that as well as the personal benefit from receiving an ATS, speaking to ATC also aided the situational awareness of other users of the surrounding airspace.

When determining the risk of the encounter, members had only the CTSW pilot's report and the radar replay with which to make their assessment. Again, members noted that, without the Coyote pilot's point of view, it was difficult to assess the true risk. However, with the information available, members agreed that the CTSW pilot had not seen the other aircraft in time to take avoiding action and, therefore, without either pilot knowing the intentions of the other, a risk of collision had existed (**CF4**). A discussion

¹ (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

² (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

followed about the separation, which was likely to have been in the region of 100-200ft, and members agreed that safety had not been assured, Risk Category B.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

2025191				
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
Flight Elements				
• Tactical Planning and Execution				
1	Human Factors	• Communications by Flight Crew with ANS	An event related to the communications between the flight crew and the air navigation service.	Pilot did not request appropriate ATS service or communicate with appropriate provider
• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action				
2	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
• See and Avoid				
3	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
• Outcome Events				
4	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

Degree of Risk: B.

Safety Barrier Assessment³

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because either pilot could have requested a LARS in order to improve their situational awareness on the other traffic.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the CTSW pilot had no situational awareness that the other aircraft had been in the vicinity.

See and Avoid were assessed as **ineffective** because this had been effectively a non-sighting by the CTSW pilot and, whilst it was not known whether the Rans Coyote pilot had been visual with the CTSW, the separation was such that if they had, greater separation would have been advisable.

³ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2025191		Outside Controlled Airspace					
Barrier	Provision	Application	Effectiveness				
			Barrier Weighting				
			0%	5%	10%	15%	20%
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	○	○				
	Manning & Equipment	○	○				
	Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action	○	○				
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	○	○				
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	●	●				
	Tactical Planning and Execution	●	●				
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action	✘	●				
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	○	○				
	See & Avoid	✘	✘				
Key:			Full	Partial	None	Not Present/Not Assessable	Not Used
Provision	●	●	○	○	○	○	○
Application	●	●	○	○	○	○	○
Effectiveness	■	■	■	■	■	■	■