AIRPROX REPORT No 2025176

Date: 10 Aug 2025 Time: 1005Z Position: 5049N 00016W Location: Shoreham

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	PA28(A)	PA28(B)
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	Shoreham ATZ	Shoreham ATZ
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	AGCS	AGCS
Provider	Shoreham Radio	Shoreham Radio
Altitude/FL	1000ft	1000ft
Transponder	A, C, S+	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	White, red	White, red
Lighting	Landing, bcn	Landing, taxi, strobes
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	1100ft	1100ft
Altimeter	QNH (1028hPa)	NR
Heading	020°	NR
Speed	85kt	80kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	SkyEcho
Alert	N/A	None
Separation at CPA		
Reported	0ft V/50m H	0ft V/300m H
Recorded	0ft V/<0.1NM H	



THE PA28(A) PILOT reports that they had been on a training flight, in the Shoreham LH circuit for RW20 following a go-around. On the downwind leg they [report that] they suddenly became visual with an aircraft same height and in very close proximity closing from their left. The other aircraft turned left and joined downwind just ahead of them. The PA28(A) pilot reports that they initially moved right and remained behind the aircraft for avoidance and made one right hand orbit at the end of the downwind leg to create separation before continuing to land.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE PA28(B) PILOT reports that they were asked by the AGO for their type of join. The pilot reported for a deadside, crosswind join for RW20. The AGO advised that there had been no known traffic to affect. On joining crosswind, the radio was busy so the pilot could not report. The pilot reports that they had seen traffic to their right and considered the best option was to turn downwind ahead of them. As the PA28(B) pilot had turned they reported downwind and visual with the traffic. The circuit and landing were then completed.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

THE SHOREHAM AIR/GROUND OPERATOR noted that the reported Airprox had occurred at approximately 1005 between two PA28 fixed-wing aircraft. The PA28(A) pilot had conducted a go-around on RW20 which was declared on the radio and to which the AGO had replied '*roger*'. The PA28(B) pilot had called inbound to Shoreham and stated they would be joining *'deadside for crosswind'* which the AGO acknowledged and reminded the pilot that the crosswind procedure should be to join over the upwind runway numbers. All standard information was passed to the PA28(B) pilot such as QNH/QFE, runway in use, circuit direction and appropriate squawk code. The PA28(B) pilot declared joining crosswind to which [the AGO recalls] they passed information on the PA28(A) being downwind [and] ahead of PA28(B). When advising that there was traffic in front of the PA28(B), the pilot responded

along the lines of "*roger I'm not visual*" and to which the AGO replied "*I'm visual with you both, I think he is in your 12 o' clock*". After this point both aircraft were outside of the AGO's immediate view being above their line of sight due to the VCR ceiling. The AGO received several radio transmissions from a helicopter inbound from the north in the time between passing the Traffic Information to the pilot of the PA28(B) and the time of the Airprox, after which the PA28(B) pilot transmitted "*Couldn't get a word in but I'm crosswind turning downwind visual with the one on my right*". The PA28(A) pilot then declared they would make one right hand orbit for spacing and position behind PA28(B). The AGO [noted that] they had had to move closer to the east facing window to be visual with the aircraft and from that perspective they looked relatively close but not in immediate danger of collision at the time the AGO had been visual. Neither pilot declared an Airprox over the radio and both fixed-wing aircraft and the helicopter landed without further incident.

Factual Background

The weather at Gatwick and Southampton Airports was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGKK 100950Z VRB03KT 9999 FEW035 22/13 Q1029=
METAR EGHI 100950Z VRB02KT 9999 FEW030 21/12 Q1029=
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UKAB Secretariat



Figure 1: At CPA – 1004:46 0ft V/<0.1NM H



Figure 2: At CPA + 20sec (1005:06). PA28(B) appears to have passed through the 12 o'clock of PA28(A), turned back through the 12 o'clock and then sat to the west of PA28(A) paralleling their track.

Both aircraft were tracked via radar and identified through Mode S data.

The PA28(A) and PA28(B) pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.[2]

Summary

An Airprox was reported when PA28(A) and PA28(B) flew into proximity at Shoreham airfield at 1005Z on Sunday 10th August 2025. Both pilots had been operating under VFR in VMC and in receipt of an Air/Ground Communication Service from Shoreham Radio.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings and a report from the Air/Ground operator involved. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board firstly discussed the actions of the PA28(A) pilot, noting that they had been on a training flight, were completing a go-around from their previous approach and had joined the left-hand circuit for RW20. They had turned downwind when they had sighted PA28(B) approaching from their left which had then turned in front of them. The PA28(A) pilot had moved to the right and then added a right-hand orbit to generate spacing. Members noted that the PA28(A) pilot had not reported hearing any of the radio exchanges between the Shoreham AGO and the pilot of PA28(B) which, combined with a lack of

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[2] (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

electronic conspicuity (EC) equipment, had led them to have had only generic situational awareness of the presence of PA28(B) (**CF4**). The Board considered that this had contributed to the subsequent late sighting of PA28(B) (**CF6**) as the 2 aircraft had closed.

Turning to the actions of the PA28(B) pilot, the Board noted that the pilot of PA28(B) had made RT calls regarding their intention to join through the deadside procedure and had been warned of other traffic with which they had not initially been visual. The pilot of PA28(B) reports that the RT frequency had been busy but they had gained visual with the one ahead at a late stage (**CF6**) and had elected to turn ahead of it onto the downwind leg, causing the PA28(A) pilot to have been concerned by its proximity (**CF7**). Members opined that, in such circumstances, if the joining pilot is not visual with the notified traffic, then they should remain clear until visual and then position to join the circuit pattern as established (**CF1**, **CF2**, **CF3**). Although the PA28(B) pilot had carried a common EC unit, it had not registered any electronic emissions from PA28(A) (**CF5**) and therefore the PA28(B) pilot had only the information from the AGO with which to form a mental model of the traffic situation. The Board agreed that this had led to only late situational awareness for the pilot (the AGO reported "*I'm visual with you both, I think he is in your 12 o' clock*") (**CF4**).

Members wished to remind all pilots that the CAA's Skyway code[3], from page 93 onwards, offers guidance on procedures for joining and operating in the circuit, including a diagram of a Standard Overhead Join on page 104.

In reviewing the contribution from the Shoreham Air/Ground operator, members recognised the efforts that the AGO had gone through to ensure that the PA28(B) pilot had been aware of and visual with PA28(A). With the known limitations in the provision of this service, and the visibility restrictions within the Shoreham tower, the Board felt that the AGO had done all possible to ensure clarity for both pilots in this case.

Concluding the discussion, members thoughts turned to the consideration of the risk of collision. Whilst it was acknowledged that the pilot of PA28(B) had achieved visual contact with PA28(A), members were in agreement that the decision to turn ahead of that aircraft had caused its pilot concern. Members agreed that safety margins had been reduced but were satisfied that there had not been a risk of collision. The Board assigned Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2025176			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Flight Elements			
	• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance			
1	Human Factors	• Use of policy/Procedures	Events involving the use of the relevant policy or procedures by flight crew	Regulations and/or procedures not complied with
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
2	Human Factors	• Insufficient Decision/Plan	Events involving flight crew not making a sufficiently detailed decision or plan to meet the needs of the situation	Inadequate plan adaption
3	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Environment	Events involving flight crew not to appropriately monitoring the environment	Did not avoid/conform with the pattern of traffic already formed
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
4	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
5	Human Factors	• Response to Warning System	An event involving the incorrect response of flight crew following the operation of an aircraft warning system	CWS misinterpreted, not optimally actioned or CWS alert expected but none reported

[3] The Skyway Code | UK Civil Aviation Authority

	• See and Avoid			
6	Human Factors	• Identification/ Recognition	Events involving flight crew not fully identifying or recognising the reality of a situation	Late sighting by one or both pilots
7	Human Factors	• Incorrect Action Selection	Events involving flight crew performing or choosing the wrong course of action	Pilot flew close enough to cause concern

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[4]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because the pilot of PA28(B) did not conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by PA28(A).

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **ineffective** because the pilot of PA28(B), on visually acquiring PA28(A), did not correctly integrate with the pattern as established by PA28(A).

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because the pilot of PA28(A) had only generic situational awareness of the presence of PA28(B) and the pilot of PA28(B) gained only late situational awareness of the presence of PA28(A).

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the equipment carried by the pilot of PA28(B) did not provide an alert to the presence of PA28(A) when it would have been expected to do so.

See and Avoid were assessed as **partially effective** because both pilots achieved only a late sighting of the other aircraft and, on visually acquiring PA28(A), the pilot of PA28(B) chose to turn in front of it.



[4] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.