


AIRPROX REPORT No 2025170

Date: 02 Aug 2025 Time: 1623Z Position: 5156N 00053W Location: 7.5NM SW Milton Keynes

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Paraglider	PA28
Operator	Civ Hang	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	None	None
Altitude/FL	2208ft	2348ft
Transponder	Not fitted	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	Blue, green, pink	White, blue
Lighting	None	Anti-col, HISL
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	2228ft	2400ft
Altimeter	SPS	QNH (1018hPa)
Heading	045°	010°
Speed	5km/h	95kt
ACAS/TAS	FLARM	SkyEcho
Alert	None	None
Separation at CPA		
Reported	46ft V/200m H	100ft V/200m H
Recorded	140ft V/0.1NM H	



THE PARAGLIDER PILOT reports that they were flying in good conditions, having started from Long Mynd. They were low and circling slowly in very weak lift. Their net groundspeed would have been approximately 10km/h (they were circling slowly and drifting in an approximately 20km/h wind). Visibility was excellent, with bright sunlight. On one of their turns, they observed a white-and-blue single-engine aircraft directly in front of them within a few seconds flight-time. They immediately broke out of their turn pattern (they had been turning right and continuing would have meant a significant risk of a mid-air collision on their next turn given their assessment of course and speed). On their left turn they could see the PA28 at the same height and passing very close by. They did not observe any deviation in course by the PA28 pilot.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE PA28 PILOT reports that there were multiple traffic alerts from [their EC device] so they were maintaining a constant lookout. They received an alert for traffic ahead and saw a blue paraglider further ahead and saw that it was moving away. It was first sighted 100m below the nose and moving away towards the left wing, their assessment was that there was sufficient separation and, since it was moving away, they did not make any course changes.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

Factual Background

The weather at Cranfield was recorded as follows:

METAR EGTC 021620Z 34004KT 270V040 CAVOK 20/07 Q1018

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and the PA28 could be positively identified from Mode S data. The paraglider was not observed on the replay. The PA28, but not the paraglider, was observed by reference to ADS-B data sources.




Figure 1 - 1622:42 (CPA+2sec)

Both pilots kindly supplied GPS track data for their respective flights. The diagram was constructed and the separation at CPA determined by combining the data sources.

The paraglider and PA28 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.¹ If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the PA28 pilot was required to give way to the paraglider.² If the incident geometry is considered as overtaking then the paraglider pilot had right of way and the PA28 pilot was required to keep out of the way of the other aircraft by altering course to the right.³

Comments

AOPA

In this case, with no ATS available to the paraglider pilot, an effective lookout saved the day and the electronic warning system guided the PA28 pilot. It is hoped that, when the Department for Transport decides on the future of electronic conspicuity systems, compatible devices will be carried by all forms of aviation. It is also hoped that compatible equipment will be available in control towers and radar units thereby enhancing safety, and assisting in avoiding incidents like this.

BHPA

The BHPA commends both pilots for their proactive use of EC equipment and their good lookout which undoubtedly helped in avoiding a more serious outcome to this incident. We observe that the paraglider pilot did very well to see the PA28, albeit at the last moment, and initiated an avoiding manoeuvre. It seems clear that multiple resolutions on the PA28 pilot's EC device had increased their alertness and focussed their lookout.

We note that the PA28 pilot seemed to have correctly identified the other reporting aircraft from its colour and position and deemed the risk of collision as being quite low. We suggest that, from the paraglider pilot's perspective, a much larger aircraft coming towards them on a non-deviating track

¹ (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

² (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

³ (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(3) Overtaking.

was an intimidating sight and, with the additional worry of wake turbulence on a non-rigid aerofoil ever-present in the pilot's mind, they have assessed the collision risk as high.

The BHPA advises all our members that the 2000-3000ft altitude band is regularly used by many GA aircraft and they should maintain an extra-vigilant lookout for these aircraft types, as well as concentrating on their own navigation and other free-flyers and sailplanes which may be sharing the same thermal.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a paraglider and a PA28 flew into proximity 7.5NM south-west of Milton Keynes at 1623Z on Saturday 2nd August 2025. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, neither in receipt of an ATS.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, GPS track data from both flights and radar photographs/video recordings. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the pilot of the paraglider, and members commended them for the carriage of an EC device to have assisted with their situational awareness. However, it was agreed that the device would not have been expected to have detected the presence of the PA28 (**CF2**). Consequently, it was agreed that the paraglider pilot had not had situational awareness of the PA28 until it had been sighted (**CF1**). Members noted that the paraglider pilot had been concerned by the proximity of the PA28 (**CF4**) and had taken avoiding action by breaking out of their thermalling turn in order to increase the separation.

Turning their attention to the actions of the pilot of the PA28, members noted that the additional EC device fitted to their aircraft had provided multiple alerts to the presence of traffic along their track. However, members agreed that it would not have been expected to have detected the paraglider (**CF2**) and that they had not had situational awareness of the paraglider (**CF1**) until it had been sighted during their visual scan of the area. Members pondered the subsequent actions taken by the PA28 pilot and their assessment of the proximity. On one hand, they had reported that the paraglider had been sighted "100m below the nose and moving away" but, on the other hand, members noted that they had reported that the separation at the closest point of the encounter had been 100ft vertically and 200m horizontally. Some members suggested that the decision to have remained on track may have actually increased the separation, reduced only when the paraglider pilot had turned away. Notwithstanding, a member with particular knowledge of paragliding operations explained that, even if avoiding action had not been required by the PA28 pilot, it may have been prudent to have provided the paraglider a wider berth which may also have been a reassurance to the paraglider pilot that they had been sighted. Further, providing greater separation from a paraglider may also have reduced the likelihood of the potentially catastrophic effects of turbulence on the canopy.

Concluding their discussion, members were satisfied that the pilot of the paraglider had taken sufficient avoiding action to have removed any risk of collision. Nevertheless, it was agreed that safety margins had been reduced and that the pilot of the PA28 had flown close enough to the paraglider to have caused its pilot concern (**CF3**). The Board assigned Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2025170			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
	Flight Elements			
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			

1	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance				
2	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
• See and Avoid				
3	Human Factors	• Lack of Individual Risk Perception	Events involving flight crew not fully appreciating the risk of a particular course of action	Pilot flew close enough to cause concern
4	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.


Safety Barrier Assessment⁴

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had situational awareness of the other aircraft until visually acquired.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the EC devices fitted to each aircraft would not have been expected to have detected the presence of the other aircraft.



⁴ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).