AIRPROX REPORT No 2025145

Date: 16 Jul 2025 Time: 1301Z Position: 5249N 00142W Location: Tatenhill ATZ

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	PA28	BE24
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	Tatenhill ATZ	Tatenhill ATZ
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	AGCS	AGCS
Provider	Tatenhill Radio	Tatenhill Radio
Altitude/FL	1480ft	1580ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	White	White
Lighting	Strobes, anti-colls	Strobes, bcn, ldg
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	900ft	1500ft
Altimeter	QFE (1000hPa)	QNH (1014hPa)
Heading	350°	~290°
Speed	90kt	90-100kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Not fitted
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	50ft V/100-200m H	500ft V/500-1000m H
Recorded	100ft V/<0.1NM H	



THE PA28 PILOT reports that they had been undertaking a circuit detail on a […] callsign. It had been the first circuit detail with the student. The workload was relatively high, although the circuit had generally been quiet during the sortie. The runway in use was 26 and the visibility was good with a cloudbase in excess of 3000ft. There was a small amount of turbulence caused by the thermic nature of the day with warm sunshine. The student was performing reasonably well, although the circuits were a little wider than ideal and height holding was proving challenging. On one of the circuits around the crosswind/downwind leg, the PA28 pilot had heard a radio call from a joining aircraft (the BE24). The PA28 pilot cannot recall the whole transmission but did recall the phrase "*direct for 26*". They had assumed that the aircraft was intending to join straight-in. The A/G operator did state that there had been an aircraft in the circuit. Overhead joins are preferred at Tatenhill. The PA28 pilot could not recall the BE24 pilot's response, although [they did recall that] its pilot did acknowledge in a subsequent transmission that they could see an aircraft departing, which they may have thought was the other aircraft in the circuit. The PA28 pilot cannot recall if they had made a downwind call or not nor if the other aircraft pilot called ahead. As the pilot of the PA28 had approached the point of turning onto left base, they report that they could not see any aircraft on a long or short final and did not see an aircraft on the base leg. As they had rolled the wings level, the pilot caught sight of the BE24, slightly higher than themselves (50-100ft) and a few hundred feet to their right at roughly their 3 o'clock. The PA28 pilot noted that they were on a slightly converging course. The BE24 pilot had then called "*left base*". The PA28 pilot had also then called left-base and added to the call that they were inside the BE24 and slightly below. At that point the PA28 may have been obscured from the BE24 pilot's vision by their low wing configuration and having being on the right-hand side of their aircraft cockpit. The PA28 pilot had had clear sight as they were on the right-hand side instructing and took control of the aircraft from the student and initially maintained current heading and a slight descent. The PA28 pilot recalls that they had been expecting the other aircraft to give way to them as they had been established in the circuit. The BE24 pilot had then called "*turning final*" to which the PA28 pilot had replied, "*Please don't, as you will hit us*". The PA28 pilot notes that they couldn't think of a more CAP413 compliant statement! At that

point, the other aircraft was still in their 3 o'clock and the PA28 pilot was not ready for the turn to final so this had seemed an early call. The radio operator also passed information to the BE24 pilot with the relative aircraft positions. At that point, the BE24 pilot had then said, "*Oh hello*", which the PA28 pilot took as [meaning that] the BE24 pilot had then seen them. The BE24 pilot had then stated that [the PA28 pilot] "*could take the landing*" and they would orbit for spacing. The BE24 pilot had then undertaken a right-hand orbit (left-hand circuits in operation) and the PA28 pilot had continued to execute a normal approach and touch-and-go and carried on the sortie as normal. The PA28 pilot reported that they had announced over the radio that they would be reporting the near miss. The PA28 pilot subsequently spoke with the A/G operator after the flight to establish any potential for improvement in what they had done. They did not contact the BE24 pilot. They considered what avoiding action they could have taken at the time. As the other aircraft had been on their right and on a converging course they could have considered giving way, although their PA28 aircraft had been lower than the other aircraft and established in the circuit so potentially had right of way. The PA28 pilot believed that, had they executed a go-around, there was a risk that the other aircraft would collide with them as they were slightly higher and their PA28 aircraft would have flown in front of them. Had the PA28 pilot turned right they believe that they would have almost certainly collided. Had they descended then the BE24 pilot may have lost sight of them and descended onto them. Another alternative the PA28 pilot believes they had was a sharp left turn, potentially climbing too but that would have meant losing sight of the BE24 as well, with their respective courses still being converging for a small moment. Potentially the only option for the PA28 pilot had been a rapid descent to pass under the other aircraft and then execute a go-around once on the deadside. Once they had seen the BE24, the risk of collision remained low although had it turned onto final then the PA28 pilot believes that they would have had very few options to avoid them.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE BE24 PILOT reports that they had departed […] and had flown a routeing avoiding Stansted and had passed to the left of Leicester under EMA Radar at 2500ft. Around Packington, they had changed frequency to Tatenhill and initiated a descent. The pilot had listened to Tatenhill for a while then made a blind call with their intention to join by means of a direct long finals for RW26. They continued their approach and made the call '*Finals* 26' shortly after which they had heard a [call] '*Downwind'.* They had then cleaned-up the aircraft, mixture, prop, throttle and set the flaps. [At that point] the pilot had then looked over their left shoulder and had noticed the PA28 in close proximity more 'base' than 'downwind' as they had expected. They made the call '*Oh hello*' followed by '*you take it'.* It had been at this point that they had initiated a right-hand orbit. On completion of the orbit, they noted the PA28 over the threshold and [heard them] call landing. They then watched the PA28 as they had set-up to land themself as [the PA28] had then proceeded to 'go around' […]. They then landed without incident, hangered their machine and left.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

THE TATENHILL AIR/GROUND OPERATOR reports that the PA28 pilot was completing touch-and-goes within the circuit on a [company] callsign and training flight. The BE24 had been [approaching] from the southeast and was arriving from […] (according to [an open source flight tracker]). On the BE24 pilot's initial call (at 1258Z) the AGO informed them that there had been one other aircraft in the circuit (referring to the PA28). The AGO believed that the BE24 pilot had then acknowledged that Traffic Information and responded that they would complete a *'straight-in approach for RW26'*. At that time the AGO believed the BE24 to be just south of Burton-Upon-Trent according to their ADS-B flight tracking software. That position placed it to the southeast of Tatenhill, which could also be interpreted as a left-base join for RW26LH. Approximately 4min later, the AGO then witnessed from the tower that the PA28 had been on a base-leg for RW26LH when they had seen it manoeuvre a sharp left bank (toward the runway on a final for 26LH) which the AGO had assumed to have been to avoid a collision with the BE24. According to the PA28 pilot, the BE24 had been approximately 50ft to their right and slightly higher. The PA28 was believed to be on a base leg on the inside of the BE24, meaning that the BE24 had been the aircraft on the right-hand side, and the PA28 was seemingly within the correct circuit pattern and had the lower altitude. The pilot of the BE24 had then completed a right orbit on the final leg of RW26LH and proceeded to land. The PA28 pilot had then then completed a few more circuits

and landed and requested that an Airprox be submitted. The AGO noted that nothing further was heard by them from the pilot of the BE24 whilst the pilot of the PA28 had visited the tower and discussed what happened with what [the AGO] had seen, and confirmed similar accounts. Around 1min before the [reported Airprox] another uninvolved aircraft had been departing on the active RW26, and which the pilot of the BE24 could have interpreted as the reported aircraft in the circuit; however, this departing aircraft had still been on the ground when [the AGO] had reported the circuit traffic status [of the PA28] on the BE24 pilot's initial call and so [the departing traffic] was not included [in that Traffic Information call].

The AGO perceived the severity of the incident as 'High'.

Factual Background

The weather at East Midlands Airport was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGNX 161250Z 30009KT 270V340 9999 SCT034 BKN045 21/13 Q1016=
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Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat



Figure 1: At CPA (1300:42) 100ft V/<0.1NM H.

Both aircraft were tracked via radar and identified through Mode S data. The PA28 and BE24 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.[2]

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[2] (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a PA28 and a BE24 flew into proximity at Tatenhill ATZ at 1301Z on Wednesday 16th July 2025. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC and in receipt of an Air/Ground Communication Service from Tatenhill Radio.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings and a report from the air/ground operator involved. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

Members firstly considered the actions of the PA28 pilot, noting that they had been instructing a student on an early circuit exercise. The pilot reports that they vaguely recalled a joining call for a straight-in approach from a second aircraft and had maintained a lookout for it. They noted that as they had turned left onto the base leg they had seen the BE24 to their right-hand side and closing (**CF7**) and had made a non-standard, but clear in content, call to the BE24 pilot to look to their left. The Board noted that neither aircraft had carried electronic conspicuity equipment and that that, combined with the non-standard RT calls, had led to inaccurate situational awareness for the PA28 pilot regarding the position and proximity of the BE24 (**CF4**).

Moving to the actions of the BE24 pilot, members noted that the pilot had made a non-standard join (**CF1**) with an unclear RT call to that effect (**CF2**) and, having been told there had been a second aircraft in the circuit, had potentially mis-identified a departing aircraft as that second aircraft and had therefore not assimilated the conflict information for the PA28 (**CF5**) and had not conformed with the traffic pattern that the PA28 pilot had established (**CF3**). Members noted that the BE24 pilot had, at the point of achieving visual contact with the PA28, initiated a right-hand turn which members felt to have been unwise, as such an action could have put that aircraft in confliction with other circuit or joining traffic. The Board agreed that, ultimately, the BE24 pilot had not sighted the PA28 until the pilot of that aircraft had called out (**CF6**).

In reviewing the contribution by the Tatenhill Air/Ground Operator, members thanked them for their report and noted that they had passed positive Traffic Information to the BE24 pilot regarding the circuit traffic in place. The Board felt that the call had paid regard to the status of the 'as yet to depart' aircraft and had been appropriate regarding the PA28. The Board felt that the AGO had acted appropriately.

Members commented that the AIP entry for Tatenhill states that '*Fixed wing to make standard overhead join, helicopters approach north of centreline'* and the BE24 pilot had actually joined from a wide base leg, compounding the confusion for the PA28 pilot. The Board was keen to emphasise that the use of poor RT quality had made an instrumental contribution to this event and wished to stress that situational awareness for all in the circuit is highly dependent on accurate and timely calls by all involved. Specifically, they felt that inaccurate position and intention reporting by the BE24 pilot had magnified the difficulty experienced by the PA28 in visually acquiring the BE24.

Concluding their discussion, members noted that, although the PA28 pilot initially had had an inaccurate mental model as to the position of the BE24, they had gained visual contact and had alerted the BE24 pilot as to their presence at the point that that pilot had aimed to turn left across their path. Members agreed that safety had been much reduced and there had been a risk of collision (**CF8**) determining this event to have carried a Risk Category B.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2025145			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Flight Elements			
	• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance			
1	Human Factors	• Use of policy/Procedures	Events involving the use of the relevant policy or procedures by flight crew	Regulations and/or procedures not complied with
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
2	Human Factors	• Accuracy of Communication	Events involving flight crew using inaccurate communication - wrong or incomplete information provided	Ineffective communication of intentions
3	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Environment	Events involving flight crew not to appropriately monitoring the environment	Did not avoid/conform with the pattern of traffic already formed
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
4	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
5	Human Factors	• Understanding/ Comprehension	Events involving flight crew that did not understand or comprehend a situation or instruction	Pilot did not assimilate conflict information
	• See and Avoid			
6	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
7	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft
	• Outcome Events			
8	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

Degree of Risk: B.

Safety Barrier Assessment[3]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance was assessed as **partially effective** because the BE24 had made a non-standard join to the visual circuit at Tatenhill.

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the BE24 pilot had not been clear in their joining call and had not conformed with the pattern of traffic established by the PA28 pilot within the circuit.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the PA28 pilot had inaccurate situational awareness on the position of the BE24, and the BE24 pilot had not assimilated the conflict information on traffic within the circuit.

[3] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.

See and Avoid were assessed as **partially effective** because the BE24 pilot had not seen the PA28 until CPA and the PA28 pilot had been concerned by the proximity of the BE24.