AIRPROX REPORT No 2025142

Date: 05 Jul 2025 Time: 1636Z Position: 5203N 00056W Location: 3.5NM ESE Silverstone

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	AW139	EC155
Operator	Civ Comm	Civ Comm
Airspace	RA(T)	RA(T)
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Basic	Basic
Provider	Silverstone Tower	Silverstone Tower
Altitude/FL	A016	A013
Transponder	A, C, S+	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	White, blue	Grey
Lighting	Pulse, strobe, nav	Landing, taxy, nav, anti-cols, strobe
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	1700ft	1500ft
Altimeter	QNH	QNH
Heading	360°	197°
Speed	110kt	110kt
ACAS/TAS	TCAS II	TCAS II
Alert	TA	TA
Separation at CPA		
Reported	200ft V/0m H	400ft V/0m H
Recorded	300ft V/<0.1NM H	



THE AW139 PILOT reports that their aircraft joined the Silverstone RA(T) via Deanshanger at 1700ft QNH. It had been difficult to call their position at Deanshanger due to multiple radio calls, but they had been cleared to enter the RA(T) via Deanshanger, with the next call [at] Deanshanger as requested by ATC.

They called "*Past Deanshanger, approaching Wicken hold*". After then being told to hold back at Deanshanger, they started to turn back towards Deanshanger. The clearance was then amended to "*Hold at Wicken at 1700ft*". They confirmed that they were already at 1700ft and then commenced the hold, being told they would be No.4. After one hold, the Pilot Flying (PF) and Pilot Monitoring (PM)] both called visual on an AS355 helicopter joining from the south-west. They expected that aircraft to fall-in behind them in the hold, but it then seemed to fly through the hold to the eastern side of Wicken. As both pilots watched the AS355 to try to assess the pilot's intentions, the PF glanced to the left and then asked the PM, "*Did you see that?*" The PM replied that they had not seen anything and asked what it was. The PF informed them that they had just overflown an EC155 egressing the RA(T) 200ft below at 1500ft QNH. The crew then focussed back on the AS355 which descended through their level. [The AW139] was then cleared to join behind the AS355 and proceeded to Silverstone without further incident.

The AW139 vortex-wake category led to a reduction to 1700ft for the hold to deconflict other holding traffic. Although this resolved the effect on other joining traffic, it meant that the height deconfliction from outbound traffic was then reduced from 500ft to 200ft separation.

[The pilot of the AW139] has spoken to one of the [EC155] pilots who [reportedly] said that they had seen [the AW139] but, if they had not been height-deconflicted, it would have been too late to have done anything about it.

[The pilot of the AW139] has spoken to the pilot [of the AS355] and mentioned that they had expected them to have joined to the west of the wood at Wicken and that they had both sets of eyes on the AS355 trying to ascertain their intentions. [Reportedly, the pilot of the AS355] could not recollect if they did or did not see [the AW139] as it had been a long weekend!

[After a review of FlightRadar24, the AS355 pilot had apparently] entered a descent just prior to the Wicken hold and [the AW139] passed 150ft below and to the side of it. They were visual with the AS355 throughout, and no risk of collision had existed, but they used a lot of capacity keeping their eyes on it. [The pilot of the AW139 commented that contributory factors had been:] workload, RT saturation and the expected procedures not followed by conflicting traffic. [The pilot of the AW139 opined that,] hopefully, some of the procedures can be tweaked to increase safety at next year's event.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

THE EC155 PILOT reports that they had been cleared to leave the RA(T) via Deanshanger (from Wicken as per the brief) at 1500ft. They saw the AW139 at the very last-minute pass over them in the opposite direction. They did not have any time to react and were surprised at the proximity of the aircraft.

[The pilot of the EC155 commented that] they were aware of other helicopters around the Wicken hold and had them on TCAS and [a screen displaying traffic with ADS-B-out data].

[The pilot of the EC155 opined that] the planned separation of larger twins at 1700ft in the hold and helicopters leaving the RA(T) at 1500ft had not been acceptable and they had been a little surprised at that on the brief. Also, departing aircraft being routed to leave at the same points as entering aircraft was a poor idea. Exiting at any point in the RA(T) rather than at the entry points would have eased conflict. The ATIS was also very hit-and-miss with the METAR not being updated which could have caused confusion regarding the correct QNH to be used.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE AS355 PILOT (as a witness) reports that they departed, as cleared, before turning left towards the Silverstone RA(T), and were transferred to Silverstone Tower to obtain a clearance. They were asked to join and hold at Stowe, which they did, and they flew that at 2000ft as per the procedure. They did one full hold and then were cleared to join via Wicken on a left-base for RW21. Once on finals, they were cleared to a pad and they picked-up their passengers.

In terms of witnessing other helicopters, they do recall seeing the AW139 and noted its lower altitude as per the procedure. There was no conflict. They do not recall seeing the EC155, but outbound aircraft were supposed to be lower so, again, there were no conflicts or concerns. [The pilot of the AS355 commented that] they were very clear of their intentions, procedures and routeing.

THE SILVERSTONE TOWER CONTROLLER reports that the ADC service was divided into TWR and PAD. TWR was responsible for the RA(T), the visual holds and for sequencing the inbound helicopters with the outbound helicopters after handover from PAD until exiting the RA(T). PAD was responsible for traffic on final, landing clearances and gates and departures until handed over to TWR (usually on crossing the heliport boundary).

This Airprox was notified to them by the ATS Manager on 17 July 2025 following an email from UKAB. No reports or comments were made by either pilot involved at the time. Consequently, they have no notes on the reported incident and cannot recall any details. However, they can state that, at 1636, the heliport would have been busy with inbound and outbound helicopters. [The pilots of] all helicopters were in receipt of a Basic Service. The weather conditions were such that all the helicopters were able to operate at the published altitudes.

Factual Background

An AIC for the establishment of Silverstone RA(T) (AIC M 114/2025) provided the following details:

5. Subject to paragraph 6, between 0700 and 2000 hours on each of the three days between 04 July and ending 06 July 2025, no aircraft is to fly below 3500 FT AMSL within the area [shown in Figure 1 below].

6. Paragraph 5 does not apply to any aircraft operating with the permission of the ATCU at Silverstone Heliport who may be contacted on Channel 123.330.

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8. A temporary ATZ will also be established at Silverstone Heliport and will be notified by NOTAM.

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10. Pilots not participating in activities at Silverstone are warned that the area surrounding the Restricted Area (Temporary) will be subject to Intense Aerial Activity due to traffic routing around, to and from the restricted airspace. This traffic may include rotary-wing, fixed-wing and aircraft formations. Pilots of all aircraft operating in the vicinity of the Silverstone and Turweston Restricted Area (Temporary) must keep a good lookout for conflicting traffic which may be flying on a multiplicity of flight paths.



Figure 1 – Silverstone RA(T)

A NOTAM (L3392/25) for the establishment of a temporary ATZ at Silverstone provided the following details:

L3392/25

Q) EGTT/QAZCA/IV/NBO/AE/000/025/5203N00103W003

A) EGBV B) FROM: 25/07/03 09:00 TO: 25/07/07 12:00

E) FOR THE PURPOSES OF RULE 11 OF THE RULES OF THE AIR REGULATIONS 2015 A TEMPORARY ATZ IS ESTABLISHED WI AREA BOUNDED BY 520411N 0010407W THEN CLOCKWISE ARC OF A CIRCLE RADIUS 2NM CENTRED 520351N 0010056W TO 520207N 0010232W THEN ANTI CLOCKWISE ARC OF A CIRCLE RADIUS 2NM CENTRED 520227N 0010544W TO 520411N 0010407W (SILVERSTONE RACING CIRCUIT)

SFC 2000FT AGL, 2500FT AMSL. ATC SERVICE PROVIDED.

CTC SILVERSTONE TWR FREQ 123.330 AND SILVERSTONE PAD FREQ 130.280.

DESIGNATED OPERATIONAL COVERAGE 10NM SFC-3000FT.

The weather at Cranfield aerodrome was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGTC 051620Z 23018KT 9999 SCT029 BKN038 22/15 Q1010
METAR EGTC 051650Z 23020KT 9999 SCT032 BKN045 22/14 Q1010
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Analysis and Investigation

Silverstone Unit Investigation

Background

This incident occurred on the Saturday of the Formula 1 British Grand Prix meeting at Silverstone Motor Racing Circuit where a temporary licensed heliport with an ATC unit was established to

support a large number of public transport helicopters transporting passengers to and from the event. Restricted Airspace (Temporary) and an ATZ were established: promulgated by AIC and NOTAM respectively.

There were two passenger terminals served by six pads (4 to 9) with an additional 3 pads (1-3) available during busy periods. Two visual holds were established at Wicken (east) and Bucknell (north-west). The standard altitude for the holds was 2000ft Silverstone QNH with 'Small' [wake turbulence category] helicopters holding at 1700ft Silverstone QNH to avoid wake turbulence issues in the holds.

The Pilot Notes state:

> Due to RTF loading it may not be possible for pilots and ATC to agree on a level of service to be provided. Where a service level has not be agreed pilots will, by default, be provided with a Basic Service.
>
> […]
>
> VRPs and Visual Holds
>
> Helicopters will enter the RA(T) via either Deanshanger or Wappenham VRPs. Visual holds are established, within the RA(T) at Wicken, Bucknell and Stowe. The holds are righthand at 2000ft QNH. Helicopters may be required to enter these visual holds in order to sequence the traffic. The maximum number of helicopters permitted in each of the visual holds is six.
>
> Helicopters in the 'Small' wake turbulence category [such as the AW139] will join and hold, if required, at 1700ft QNH. This removes any wake turbulence issues in the holds. Standard wake turbulence spacing will be applied between 'Small' and 'Light' helicopters [such as the EC155 and also the AS355] between the hold and landing together with departures.
>
> When joining from the visual hold do not descend to 1500ft QNH until established on the inbound leg. Caution: 'Small' wake turbulence category helicopters may be holding at 1700ft QNH.

Investigation

Information available was the RT recording and discussion with the ATCO providing TWR service. This Airprox was notified to the Unit on 16th July 2025. The ATCO providing the TWR service was contacted, and they submitted an MOR. No notification [of an Airprox] was made at the time nor during the event.

The incident took place during the 'departure' phase on Qualifying Day for the Formula 1 British Grand Prix. Parking was not available at the temporary heliport, therefore, having dropped passengers during the 'arrival' phase, helicopter pilots had to depart and park at Turweston Aerodrome, Bicester Heliport or their feeder site to wait for their passengers.

There were 344 movements on Saturday 5th July. The majority of the movements during the arrival phase took place between 1000 and 1200 hours and the departure phase movement between 1500 and 1700 hours. At the time of this reported incident the RT loading on the TWR frequency was high with periods of constant transmissions by ATC and helicopter pilots. The RT recording of the TWR channel was reviewed. The TWR ATCO's workload was assessed as high with inbound and outbound traffic, some inbound helicopters were required to hold for capacity reasons or passengers not being ready.

Timeline (pertinent transmissions involving the Airprox helicopters):

1629:23 [AW139 C/S] established contact with the TWR to join via Deanshanger at 1700ft QNH and was told to report at Deanshanger.

1632:52 [EC155 C/S] called ready [on the ground] on PAD and was cleared for takeoff.

1633:34 [AW139 C/S] reported approaching Wicken with TWR.

1633:46 TWR told [AW139 C/S] to hold at Wicken.

1633:55 [AW139 C/S] reported at Wicken at 1700ft.

1634:06 PAD transferred [EC155 C/S] to TWR.

1634:15 [EC155 C/S] checked in with TWR. TWR replied with "*report leaving*".

1634:38 [AW139 C/S] reported holding at Wicken at 1700ft.

1636:42 TWR told [AW139 C/S] to follow the AS355 leaving the hold.

1637:22 [EC155 C/S] reported leaving the frequency.

No reference was made to an Airprox on the TWR frequency.

The PAD channel recording was checked for the period that [AW139 C/S] was on that channel and no comment on an incident, nor any mention of an Airprox, was made.

ATCO (TWR)

The ATCO stated that the frequency would have been busy during the reported time, with helicopters inbound to collect passengers after the conclusion of the qualifying session. The two visual holds were in use as helicopters were inbound before their passengers had arrived at the heliport. Having been informed of the Airprox 13 days after the event, they had no recollection of the events and, as no notification was made during the event, they had no notes, and an MOR was not submitted within the required timeframe. An MOR was submitted upon being notified of the Airprox [by the UKAB].

Conclusion

There were no Silverstone TWR elements to this incident: the pilots were operating under VFR in Class G airspace and responsible for their own separation. To overcome wake turbulence issues with 'Small' and 'Light' helicopters in the visual holds, 'Small' helicopters were required to hold at 1700ft beneath the 'Lights' at 2000ft. This reduced the altitude difference between an inbound 'Small' routeing via Deanshanger and Wicken and an outbound 'Light' to 200ft rather than the standard 500ft. At the time the procedures were designed, there were only two AW139s booked for this event. Three weeks before the event, this had increased to seven AW139s and an S92, all operating multiple flights. The altitude difference of 200ft between inbound 'Small' helicopters and outbound helicopters may have caused the AW139 pilots some surprise when they may have been expecting the usual 500ft at such events.



Figure 2 – An extract from the Silverstone Pilot's Briefing document.

Changes for 2026

Reviewing this incident highlighted that, whilst deconflicting 'Small' and 'Light' helicopters when inbound and within the visual holds, the proximity of the outbound routeing (at 1500ft) via Deanshanger [past] the Wicken hold (with 'Small' helicopters holding at 1700ft) had been overlooked. Although this was not a wake turbulence incident, there remained a possibility for this to have occurred with the present routeings. As a result of this incident, the airspace and routeings have been reviewed. In 2026, there will be one RA(T) protecting both Silverstone and Turweston traffic. The routes will be redrawn to avoid inbound and outbound helicopters tracking close to each other.

An approved Flight Information Display will be introduced during 2026. This will be able to display temporary airspace and enable ATC to monitor track-keeping and assist in identifying traffic.

CAA ATSI

ATSI has reviewed all the reports, the radar replay and RT recordings. The frequency was occupied almost continuously throughout this period and, for the majority of the time, the controller was dealing with calls from the pilots of inbound aircraft and, occasionally, outbound aircraft. No Traffic Information was heard to have been passed to any outbound pilots on traffic routeing to, or actually in, the holding area during this period, only to pilots of inbound aircraft on which helicopter they were to follow in the sequence.

As per the Silverstone ATC investigation report, there appears to have been some deconfliction of inbounds and outbounds by a small margin in the vertical plane, but no geographical/lateral deconfliction. It is understood that this will be rectified next year. The pilot of the EC155 passed through the holding area, albeit remaining 200ft below the minimum holding altitude (VFR), and into proximity with the AW139 with no Traffic Information having been passed to either pilot.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and both aircraft could be positively identified from Mode S data (Figure 3) and were displayed flying at Flight Levels. An appropriate conversion factor was used to calculate their respective altitudes. The pilot of the EC155 kindly supplied GPS track data for their flight. The diagram was constructed and the separation determined by combining the data sources.



Figure 3 – The traffic situation at 1636:02

CPA was determined to have occurred between the radar sweeps at 1635:58 and 1636:02 (Figures 4 and 5).



Figure 4 - 1635:58



Figure 5 - 1636:02



Figure 6 – The location of the ATZ and RA(T)



Figure 7 – The relative positions of the helicopters at CPA

The AW139 and EC155 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the AW139 pilot was required to give way to the EC155.[2]

Summary

An Airprox was reported when an AW139 and an EC155 flew into proximity 3.5NM east-southeast of Silverstone at 1636Z on Saturday 5th July 2025. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC and in receipt of a Basic Service from Silverstone Tower.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, GPS track data for the flight of the EC155, a report from the air traffic controller involved and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the pilot of the AW139. Members agreed that, with very high occupancy of the Silverstone Tower frequency, it would not be reasonable to have expected them to have been able to have maintained a detailed mental model of the positions of all other aircraft in the area. Rather, whilst they waited to receive their clearance to leave the Wicken hold and begin their approach to the Silverstone heliport, it would be more reasonable to expect them to have only assimilated information pertaining to other traffic in the Wicken hold. It was noted that both pilots in the AW139 had subsequently visually acquired the AS355, whose pilot had been cleared from the southerly hold at Stowe to commence their approach to Silverstone. Members appreciated that the AW139 pilot had expected the AS355 pilot to have taken a more northerly route (one that would have taken it with the flow of traffic at the western side of the Wicken hold). However, their transit of the Wicken hold area had been flown further to the east, with a north-easterly track, that had been in opposition to the flow of the traffic in the hold and had brought them into proximity with the AW139 that had been tracking southwards at that moment. Members agreed that the acquisition of the AS355 had been a distraction to the AW139 crew (**CF5**) and they had spent some moments assessing the safest course of action.

It was noted that the TCAS equipment fitted to the AW139 had provided a Traffic Alert (**CF4**), however, given the level of traffic in the area, members agreed that it had been prudent to have maintained a high degree of attention outside the cockpit window for collision avoidance. As such, members suggested that the AW139 pilot may not have assimilated that the TCAS had alerted to the presence of the EC155 converging from their right and, consequently, agreed that the AW139 pilot had not had situational awareness of the EC155 until the moment of CPA (**CF3**). It was further agreed that there had been no time for the pilot of the AW139 to have taken any avoiding action and that that effectively constituted a non-sighting (**CF6**).

Members next turned their attention to the actions of the pilot of the EC155. It was agreed that, as had been the case with the AW139 pilot, it would not have been reasonable to have expected them to have gathered specific situational awareness of all the helicopters in the vicinity. Nevertheless, members noted that they reported that they had been aware of other helicopters around the Wicken hold and that they had received a TCAS Traffic Alert (**CF4**). Notwithstanding, given that the pilot of the EC155 had also reported that they had seen the AW139 'at the very last-minute pass over them' and that 'they did not have any time to react', members agreed that they had not gathered situational awareness of the AW139 until that moment (**CF3**). Members agreed that, without there having been any time to have taken avoiding action, the sighting had effectively been a non-sighting (**CF6**).

Members next considered the actions of the Silverstone controller, and it was noted that the RT loading of the Tower frequency had been particularly high. Members appreciated that the Airprox had occurred outside the Silverstone ATZ and the pilots involved had been in receipt of a Basic Service. An Advisor

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[2] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

with particular experience of airspace and air traffic management explained to members that the three helicopters involved in this encounter were 'aerodrome traffic' under the definition provided in UK (EU) 923/2012 Article 2(9), viz:

> 'All traffic on the manoeuvring area of an aerodrome and all aircraft flying in the vicinity of an aerodrome. An aircraft operating in the vicinity of an aerodrome includes but is not limited to aircraft entering or leaving an aerodrome traffic circuit'.

The Advisor explained further that, as 'aerodrome traffic', even when outside the ATZ, it would be reasonable to suggest that the pilots may have had the expectation of receiving Traffic Information in this scenario (as the ATCO should have known that the aircraft were proximate) and to have been issued a warning if the ATCO had considered that a definite risk of collision had existed. Indeed, CAP 493 (Manual of Air Traffic Services - Part 1, Section 2, Ch.1, para. 7A) states that:

> Traffic information and instructions shall be passed to aircraft on any occasion that a controller considers it necessary in the interests of safety, or when requested by a pilot. In particular, Aerodrome Control shall provide:
>
> (1) generic traffic information to enable VFR pilots to safely integrate their flight with other aircraft;
>
> (2) specific traffic information appropriate to the stage of flight and risk of collision;
>
> (3) timely instructions as necessary to prevent collisions and to enable safe, orderly and expeditious flight within and in the vicinity of the ATZ.

Notwithstanding, the Advisor also posed the question of whether it had been reasonable to have expected the ATCO to have provided Traffic Information in this particular case. Some members suggested that it may not have been reasonable given the high RT occupancy and high ATCO workload. It was agreed that, without the use of any surveillance equipment, the Silverstone controller had generic, rather than specific, situational awareness of the positions of the AW139 and EC155 (**CF2**).

Members next pondered the respective altitudes of the three helicopters being considered. It was noted that the Mode C data indicated that they had all flown at altitudes lower than the hold and transit altitudes as provided in the Silverstone Pilot's Briefing document. However, it was appreciated that the altitudes shown in this report have been corrected by reference to the QNH observed at Cranfield aerodrome and may not have been the same as the QNH as broadcasted by the Silverstone ATIS and in use by the pilots. It was noted that the procedure, as designed, and promulgated in the briefing document, had provided a vertical separation of just 200ft between a helicopter in the hold at Wicken (1700ft for the wake vortex category of the AW139) and a helicopter on the outbound route past the Wicken hold (the EC155 in this case). It occurred to members that such a separation could have been inadvertently eroded entirely by two pilots that had maintained their altitude in accordance with the altitude holding competency requirement of +/-100ft (Part-FCL Appendix 4 and replicated in UK CAA Standards Document 03(H)). It was also pointed out that the outbound route from the hold at Stowe had passed through the Wicken hold at 2000ft AMSL, the same altitude as helicopters in the 'light' wake vortex category orbiting in that hold. Members agreed that the prescribed routeings and altitudes had brought helicopters into proximity and had not provided sufficient vertical, or indeed, horizontal separation (**CF1**). The Board was heartened that the Silverstone Unit Investigation had already identified areas for improvements to be made prior to the 2026 event.

Members turned their attention to the matter of the risk of collision. It was appreciated that, at the moment of CPA, the separation between the helicopters had actually been greater than that provided for their respective routes in the Silverstone Pilot's Briefing document. Nevertheless, members agreed that the proximity had caused both pilots concern (**CF7**) and it was concluded that the design of the procedure had provided insufficient separation. It was also appreciated that the presence of the AS355 near the eastern side of the Wicken hold had caused a distraction to the AW139 pilot at a critical moment. Members concluded that the aforementioned factors had reduced safety margins but, ultimately, were satisfied that there had not been a risk of collision. The Board assigned Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2025142			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Ground Elements			
	• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance			
1	Organisational	• Aeronautical Information Services	An event involving the provision of Aeronautical Information	The Ground entity's regulations or procedures were inadequate
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
2	Contextual	• Traffic Management Information Action	An event involving traffic management information actions	The ground element had only generic, late, no or inaccurate Situational Awareness
	Flight Elements			
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
3	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
4	Contextual	• ACAS/TCAS TA	An event involving a genuine airborne collision avoidance system/traffic alert and collision avoidance system traffic advisory warning triggered	
	• See and Avoid			
5	Human Factors	• Distraction - Job Related	Events where flight crew are distracted for job related reasons	
6	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
7	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	~~Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement~~	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[3]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because the routeing for pilots departing the RA(T) brought their aircraft into proximity with those in the hold at Wicken.

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the Silverstone Tower controller had generic, rather than specific, situational awareness of the respective positions of the AW139 and EC155.

Flight Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because, essentially, neither pilot had situational awareness of the presence of the other aircraft until visually acquired.

[3] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.

See and Avoid were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had sighted the other aircraft until the moment of CPA.