AIRPROX REPORT No 2025139

Date: 07 Jul 2025 Time: 1059Z Position: 5606N 00514W Location: Lachlan Bay

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Cessna T206	ASH31
Operator	Civ FW	Civ Gld
Airspace	Argyll CTA	Argyll CTA
Class	E (+TMZ)	E (+TMZ)
Rules	IFR	VFR
Service	Radar Control	None
Provider	Prestwick	(Prestwick)
Altitude/FL	FL084	FL082
Transponder	A, C, S+	A, C, S+
Reported		
Colours	White/black	White
Lighting	Strobes	Not fitted
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	7280ft (GPS)	8000-8500ft
Altimeter	QNH (1013hPa)	QNH (NK hPa)
Heading	149°	northeast
Speed	100kt	~60kt
ACAS/TAS	TAS	FLARM
Alert	TA	None
Separation at CPA		
Reported	300ft V/0.4NM H	200ft V/0.5NM H
Recorded	200ft V/0.3NM H	



THE PRESTWICK CONTROLLER reports [T206 C/S] was given a joining clearance on track to FYNER. [ASH31 C/S] was a glider maintaining a listening watch on the frequency operating in Class E airspace under VFR. [T206 C/S] was given Traffic Information on the glider and asked if they needed vectors to avoid the traffic. They advised that they were happy to continue. The Traffic Information was updated along with a further question of whether they needed a heading to avoid, which was declined. When approximately 5-10 miles between the two aircraft, further Traffic Information was passed and the pilot requested a left turn to avoid. This was approved as they were under Radar Control. They believe they requested left 20° which the controller deemed sufficient to avoid the glider as it was manoeuvring in a small area at that time. The [T206] appeared to be turning very slowly and was becoming closer in proximity to the glider. Further Traffic Information was passed as the glider appeared to be tracking north towards the [T206]. At this point (STCA was red) they asked the [T206] pilot if they were visual to which they said "*negative*". Both aircraft were at FL080 so the controller then deemed there to be a collision risk and gave an avoiding action turn to the left with Traffic Information. They had also passed generic Traffic Information to the glider [pilot] as they had been identified using Mode S. To their recollection they did this twice. [T206 C/S] did not take the avoiding action turn and advised that they had seen the aircraft and passed behind. The glider pilot also called visual with the traffic.

THE T206 PILOT reports they frequently fly VFR in Alpine regions, where the high density of glider activity places increased demands on visual traffic awareness. The principle of "see and avoid" is of central importance under these conditions. Already during departure, [departure airfield] Tower advised them of glider activity "south of Oban", which prompted them to initially proceed 11NM southwest before turning onto their planned southeasterly course. During the climb, a target first appeared on the Garmin Traffic Advisory System (TAS), which graphically displays traffic including relative altitude. Additionally, a traffic advisory was issued by the controller, who alerted both [pilots] to each other. This coordinated approach proved helpful in their view. According to the TAS, the glider showed significant altitude variations. They were in a steady climb on a stable heading. During the approach, the target remained

displayed in white, indicating no immediate conflict. Only when it passed abeam did the symbol briefly change to yellow, indicating relative proximity but not an imminent hazard. They saw the glider in the left 10 o'clock position about 300ft below and it passed to the north of them, on the left side, with an estimated horizontal distance of approximately 0.3-0.4NM. In their assessment, this situation did not constitute a hazardous proximity. The controller's Traffic Information was appropriate and professional in their view, especially considering that not all aircraft in that airspace can be assumed to carry TAS or similar systems. The avoidance recommendation issued by the controller to turn to the left was, [in retrospect,] not optimal (a turn to the right would have improved distance [at CPA]), likely due to the limited predictability of the glider's circling flightpath as well as possible radar delay.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

THE ASH31 PILOT reports listening out to Scottish Information and squawking 7000 on their Mode S transponder. They were heading up the east shore of Loch Fyne to the northeast at about 8000-8500ft AMSL with the altimeter set on Standard Pressure Setting, when they got a message from Scottish advising of an aircraft in the 12 o'clock at their level. They were not sure how precise the heading direction was given as there were at least two messages, one of which they did not read clearly. They acknowledged the call and immediately scanned ahead, searching for the aircraft ready to take avoiding action. They then heard what they presumed to be the [other pilot] say that they could see them on TCAS. That message modified their approach. It made no sense to vary their height or heading without a sighting, making things more difficult for the other [pilot] to reliably alter course to avoid them, so they held both steady while scanning ahead. Shortly after that, they had the aircraft visual in about the 9 o'clock position, about 1km away at a similar height and clearly passing comfortably to the rear.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

Factual Background

The weather at Glasgow Airport was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGPF 071120Z AUTO 28013KT 250V310 9999 BKN035 17/10 Q1014=
METAR EGPF 071050Z AUTO 29011KT 250V330 9999 FEW037 17/10 Q1014=

TAF EGPF 071055Z 0712/0812 29013KT 9999 FEW018 SCT028 TEMPO 0712/0718 30016G26KT PROB30
TEMPO 0712/0716 7000 RA -SHRA=
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Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

A review was made of the pilot and controller reports, the Scottish R/T transcript and area radar as follows:

From the moment the [T206] pilot came onto the Scottish frequency their track was taking them towards the area in which there were two gliders operating, one of which was [the ASH31]. Both [the T206] and [ASH31] rates of climb and actual levels were similar, meaning their levels were always within 100-200ft of each other whilst both in the climb.

The Prestwick controller provided frequent updates to the [T206] pilot and endeavoured (successfully) to have the [ASH31] pilot join them on the frequency (there was no requirement for the [ASH31] pilot to do so to operate VFR in that area). Despite the Traffic Information being passed by the controller on more than one occasion, and offers of assistance of a heading to avoid, the [T206] pilot continued to track towards [the ASH31] and effectively into proximity.

There was an anomaly in the report from the [T206] pilot. They appeared to have mis-remembered the sequence of RTF. In their report they stated that:

'*The avoidance recommendation issued by the controller to turn to the left was, [in retrospect,] not optimal (a turn to the right would have improved distance), ...*'

Whereas in fact earlier at 1058:10, the [T206] pilot was heard to say:

"[C/S] *er we suggest right thirty degrees to the left?*"

The controller replied,

"*yeah, heading is approved. Traffic now one o'clock at 2 miles, same level. Er heading, left twenty degrees to avoid*."

The [T206] pilot did not acknowledge. The controller then went on to issue their own avoiding action turn at 1058:40.

With the [T206] pilot having already indicated at a late stage that they wanted to turn to avoid the traffic, it was they who apparently suggested a left turn, although they mention both left and right in their transmission so it was confusing. A slight turn to the left was then observed to have commenced by 1058:30, taking [the T206] closer to [the ASH31], before then a slight turn to the right to take it behind [the ASH31]. It appeared [the T206] did not action the controller's suggested avoiding action to the left.

A right turn earlier to avoid would have been more appropriate, but the relative positions of the aircraft by then would have required an immediate rate one avoiding action turn by the [T206] pilot for it to have been effective.

According to CAP493, a controller is not required to separate IFR and VFR [traffic] in Class E airspace and with regards to traffic information:

b) to IFR flights: wherever practicable, pass traffic information and if requested by the pilot or when deemed necessary by the controller, suggest traffic avoidance advice on participating and non-participating VFR flights;

c) to VFR flights: provide traffic information in accordance with CAP 774 – UK Flight Information Services

The [ASH31] pilot was not originally on the same frequency, and the controller did well to resolve that.

The controller fulfilled the requirements of both CAP493 and CAP774 and worked hard to do so.

UKAB Secretariat

The T206 and ASH31 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the T206 pilot was required to give way to the ASH31.[2]

CAP493 (Manual of Air Traffic Services – Part 1), Section 1 (General), Chapter 2 (Flight Rules), paragraph 2 (Classification of Airspace) contains the following information with respect to Class E airspace:

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[2] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

Table 1: Classifications of Airspace Established in the UK FIRs

Class	Flight Rules	Aircraft Requirements	Minimum Services by ATC Unit
E	IFR and VFR	IFR flights to obtain ATC clearance before entry and comply with ATC instructions. VFR flights do not require clearance.	(a) Separate IFR flights from other IFR flights;
			(b) to IFR flights: wherever practicable, pass traffic information and if requested by the pilot or when deemed necessary by the controller, suggest traffic avoidance advice on participating and non-participating VFR flights; (c) to VFR flights: provide traffic information in accordance with CAP 774 – UK Flight Information Services

NATS Ltd Occurrence Investigation

Summary

The PC Westcoast controller reported an Airprox between [T206 C/S] operating IFR, and [ASH31 C/S], a glider maintaining a listening watch on the frequency operating in Class E airspace, VFR. The controller, on two occasions, issued Traffic Information to [T206 C/S] on the glider and asked the pilot whether they needed vectors to avoid the traffic. The pilot stated they were happy to continue on both occasions. When approximately 5-10 miles between the two aircraft, further Traffic Information was passed and the pilot requested a left turn to avoid, which was approved. Further Traffic Information was passed as the glider appeared to be tracking north towards [T206 C/S]. Following red STCA activation, the controller deemed there to be a collision risk therefore suggested avoiding action and Traffic Information to [T206 C/S]. Both pilots then reported visual.

Description and Investigation

Information available to the investigation included:

• CA4114 from the Westcoast controller (NATS Ref No: OCC314422)
• NATS4118 Initial Watch Management Investigation Report (NATS Ref No: OCC314435)

The Westcoast sector was being operated by a single controller, in a combined tactical and planner role. [T206 C/S] was a Cessna 206 Stationair from [departure airfield] to [destination airfield], IFR.

Operating in the vicinity of waypoint FYNER at various levels (in class E airspace) was glider [ASH31 C/S] along with other glider traffic.

The controller explained, '…*the glider concerned* ([ASH31 C/S]) *had been in the airway and surrounding area before the incident. They were above FL100 and not listening on frequency (which they are allowed to do) in the vicinity of FYNER when I had multiple EGPH inbounds and 1 x Glasgow inbound. The PH inbounds were higher and not too much of a concern in the end. The Glasgow inbound ended up underneath the traffic but very close laterally*'.

'*I asked another glider pilot on the frequency if they knew the pilot and briefly explained that I knew they were entitled to be there, but it may have some benefit if they were maintaining a listening watch whilst flying in Class E airspace where there are multiple IFR inbounds. The pilot of [ASH31 C/S] called not long after this conversation*'.



Figure 1

The pilot of [T206 C/S] reported in with the controller at 1052:13 (all times in this report are UTC) routeing to FYNER and, after the controller had arranged for the flight plan to be activated, they agreed a Basic Service with the pilot. A joining clearance was then issued to the pilot of [T206 C/S], on track to FYNER in the climb to FL130 which was read back by the pilot. The location of [T206 C/S] at this time is shown in Figure 1.

In Figure 1, [ASH31 C/S] was descending through FL80, 20.5NM southeast of [T206 C/S]. The aircraft to the north of [ASH31 C/S], at FL106 was another glider ([C/S]) the pilot of which was maintaining a listening watch on the frequency.

Almost immediately after issuing the joining clearance to the pilot of [T206 C/S], the controller passed Traffic Information to them, "*In the airway there's two gliders operating in the airway just to the west of FYNER. I'll give you further Traffic Information as you get a bit nearer*".

As the gliders were operating in Class E airspace, there was no separation requirement between them and IFR traffic such as [T206 C/S], as was prescribed in the UK AIP, ENR 1.4, paragraph 2.5. The UK AIP also prescribed, in terms of IFR traffic in Class E airspace, '*Whenever practicable, Traffic Information is provided on VFR flights and if requested by the pilot or if deemed necessary by the controller, traffic avoidance advice will be suggested*'.

At 1054:26 the pilot of [T206 C/S] was re-cleared to join controlled airspace on track to DCS. This was a right turn of around 10°. The controller changed the Service with [T206 C/S] at 1055:59 to Radar Control and passed further information on the glider traffic, "*There is traffic in your twelve o'clock at eight miles, tracking northeast bound, so right to left, they're indicating flight level seven two at this time, unverified and climbing*". The pilot responded that they were "*looking out*" and the controller added, "*It is VFR traffic in the airway, Sir*".

The controller then made two attempts to blind call the pilot of [ASH31 C/S] and the pilot responded on the second attempt, at 1056:50 and was passed Traffic Information on [T206 C/S]. The pilot responded, "*Copied that, to the northwest I'll be sitting here and climbing for a couple of minutes*". Low level Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA) activated between [T206 C/S] and [ASH31 C/S] at 1056:51 when the aircraft were 5.6NM apart.

The controller then passed further Traffic Information to the pilot of [T206 C/S] and asked the pilot if they "*needed a heading to avoid*?". The pilot of [T206 C/S] responded, "*No, negative, we have him on TCAS*". The controller confirmed it was glider traffic in the airway which was maintaining a listening watch on frequency.



Figure 2

The controller's transmission ceased at 1057:26 and the relative locations of both aircraft at this time are shown in Figure 2.

At 1057:41 the controller updated the Traffic Information to the pilot of [T206 C/S] and the pilot responded, "*We're looking out*".

The controller then passed Traffic Information to the pilot of [ASH31 C/S] who responded, "*Copied that*". The aircraft were 3.8NM apart at this time, at the same level. The pilot of [ASH31 C/S] then turned onto a northerly track, back towards [T206 C/S].

Figure 3

The controller then answered a telephone call from Inverness. Whilst the controller was in the call, at 1058:10, the pilot of [T206 C/S] requested, "*right thirty degrees to the left*?" and the controller responded that the heading was approved and passed further Traffic Information. The controller ended their transmission with, "…*heading left twenty degrees to avoid*". The locations of the aircraft at this time are shown in Figure 3.

Red STCA activated between both aircraft at the end of this transmission at 1058:23 when they were 1.8NM apart.

At 1058:40 the controller transmitted to the pilot of [T206 C/S], "*Avoiding action. Suggested. Turn left onto heading zero four zero degrees to avoid, that traffic is in your twelve o'clock now at the same level. Are you visual Sir*?". The pilot responded that they were visual, had the traffic in sight and "*just passing*". The controller asked if they were happy to proceed own navigation with that traffic in mind and the pilot responded they were. The controller then passed Traffic Information to the pilot of [ASH31 C/S] and informed them [T206 C/S] had them in sight. The pilot responded, "*Had him visual, he's passed by behind me*".

During these transmissions the pilot of [T206 C/S] commenced a twenty-degree left turn at 1058:43. No other avoidance manoeuvre was observed by either pilot during this incident.



Figure 4

The closest point of approach between [T206 C/S] and [ASH31 C/S] also occurred during this R/T exchange, at 1059:04, and was recorded on Multi-Track radar as 0.3NM and 200ft as shown in Figure 4.

The [controller report] detailed that the controller, '…*stated that* [they] *thought that the 2 aircraft were going to collide because they were not in sight of each other and the radar returns were becoming very close,* [they] *decided to suggest avoiding action even though the pilot had initially declined headings to avoid*'. For that reason, the controller reported this event as an Airprox.

Conclusions and RAT Assessment

The Airprox occurred when the Westcoast controller considered that the relative positions and speeds of [T206 C/S] and VFR glider traffic in Class E airspace, [ASH31 C/S], were such that their safety may have been compromised.

The Closest Point of Approach occurred at 1059:04 and was recorded on Multi-Track Radar as 0.3NM and 200ft. There was no prescribed separation requirement between [T206 C/S] and [ASH31 C/S] as the latter was VFR in Class E airspace, and [T206 C/S] was IFR.

Several times prior to the closest point of approach the controller passed Traffic Information to both of the involved pilots, asked the pilot of [T206 C/S] if they required an avoidance heading and subsequently passed suggested avoiding action to the pilot of [T206 C/S] when they became concerned about the proximity of both aircraft.

Comments

BGA

The Westcoast controller is to be commended for going out of their way to contact the ASH31 pilot, and for giving both pilots timely, plentiful Traffic Information.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Cessna T206 and an ASH31 flew into proximity overhead Lachlan Bay at 1059Z on Monday 7th July 2025. Both pilots were operating in VMC in Class E airspace, the Cessna T206 pilot under IFR in receipt of a Radar Control Service from Prestwick and the ASH31 pilot under VFR, listening out on the same Prestwick frequency.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, GPS data, a report from the air traffic controller involved and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first discussed the pilots' actions and commended the ASH31 pilot for their cooperation with the controller's request to change to the controlling frequency. Members noted that it had been fortunate the ASH31 pilot had been the holder of an FRTOL or they would not have been permitted to communicate on a frequency other than those allocated to gliding. The controller had passed Traffic Information to the T206 pilot on a number of occasions and had suggested a turn direction for avoiding action but the T206 pilot had been satisfied that their TAS-derived situational awareness (**CF5**) had been sufficient to allow them to safely pass the ASH31. Members noted that the ASH31 pilot had been operating under VFR in Class E (+TMZ) airspace and could have changed their course at any time and without reference to the controller, which they had in fact done some 1½min before CPA. Members agreed that, initially without visual contact with the ASH31, the T206 pilot may have been better served by taking a turn or adjusting their level to remain clear of both the ASH31 and its potential for no-notice manoeuvre. Members spent some time discussing the application of a Radar Control Service to a pilot operating under IFR in Class E airspace and how that might be carried out in the presence of unknown VFR traffic in the same airspace. On the one hand the T206 pilot was under Radar Control, normally a synonym for positive control of a pilot's heading and level, whilst on the other hand the MATS Part 1 (CAP493) states that IFR flights will only be separated from other IFR flights and for the controller to 'suggest traffic avoidance advice on participating and non-participating VFR flights' should they deem

it necessary or the IFR pilot requests such. Members also noted that the duty of care to prevent collision always applied and that this had no doubt influenced the controller in their actions. In the event, the T206 pilot had had sufficient situational awareness to pass safely behind the ASH31, albeit with little contingency allowance should the ASH31 pilot have elected to reverse course, and in such proximity as to cause the Prestwick controller concern (**CF3**). The Prestwick controller had been concerned by the reducing separation of the 2 aircraft (**CF1**), no doubt influenced to a degree by the activation of STCA (**CF2**). The Board commended the controller for their diligent actions and continued control as the situation had developed. The T206 pilot had seen the ASH31 at about CPA, effectively a non-sighting (**CF6**), and, although the ASH31 TAS had not been compatible with the T206 EC (**CF4**), the ASH31 pilot had seen the T206 a little before, but had in any case been satisfied that the T206 pilot had had sufficient situational awareness when they heard them report that "*we have him on TCAS*". Turning to risk, the Board members agreed unanimously that a Risk C applied, no risk of collision but safety reduced.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors: ,

	2025139			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Ground Elements			
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
1	Human Factors	• Expectation/ Assumption	Events involving an individual or a crew/ team acting on the basis of expectation or assumptions of a situation that is different from the reality	Concerned by the proximity of the aircraft
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
2	Technical	• STCA Warning	An event involving the triggering of a Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA) Warning	
	Flight Elements			
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
3	Human Factors	• Lack of Action	Events involving flight crew not taking any action at all when they should have done so	Pilot flew close enough to cause concern despite Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
4	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
5	Contextual	• Other warning system operation	An event involving a genuine warning from an airborne system other than TCAS.	
	• See and Avoid			
6	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[3]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

[3] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because the T206 pilot flew close enough to the ASH31 to cause the Prestwick controller concern.

See and Avoid were assessed as **partially effective** because the T206 pilot saw the ASH31 at about CPA, effectively a non-sighting.