


**AIRPROX REPORT No 2025137**

Date: 04 Jul 2025 Time: 1645Z Position: 5159N 00005E Location: IVO Nuthampstead

**PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB**

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Silvaire	C172
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Listening Out	Listening Out
Provider	SafetyCom	Stansted Approach
Altitude/FL	~1150ft	900ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	Blue, black	White
Lighting	None	Landing, taxi, nav, anti-col, beacon
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	NR
Altitude/FL	500ft	990ft
Altimeter	QFE (1001hPa)	QNH
Heading	045°	050°
Speed	60kt	110kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	SkyEcho
Alert	N/A	None
<b>Separation at CPA</b>		
Reported	<100ft V/0m H	"not seen"
Recorded	~250ft V/0.1NM H	



**THE SILVAIRE PILOT** reports that they were the handling pilot, flying from the left seat. They considered themselves to be a reasonably experienced GA pilot. Their passenger, also qualified, was also an experienced GA pilot. They were inbound to Nuthampstead after a 50min flight from the north-west. Having made the appropriate calls on SafetyCom, they joined overhead Nuthampstead from the west on the QFE (1001hPa). They entered the circuit from the deadside and joined the crosswind leg for RW23. It was their intention to conclude the flight with a late-downwind PFL. During their approach to the airfield, they responded to a blind call from one of two Eurofox pilots who had arrived an hour earlier and had been in the process of departing Nuthampstead on RW23. They were not aware of any other traffic to affect. As the [Eurofox pilot] climbed away, the [pilot of the Silvaire] made a further call confirming that they were visual with both [Eurofox] aircraft and there was no conflict. The call was acknowledged. At that point, their passenger commented on how difficult it was to acquire the two aircraft against the background, even though they knew where to look. Ironically, they also discussed how much easier it is to spot an aircraft that is higher and silhouetted against a bright sky.

At approximately 1645, they commenced the PFL from the downwind leg. They trimmed the aircraft for 'best glide' whilst initiating a shallow constant-aspect left turn towards their aiming point on RW23. Early in the descending turn, they suddenly found themselves looking straight down at the top of a white Cessna which had passed directly beneath them. It appeared from their rear-left quarter and quickly disappeared under the nose. They estimate the separation was less than 100ft.

Although they had not heard any radio calls, they initially thought that they had blundered into the circuit ahead of an aircraft that was already downwind for RW23. They abandoned the PFL and elected to follow the much faster Cessna as the number two to land. They continued to extend the downwind leg but, as the distance between them continued to increase, it soon became apparent that Nuthampstead was not the pilot's destination.

After they landed, ground witnesses told them that the Cessna had appeared at low-level from the south. Its arrival was not noticed until it had crossed the airfield boundary. The witnesses believed that a collision was imminent as they saw the Luscombe in a glide-descent and the Cessna rapidly converging from behind. Its height was estimated to be less than 500ft AGL throughout the transit of the airfield, and beyond.

[The pilot of the Silvaire opined that,] as they approached Nuthampstead, they may have been overly-focused on looking out for the two Eurofox aircraft climbing out from RW23. There had been two pairs of experienced eyes in the cockpit, and yet they still did not spot an aircraft heading in the opposite direction on a near reciprocal track to the departing aircraft. When they joined crosswind, the Cessna would have been on their right and, being at an unusually low level, it would have been below their line of sight due to the instrument panel and starboard cockpit structure. They have assumed that the Cessna pilot was not monitoring SafetyCom as there was plenty of radio traffic and it might have been a clue to indicate the position of several aircraft in the immediate vicinity. Although the [pilot of the Silvaire] had formed a mental picture of all the aircraft that they thought had been in the circuit, it did not mean that the picture was complete!

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

**THE C172 PILOT** reports that they had edged around the Stansted TMZ, staying well below the CTA. They had used Nuthampstead airfield as a good reference point along their route before [their approach to their destination]. The Stansted frequency had been busy and was used as a listening frequency when transiting the Stansted TMZ.

## Factual Background

The weather at Stansted was recorded as follows:

METAR EGSS 041650Z AUTO 25013KT 220V290 9999 NCD 26/05 Q1022

## Analysis and Investigation

### UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and both aircraft could be positively identified from Mode S data. Neither aircraft was observed by reference to ADS-B data sources.




Figure 1 – 1644:30




Figure 2 – 1644:34

CPA was determined to have occurred between the radar sweeps at 1644:30 and 1644:34 (Figures 1 and 2). The diagram was constructed from the radar data.

The Silvaire and C172 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.<sup>1</sup> An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.<sup>2</sup>

## Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Silvaire and a C172 flew into proximity in the vicinity of Nuthampstead at 1645Z on Friday 4<sup>th</sup> July 2025. The Silvaire pilot was operating under VFR in VMC listening-out on the SafetyCom frequency, and the C172 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC listening-out on the Stansted Approach frequency.

## **PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS**

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots and radar photographs/video recordings. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the pilot of the Silvaire. Members noted that they had heard a blind call from the pilot of a Eurofox and had visually acquired two Eurofox aircraft departing from Nuthampstead RW23. It was noted that their passenger had opined that the aircraft had been difficult to sight and some members wondered whether the task of acquiring the departing aircraft had overshadowed a more thorough visual scan of the surrounding area. Nevertheless, members agreed that the pilot of the Silvaire had not heard radio calls from any other pilots in the area and had not had situational awareness of the presence of the C172 (**CF4**). Members noted that the Silvaire had not been fitted with an additional electronic conspicuity device and suggested that, had one been fitted, it may have provided an alert and drawn their attention to the presence of the C172 approaching from the south. Members agreed that the pilot of the Silvaire had not sighted the C172 until the moment of CPA and that that effectively constituted a non-sighting (**CF6**).

Members next turned their attention to the actions of the pilot of the C172, and it was noted that they had tuned their radio to the Stansted Approach frequency. Members suggested that it had been unlikely that they would have gathered pertinent traffic information relevant to their particular route by listening-out on that frequency. Members next pondered the altitude at which the C172 pilot had selected to transit the area and noted that their height had been less than 500ft AGL as they had passed east abeam Nuthampstead. It was agreed that, at that altitude, it had been imperative to have maintained a very effective and thorough visual scan. Members agreed that the electronic conspicuity device fitted to the C172 would not have been expected to have alerted to the presence of the Silvaire (**CF5**) and that the pilot of the C172 had not had situational awareness of it (**CF4**). It was further agreed that the Silvaire had not been sighted by the C172 pilot at any stage during the encounter (**CF6**).

It was noted that the pilot of the C172 had been aware of the location of Nuthampstead (having planned to use it as '*a good reference point along their route*') but had flown at an altitude at which it would have been reasonable to have expected to have encountered circuit traffic. Members thoughts returned to the selection of an appropriate radio frequency and agreed that it would have been most prudent to have made a call on the SafetyCom frequency and to have announced their intentions for the benefit of other pilots in the vicinity. It was also agreed that they had not complied with the regulation to have conformed with, or avoided, the pattern of traffic at Nuthampstead (**CF1**). Members concluded that they had not made a sufficiently detailed plan to have met the needs of the situation (**CF2**) and had not avoided the pattern of traffic in operation (**CF3**).

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<sup>1</sup> (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

<sup>2</sup> (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

Members turned to the matter of the consideration of the risk of collision. It was agreed that neither pilot had had situational awareness of the other aircraft and the pilot of the C172 had not sighted the Silvaire. The pilot of the Silvaire had not sighted the C172 in time to have taken any avoiding action. It was therefore agreed that, with the Silvaire descending on the downwind leg as the C172 had flown underneath, it had been purely by chance that the separation had not been closer. Members agreed that there had been a serious risk of collision (**CF7**) and assigned Risk Category A to this event.

## **PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK**

### Contributory Factors:

	2025137			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
	<b>Flight Elements</b>			
	<b>• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance</b>			
1	Human Factors	• Use of policy/Procedures	Events involving the use of the relevant policy or procedures by flight crew	Regulations and/or procedures not complied with
	<b>• Tactical Planning and Execution</b>			
2	Human Factors	• Insufficient Decision/Plan	Events involving flight crew not making a sufficiently detailed decision or plan to meet the needs of the situation	
3	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Environment	Events involving flight crew not to appropriately monitoring the environment	Did not avoid/conform with the pattern of traffic already formed
	<b>• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action</b>			
4	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	<b>• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance</b>			
5	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
	<b>• See and Avoid</b>			
6	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
	<b>• Outcome Events</b>			
7	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

Degree of Risk: A.

### Safety Barrier Assessment<sup>3</sup>

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

#### **Flight Elements:**

**Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance** were assessed as **partially effective** because the pilot of the C172 had not complied with the regulation to have conformed with, or avoided, the pattern of traffic in operation at Nuthampstead.

**Tactical Planning and Execution** was assessed as **ineffective** because the pilot of the C172 had not made a sufficiently detailed plan for their flight in the vicinity of Nuthampstead.

<sup>3</sup> The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

**Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action** were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had situational awareness of the presence of the other aircraft.

**Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance** were assessed as **ineffective** because the electronic conspicuity device fitted to the C172 would not have been expected to have detected the presence of the Silvaire.

**See and Avoid** were assessed as **ineffective** because the pilot of the Silvaire had not sighted the C172 until the moment of CPA, and the C172 pilot had not seen the Silvaire.

