AIRPROX REPORT No 2025132

Date: 29 Jun 2025 Time: 1105Z Position: 5108N 00154E Location: 9NM north of Calais

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	BE200	Calidus
Operator	Coast Guard	Civ Helo
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Basic	Traffic
Provider	London Info	Lille
Altitude/FL	~3450ft	~2750ft
Transponder	A, C, S+	A, C, S+
Reported		
Colours	Red and White	Yellow
Lighting	Strobes, bcn, nav	Strobes, nav
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	3000ft	2800ft
Altimeter	QNH (1025hPa)	QNH (1026hPa)
Heading	NK	109°
Speed	135kt	95kt
ACAS/TAS	TCAS II	TAS
Alert	RA	TA
Separation at CPA		
Reported	Not seen	100ft V/0m H
Recorded	~700ft V/<0.1NM H	



THE BE200 PILOT reports that they had been operating a single pilot flight with a Sensor Operator at the back-right seat position. They were operating above the English Channel TDAs at 3000ft with a Basic Service from London Information, and deconflicting from traffic above and below on the same task using 123.100MHz and were in good VMC. They were very busy on task (concentrating on the sea surface) and avoiding Belgian and French airspace. The pilot reports that they became aware of traffic on TCAS at a similar level, could not see it and started to initiate a climb to avoid. They then received a 'TRAFFIC TRAFFIC' quickly followed by 'CLIMB, CLIMB NOW' [from their TCAS equipment]. The pilot followed the RA, received a 'CLEAR OF CONFLICT' and levelled at 4000ft. The Sensor Operator saw a yellow gyrocopter (the pilot never saw the traffic). They told London Information who said they were unaware of any traffic in their area.

THE CALIDUS PILOT reports that they were fully on a steady level and height, transiting into the French FIR, and speaking with Lille. Lille warned them about another aircraft that they easily visually observed at around their 10 o' clock [and they] advised them *'traffic in sight'*. The pilot continued on their heading, and assumed that the other aircraft had been a patrol aircraft of some form. They watched the other aircraft turn towards them, on what appeared to be a direct path, and wondered if they were being 'checked out'. The Calidus pilot made no course change, but as it came closer considered the risk of a collision was high enough that they should take avoiding action and descended. […] The other aircraft passed directly overhead. The Calidus pilot reports that they had been surprised by the other aircraft action, but the RT was busy and did not therefore make an Airprox report.

The Calidus pilot adds that, prior to their initial contact with Lille, they had been in receipt of a Basic Service with London Information and had been squawking 7000.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

THE LONDON INFORMATION FISO reports that an aircraft (the BE200) pilot reported a TCAS alert. The FISO had been unsure if that had been an RA or TA. They confirmed that they had no known traffic in the area to affect. The BE200 pilot confirmed that and reported the other aircraft had been a microlight [they recall] and did not indicate any concern over the TCAS alert. The FISO believed they had reported a TA. The FISO reports that the pilot then switched frequency […].

Unfortunately, it has not been possible to secure a report from the **LILLE CONTROLLER.**

Factual Background

The weather at Southend Airport was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGMC 291050Z VRB05KT 9999 FEW032 SCT035 26/16 Q1025=
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Analysis and Investigation

NATS Safety Investigations

The pilot of a BE200 had been undertaking a search and rescue task in the English Channel to the west of KONAN. The pilot had been in communication with the London FISO, squawking 1177, and a Basic Service had been agreed. The aircraft had been operating at 3000ft, which converted to FL027 on the Multi-Track Radar display. An autogyro Calidus, had been squawking 7000, tracking eastbound indicating FL026 on the Multi-Track Radar.

The Calidus had been squawking 7000, tracking eastbound indicating FL026 on the Multi-Track Radar. The pilot had previously been in receipt of a Basic Service from the London FISO, however they had left the frequency at 1056, prior to this event. At 1102:12, the Calidus pilot changed squawk to 6120[1]. This squawk was not assigned to a UK ATC unit, and it has not been possible for NATS to determine which ANSP assigned this squawk. The Calidus operated between FL024 and FL025 when on that squawk. The closest [recorded] point of approach displayed on the Multi-Track Radar occurred at 1104:46 approximately 3NM west of KONAN and was measured as 1NM and 200ft. The Calidus disappeared from radar at that time due to radar coverage in the area. The BE200 climbed from FL027 at 1104:58. Given that the Calidus did not display on the radar replay again from this time whereas the BE200 was displayed, it was assumed the Calidus had been below the BE200 at all times. The BE200 pilot reported on the FIS frequency at 1107:33 "*We're at four thousand feet now … we did have a TCAS RA with a yellow autogyro about three or four minutes ago. I know it is not really relevant as it is the open FIR, but I thought I'd let you know*."

Conclusions

The Airprox occurred when the BE200, engaged in a search and rescue mission, came into proximity with the Calidus outside controlled airspace. The Closest Point of Approach occurred when the Calidus was potentially beneath radar coverage and therefore has not been determined. The incident was resolved by the BE200 [pilot] responding to a TCAS RA.

CAA ATSI

ATSI does not normally comment on the actions of non-UK ATC, however, ATSI notes that Traffic Information was reportedly passed by Lille to the Calidus pilot on the presence of the BE200. The BE200 pilot had been receiving a non-surveillance-based service and so the Calidus would not have been known traffic, although it is noted that the BE200 pilot did receive a TCAS warning of its proximity.

[1] The Calidus pilot confirmed that this squawk was assigned by Lille.

UKAB Secretariat



Figure 1: At 1104:54 – the last time both aircraft were detected on radar. White cross marks CPA



Figure 2: From the Airspace Analyser Tool at 1105:10



Figure 3 TDA D098E

EGD098E

When operationally required a TDA is established within the area bounded by straight lines joining successively the following points:

a. 510756N 0012635E;
b. 511454N 0013137E;
c. 512251N 0013322E;
d. 511740N 0015439E;
e. 511447N 0020000E;
f. 511153N 0015200E;
g. 510607N 0014309E;
h. 510336N 0013547E;
i. 510756N 0012635E.

TDA EGD098E is established between surface and 1500ft AMSL.
In order to accommodate additional RPAS operations, the Upper Limit of EGD098E may extend to 2500ft AMSL and will be notified by the G field of the activation NOTAM. *[That extension had not been notified on this occasion].*
Within EGD098E, a SUAAIS will be available from Flight Information Service on frequency 124.600MHz (London Information).
Within EGD098E, during the hours of watch, a SUAAIS will also be available from Lydd Air Traffic Control on channel 120.705MHz (Lydd Approach).

The Calidus had operated at approximately 2750ft AMSL in crossing above EGD098E.

Both aircraft were tracked by radar and identified through Mode S data. As the Calidus ceased to display on the radar approximately 14sec before CPA, the diagram at page 1 and estimation of CPA was made by combining radar and ADS-B derived data.

The BE200 and Calidus pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[2] If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the BE200 pilot was required to give way to the Calidus.[3]

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a BE200 and a Calidus flew into proximity 9NM north of Calais at 1105Z on Sunday 29th June 2025. The BE200 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC in receipt of a Basic Service from London Information, and the Calidus pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and reports having been in receipt of a Traffic Service from Lille.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, GPS data, a report from the FISO involved and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

Members discussed the scenario of this event, noting that the BE200 pilot and crew had been focussed on an operational task, had been equipped with a Traffic Collision Avoidance System and in receipt of an Air Traffic Service. The Board recognised that the Basic Service they had utilised is less comprehensive than others but understood that the nature and area of operation and their altitude had limited the scope in that choice (**CF1**). Members felt that that, together with the aircraft colours and lighting suite utilised, had meant that the crew had given themselves the best opportunity to see and be seen. On receiving the proximity warnings via their TCAS, the pilot having been concerned by the other aircraft's proximity (**CF2**), had reacted appropriately and followed the instruction given (**CF3**) with the crew member seeing the Calidus as the two aircraft had passed. In considering the contribution to this event by the London Information FISO, members noted that they had reported having been unaware of the Calidus despite having served it earlier and members accepted that this was not unusual as the pilot had been in receipt of a non-surveillance based service and the Flight Information Service Officer had been dealing with a number of other aircraft in that area at that time. However, it was agreed the provisions of a Basic Service had been met in this case.

At the time of writing this report, the UKAB had not received a report from the Lille controller.

In considering the actions of the Calidus pilot, members noted that this route and the various restrictions around it had been well known to them. They had utilised appropriate electronic alerting equipment and had been in receipt of the most appropriate Air Traffic Service available at that range and altitude. The pilot reports having received a Traffic Alert (**CF4**) from their TAS and Traffic Information from the Lille controller as to the presence of the BE200. They visually acquired that aircraft and maintained their flightpath as the BE200 had passed overhead.

In concluding the discussion, the Board discussed the risk, with members agreeing that normal safety standards and parameters had pertained and there had been no risk of collision. The Board recorded the event as risk category E. Members agreed on the following contributory factors:

CF1: Under a Basic Service, the London Flight Information Officer had not been required to monitor the flight of the BE200.

CF2: The BE200 pilot had been concerned by the proximity of the Calidus.

CF3: The BE200 pilot had received a Resolution Advisory indication on their TCAS equipment.

CF4: The Calidus pilot had received a Traffic Alert on their TAS equipment.

[2] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[3] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2025132			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Ground Elements			
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
1	Contextual	• ANS Flight Information Provision	Provision of ANS flight information	The ATCO/FISO was not required to monitor the flight under a Basic Service
	Flight Elements			
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
2	Human Factors	• Unnecessary Action	~~Events involving flight crew performing an action that was not required~~	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
3	Contextual	• ACAS/TCAS RA	An event involving a genuine airborne collision avoidance system/traffic alert and collision avoidance system resolution advisory warning triggered	
4	Contextual	• Other warning system operation	An event involving a genuine warning from an airborne system other than TCAS.	

Degree of Risk: E.

Safety Barrier Assessment[4]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that all safety barriers present were fully effective.



[4] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.