


AIRPROX REPORT No 2025122

Date: 25 Jun 2025 Time: 1341Z Position: 5056N 00032W Location: 2.5NM W Parham

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Eurofox	Cessna 182
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Listening Out	Listening Out
Provider	Parham	Farnborough East
Altitude/FL	2700ft	2900ft
Transponder	A, C, S+	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	Yellow/black	White/blue
Lighting	Strobes, nav, land	Strobes, beacon
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	2700ft	3000ft
Altimeter	QFE (1010hPa)	QNH (NK hPa)
Heading	Turning right	~280°
Speed	65kt	120kt
ACAS/TAS	PowerFLARM	SkyEcho
Alert	None	None
Separation at CPA		
Reported	100-300ft V/ 100-300ft H ¹	NR V/NR H
Recorded	200ft V/<0.1NM (<~600ft) H	



THE EUROFOX PILOT reports towing an ASK21 glider to 3000ft above airfield elevation for spinning exercises, climbing initially to the west. They climbed steadily west, then turned north and continued climbing. They then executed a right turn ending in a south-easterly direction until the glider released from tow. They did not see the other aircraft and were not alerted to its presence by either ADS-B or [their TAS]. The instructor in the glider being towed raised the Airprox when they had both landed. Examination of [a web-based flight tracker] showed that they were at right angles to the approaching aircraft, which was higher, with their line of sight obscured by the right wing. Despite raising the right wing for lookout before starting the right turn, they did not see the approaching aircraft above them.

THE ASK21 INSTRUCTOR reports on aerotow behind a FLARM and transponder-equipped Eurofox tow-plane. The purpose of the flight was for spinning training with a student and the glider was to be aero-towed to an area just west of the airfield, suitable for the exercise. The tow-plane was making a right climbing turn from a northerly heading to an easterly heading at around 2800ft height, about 2NM to the west of Parham airfield. The other aircraft was masked from view by the tow plane. The first sight they had of the other aircraft was as it appeared over the top of the tow-plane, flying east-to-west on a virtually opposite heading [at about the CPA]. From first sighting to the other aircraft passing by was very quick and no avoiding action was taken by the tow-plane or glider. The other aircraft was somewhere between 100ft and 300ft separation vertically and 100ft to 300ft laterally. The lateral separation put them on each other's left. It was sufficiently close to be able to read the aircraft registration on the fuselage in the brief time they saw it. They did not observe the other aircraft make any course changes in the very brief time it was visible to them.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

¹ As reported by the ASK21 instructor.

THE C182 PILOT reports in level cruise at 3000ft with the aircraft under autopilot control, coupled in NAV and ALT Modes, between HOLLY and NIDGO waypoints. The only other aircraft observed during the flight was a tug towing a glider to the west of Parham, initially below them in the 10 o'clock position. The aircraft appeared to be crossing their track from south-to-north at approximately 90° and passed below and behind. The aircraft did not show as an aural or visual target on [the TAS] equipment [display]. The exact altitude or type could therefore not be determined. No avoidance manoeuvring was required.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

Factual Background

The weather at Shoreham and Gatwick airports was recorded as follows:

METAR EGKA 251350Z 20008KT CAVOK 21/16 Q1012=

METAR EGKK 251350Z 20006KT 140V310 9999 FEW038 26/15 Q1012=

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

The Eurofox, ASK21 and C182 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.² If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the C182 pilot was required to give way to the Eurofox towing the ASK21.³

Comments

BGA

Parham is one of approximately 80 permanent glider launch sites in the United Kingdom listed in UK AIP ENR 5.5 and labelled on the CAA 1:500,000 and 1:250,000 charts with a "G" symbol, as shown on the chart segment in Part A. A greater density of gliders, and aircraft towing gliders, may be expected nearby at any time during daylight hours, and at any altitude up to cloudbase.

The carry-on CAP 1391 ADSB-based TAS on board the C182 can be configured to receive transmissions from the EC equipment carried by almost all gliders and glider tow-planes (including both the EuroFox and ASK21 involved in this incident) and display nearby glider traffic via participating EFB applications. Using this option would provide a useful additional safety barrier in airspace where gliders operate.

The EC equipment fitted to the ASK21 (and in fact, to almost all gliders and glider tow-planes) warns of impending conflicts with other similarly-equipped aircraft, but basic installations do not detect aircraft equipped only with a transponder or a CAP 1391 ADSB-out device, as the C182 was in this case. However, recent versions of this EC equipment can optionally include a 1090MHz receiver and thereby warn of conflicts with transponder and ADSB-out-equipped aircraft. Updating glider EC hardware to add such a 1090MHz receiver would provide a useful additional safety barrier in airspace with a high density of transponder or ADSB-out equipped aircraft.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Eurofox towing an ASK21 glider and a C182 flew into proximity 2.5NM west of Parham gliding site at 1341Z on Wednesday 25th June 2025. All the pilots were operating under

² (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

³ (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging and (iv).

VFR in VMC, the Eurofox and ASK21 pilots listening out on the Parham frequency and the C182 pilot listening out on the Farnborough East frequency.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from all 3 pilots and radar photographs/video recordings. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board members first discussed the actions of the Eurofox and ASK21 pilots. Members noted that, in accordance with the BGA advice to 'stay focused on the tug at all times'⁴, the ASK21 pilot's attention would have been almost exclusively focussed on the Eurofox tug aircraft, for the obvious reason that inattention could lead to them flying away from the desired towing position and, in extremis, causing an upset to the towing Eurofox. It was not surprising, therefore, that the ASK21 pilot had only been able to detect the C182 'as it appeared over the top of the tow-plane'. The Eurofox and ASK21 pilots had had no situational awareness of the transiting C182 (**CF1**) because they had had no Traffic Information from either a surveillance-based FIS or their respective TAS equipment (**CF2**). Similarly, the C182 TAS had not alerted on the Eurofox ADS-B Out transponder (**CF2**), for reasons that the Board could not ascertain, but the C182 pilot had had presumably at least generic situational awareness (**CF1**) that tug aircraft and gliders would have been more likely to have been found in the vicinity of Parham gliding site. Members noted that a FIS, especially a surveillance-based FIS with an appropriate level of service, may have been more useful than simply listening out, and that a radio call to Parham on the way past may also have improved situational awareness for all concerned. The Board agreed that, in the event, the Eurofox pilot had not seen the C182 (**CF3**) and the ASK21 pilot had been concerned by the proximity of the C182 (**CF4**). Members wondered to what degree the C182 pilot, transiting on autopilot between airways reporting points, had been aware of the proximity of Parham gliding site. Notwithstanding, the Board agreed that the C182 pilot had seen the Eurofox and ASK21 in sufficient time to assess that they had not needed to manoeuvre, but members noted that a glider and tug combination will almost always be climbing and therefore that due allowance of potentially reducing vertical separation must also be made. Turning to risk, one member felt that the Airprox amounted to a Risk E encounter, normal parameters applied, but the majority felt that it was best described as Risk C, safety reduced but no risk of collision.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2025122			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
	Flight Elements			
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
1	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
2	Human Factors	• Response to Warning System	An event involving the incorrect response of flight crew following the operation of an aircraft warning system	CWS misinterpreted, not optimally actioned or CWS alert expected but none reported
	• See and Avoid			
3	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
4	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.

⁴ <https://members.gliding.co.uk/safety/safe-aerotowing/>

Safety Barrier Assessment⁵

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the Eurofox and ASK21 pilots had had no situational awareness of the presence of the C182, and the C182 pilot had had only generic situational awareness that gliders and tow aircraft might be operating in the vicinity of Parham gliding site.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the C182 TAS had not alerted off the Eurofox ADS-B Out transponder when an alert would have been expected.

Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2025122				Outside Controlled Airspace				
Barrier		Provision	Application	Effectiveness				
				Barrier Weighting				
				0%	5%	10%	15%	20%
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance							
	Manning & Equipment							
	Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action							
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance							
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance							
	Tactical Planning and Execution							
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action							
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance							
	See & Avoid							
Key:								
	Full	Partial	None	Not Present/Not Assessable	Not Used			
Provision								
Application								
Effectiveness								

⁵ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).