AIRPROX REPORT No 2025115

Date: 20 Jun 2025 Time: 1116Z Position: 5232N 00054W Location: 7NM SE of Leicester Aerodrome

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Ximango	C152
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	None	Listening Out
Provider	N/A	Leicester Radio
Altitude/FL	2900ft	2900ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	White	White, orange
Lighting	Strobe	Landing, taxy, navigation, beacon
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	~2600ft	3000ft
Altimeter	QNH (1025hPa)	QNH
Heading	211°	360°
Speed	~60kt	90kt
ACAS/TAS	PowerFLARM	Not fitted
Alert	None	N/A
Separation at CPA		
Reported	0ft V/300m H	0ft V/100m H
Recorded	0ft V/<0.1NM H	



THE XIMANGO PILOT reports that they had been on a local flight toward […] airfield and back, mainly to gain currency after the aircraft had been in maintenance for 7 months. They were flying in a straight line from Oakham back towards [destination airfield] at approximately 2600ft QNH when, as they had been approaching Market Harborough from the northeast, a small white GA aircraft flew straight across in front of them from left-to-right. The pilot reports that they did not see the aircraft before it was plan view directly in front of them, so had no time to take any avoiding action. Afterwards, they had turned towards the direction [the other aircraft had headed to] but did not see them again.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE C152 PILOT reports that, whilst carrying out general handling just to the south of Leicester airport in an area regularly used for pilot training, they had just completed a clearing turn, rolling out onto roughly a northerly heading at roughly 3000ft, when they noticed a glider just above them on their starboard side at a range estimated to be 200m. The C152 pilot commenced immediate avoiding action by steeply descending to the left away from the glider. Unfortunately, the glider was just above on their starboard side. [The pilot notes that] the C152 has high wings and the glider had been approaching from the most difficult angle for them to see it.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE LEICESTER AIR/GROUND OPERATOR reports that they have nothing recorded; this event had been 7NM from their overhead.

Factual Background

The weather at RAF Wittering was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGXT 201050Z 14008KT CAVOK 25/15 Q1024 RMK BLU=
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Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat



Figure 1: at CPA (1115:34) 0ft V/<0.1NM H

Both aircraft were tracked and identified using radar. The altitudes referenced in the table at page 1 are calculated by applying a QNH-to-SPS adjustment.

The Ximango and C152 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the C152 pilot was required to give way to the Ximango.[2]

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Ximango and a C152 flew into proximity 7NM southwest of Leicester aerodrome at 1116Z on Friday 20th June 2025. The Ximango pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and had not been in receipt of a Flight Information Service, and the C152 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and had been listening out on the Leicester Air/Ground frequency.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings and a confirmation report from the Air/Ground Operator referenced by one of the pilots. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board firstly discussed the actions of the Ximango pilot, noting the nature of their flight and the route taken for that exercise. Members noted that the pilot had elected not to seek an Air Traffic or

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[2] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

Flight Information Service and advised that such services, where available, can add significant situational awareness of other activity in the area. The Board agreed that, in this case, neither the Ximango nor the C152 pilots had secured a Lower Airspace Radar Service or similar from one of the local providers (**CF1**). The Board noted that the Ximango pilot had carried and utilised electronic conspicuity (EC) equipment favoured by such aircraft but it had unfortunately been unable to receive electronic emissions from the C152 (**CF3**). Members therefore agreed that the absence of a common Air Traffic Service and incompatible EC equipment had left the Ximango pilot with no situational awareness of the presence of the proximity of the C152 (**CF2**). The Ximango pilot reported having seen the C152 only as it had passed across their nose, providing no time to initiate avoidance action, and members deemed this to have been effectively a non-sighting (**CF4**).

Turning to the actions of the C152 pilot, members recognised that they had elected to utilise an area popular for general handling and pilot training exercises and had maintained a listening watch on the nearby Leicester Aerodrome frequency. Members felt that an active Air Traffic Service could have provided a greater degree of situational awareness for the C152 pilot (**CF1**). Members noted that the pilot had not carried or utilised an EC unit (**CF3**) and opined that such equipment can be a relatively affordable and simple step to improve a pilot's awareness of, and visibility to, others. Members agreed that, in this event, the C152 pilot had not had any situational awareness of the presence of the Ximango (**CF2**). The Board felt that it had been extremely fortunate that the C152 pilot had visually acquired the Ximango at a very late stage (**CF4**) as they had rolled out of their turn and managed to initiate some avoiding action. Members felt that, with the aircraft co-altitude, that action was undoubtedly helpful in keeping the aircraft apart.

The discussion concluded and members considered the risk of collision. They agreed that the safety of the aircraft had not been assured, safety margins had been reduced much below the norm and separation had been reduced to the bare minimum. Both pilots had achieved only very late sightings of the other aircraft with only the C152 pilot managing to initiate any avoiding action and members opined that providence had played a major part in events. The Board agreed that there had been a serious risk of collision (**CF5**) and assigned Risk Category A to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
1	Human Factors	• Communications by Flight Crew with ANS	An event related to the communications between the flight crew and the air navigation service.	Pilot did not request appropriate ATS service or communicate with appropriate provider
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
2	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
3	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
	• See and Avoid			
4	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
	• Outcome Events			
5	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

Degree of Risk: A.

Safety Barrier Assessment[3]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because both pilots could have considered utilising a LARS from East Midlands Radar.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had any situational awareness of the presence of the other aircraft.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the electronic conspicuity equipment carried by the Ximango pilot had been unable to receive any electronic emissions from the C152, and the C152 had not been equipped with any form of EC.

See and Avoid were assessed as **ineffective** because both pilots had achieved visual contact with the other aircraft too late to materially increase separation.



[3] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.