


AIRPROX REPORT No 2022169

Date: 08 Aug 2022 Time: ~1503Z Position: ~5318N 00138W Location: 3.5NM E Camphill

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	PA28	Unk paraglider
Operator	Civ FW	Civ Hang
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Basic	Unknown
Provider	London Info.	NK
Altitude/FL	4000ft	NK
Transponder	A, C, S	None
Reported		
Colours	White, Blue	NK
Lighting	Beacon, Nav	NK
Conditions	VMC	NK
Visibility	>10km	NR
Altitude/FL	3900ft	NK
Altimeter	QNH (1028hPa)	NK
Heading	220°	NK
Speed	97kt	NK
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Unknown
Separation at CPA		
Reported	50ft V/300m H	N/A
Recorded	NK V/NR H	



THE PA28 PILOT reports that they had changed to London Information on leaving [their previous frequency] and the transmissions [that had been heard] on both [their current and previous] services gave them the impression there was very little traffic in the area. The heat of the day was generating turbulence over built-up areas so they had climbed above their planned altitude (3700ft) to avoid some of it. Having passed just to the west of Sheffield, they were approaching Camphill gliding site and were looking out for gliders but saw none, and no other traffic was apparent. At this point, it was almost 30min into the flight and they prepared to change fuel tanks. Before doing so they checked their fuel log, the time and the current tank. As they looked up from doing this, they saw a paraglider pass slightly below to their starboard side. Recovering from the shock of this, they immediately started scanning ahead for any other traffic and saw another paraglider in the distance, well off to their port side (approximately 1NM laterally) and slightly above. They judged the separation [from this second paraglider] was sufficient not to require a change of course. The second paraglider was well-silhouetted against the haze in the distance so they saw it in good time. They assume that they did not see the first paraglider when they were looking for gliders from Camphill because it was obscured by their aircraft's cowling and/or it was somehow less visible due to the sun. [In hindsight] they realise that they should have made a report to London Information to alert any other traffic to the [paraglider] traffic, [however they suspect] that the surprise of the situation had unsettled them and by the time they had recovered their composure it seemed too late.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE PARAGLIDER PILOT could not be traced.

THE LONDON INFORMATION FISO reports that the PA28 pilot reported on the frequency at 1448 at an altitude of 3600ft. A Basic Service was agreed, the pilot was asked to squawk 1177 with Mode C, and issued with the Barnsley ASR pressure setting.

Within a short period of time [there was a] handover of watch to another FISO. The pilot did not report an Airprox up to the time of the handover, and the oncoming FISO never mentioned later that anything had been reported.

Investigating [the event] later, there is no indication on the FIS flight strips of any reported occurrence.

Factual Background

The weather at Doncaster Sheffield was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGCN 081450Z 19003KT 130V260 CAVOK 26/11 Q1027  
METAR EGCN 081520Z VRB02KT CAVOK 27/10 Q1027
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Analysis and Investigation

NATS Safety Investigations Summary

The pilot [of the] PA28 subsequently reported an Airprox with a paraglider 3.7NM east of Camphill gliding site in Derbyshire. [The PA28 pilot] was receiving a Basic Service with London Information at the time of the reported Airprox.

Information available to the investigation included:

- [The reporting form from the] London Information FISO.
- Pilot report from [the PA28 pilot].
- Radar and R/T recordings.

[The PA28 pilot] called onto the London Information frequency at 1447:30. The pilot advised their position [and altitude], and requested a Basic Service. The FISO requested the pilot of [the PA28] to squawk 1177 with Mode C and offered a Basic Service, and advised that the Barnsley [regional pressure setting] was 1022hPa. This was read back by the pilot.

A position handover took place and the incoming FISO took over the frequency at 1451:12. [The PA28 pilot] requested to change frequency at 1519:15. The FISO advised the pilot to squawk conspicuity and said goodbye. There was no other communication between London Information and the pilot of [the PA28] between the above times.

The pilot of [the PA28] subsequently filed an Airprox involving a paraglider 3.7NM east of Camphill Gliding site at 3900ft on QNH 1028hPa. The pilot report stated that the time of the Airprox was 1600hrs local, which would make it 1500 UTC. [The PA28 pilot] was operating with a Basic Service from London Information at the time of the reported incident, although the pilot made no reference to the incident on the R/T.

The pilot of [the PA28] reported that the distance of first sighting of the paraglider was 300m bearing 080°. The pilot stated that the colour of the canopy was possibly silver and the minimum distance was 300m and below by 50ft.

Safety Investigations checked the radar at time of the incident. There was a primary contact on the aircraft's left-hand side which was 2.2NM in distance from [the PA28], see Figure 1, however analysis of the radar by Safety Investigations indicated that there were no associated primary or secondary contacts definitively associated with the paraglider visible on radar at the approximate time of the event.



Figure 1.

The pilot of [the PA28] reported that no avoiding action was taken as the paraglider had almost passed when it was spotted.

UKAB Secretariat

The PA28 and paraglider pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.¹ If the incident geometry is considered as head-on or nearly so then both pilots were required to turn to the right.² If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the PA28 pilot was required to give way to the paraglider.³

Comments

AOPA

When flying in Class G airspace it is important to look for all forms of aerial activity and in this case gliders would have seemed most appropriate, however, flying close to ridges can increase the chances of encountering other forms of lift-seeking aviation and the dangers this involves. Without any form of EC or radar coverage, effective lookout is the only defence for avoidance of a MAC. It is good to see between each task of fuel change the pilot was looking out.

BHPA

After exhaustive inquiries by the local BHPA paragliding club, the BHPA has been unable to trace the incident paraglider pilot. It is quite reasonable to assume that, although the wind speed would not have been strong enough for localised hill/ridge soaring, the very light winds and late afternoon thermals from that hot summer's day probably would have enabled some successful local flights. Hence why two paraglider pilots were seen by the PA28 pilot some distance apart. However, due to the high pressure giving generally stable conditions, it is unlikely that local club pilots were able to fly any considerable distances which is why no flights were entered into the Paragliding XC League that day and why we have been unable to trace the pilot(s) involved.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a PA28 and an unknown paraglider flew into proximity approximately 3.5NM east of Camphill at approximately 1503Z on Monday 8th August 2022. The PA28 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC, in receipt of a Basic Service from London Information. The unknown paraglider pilot could not be traced.

¹ (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

² (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(1) Approaching head-on.

³ (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of a report from the PA28 pilot, radar photographs/video recordings, a report from the FISO involved and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the PA28 pilot and was encouraged that the pilot had been aware of their proximity to Camphill gliding site and had been looking out for gliders. However, a GA pilot noted that glider sites are located, for obvious reasons, at locations where lift is often produced, and that this feature will also attract pilots of other aircraft types which utilise the lift. The Board discussed whether the number of people who participate in paragliding activities had increased over the last few years, and a paragliding pilot member stated that they understood numbers to be steady, however, pilots increasingly announce areas of favourable conditions on social media and they felt that, because of this, clusters of paragliders have become more common. The Board noted that the PA28 pilot had not reported an EC alert regarding the unknown paraglider prior to the Airprox, leading members to agree that they had not had any prior knowledge of its presence (**CF2**). Members also noted that the PA28 pilot had reported that they had become visual with the paraglider to their starboard side and slightly below, which a GA pilot member stated meant that the paraglider would have been obscured by the aircraft's engine cowling until this point (**CF4**), with the Board going on to agree that this sighting had been at or after CPA (**CF3**).

The Board then turned its attention to the ground element involvement and quickly agreed that, under the Basic Service they had been providing, the London Information FISO had not been required to monitor the flight of the PA28 (**CF1**) noting that, as London Information is not surveillance equipped, they had not had any ability to do so.

Finally, the Board considered the risk involved in this Airprox. Members noted that the PA28 pilot had not had any prior awareness of the presence of the paraglider and that they had only become visual with it at, or after, CPA. Members agreed that it was unfortunate that the paraglider pilot could not be traced because, without their report, it was impossible for the Board to know whether they had had any EC equipment with them, or if they had seen the PA28 and taken any avoiding action. Because of this, the Board was unable to assess the effectiveness of the Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance and See and Avoid barriers. Members agreed that, due to the PA28 pilot's reported separation between the aircraft, there had been no risk of collision, however, safety had been degraded. Consequently, the Board assigned a Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

2022169				
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
Ground Elements				
• Situational Awareness and Action				
1	Contextual	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ANS Flight Information Provision 	Provision of ANS flight information	The ATCO/FISO was not required to monitor the flight under a Basic Service
Flight Elements				
• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action				
2	Contextual	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Situational Awareness and Sensory Events 	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
• See and Avoid				
3	Human Factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitoring of Other Aircraft 	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
4	Contextual	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Visual Impairment 	Events involving impairment due to an inability to see properly	One or both aircraft were obscured from the other

Degree of Risk: C

Safety Barrier Assessment⁴

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **not used** because the London Information FISO had not been required to monitor the PA28 pilot’s flight and, not being surveillance equipped, they had no ability to do so.

Flight Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the PA28 pilot had not had any awareness of the presence of the paraglider prior to sighting it.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were not assessable because no information was available regarding the equipment carried by the paraglider pilot.

See and Avoid were not assessable because, without a report from the paraglider pilot, it was not possible to determine whether or not they had become visual with, and avoided, the PA28.

Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2022169		Outside Controlled Airspace						
Barrier	Provision	Application	Effectiveness					
			Barrier Weighting					
			0%	5%	10%	15%	20%	
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓					
	Manning & Equipment	✓	✓					
	Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action	✗	○					
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	●	●					
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓					
	Tactical Planning and Execution	✓	✓					
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action	✗	✓					
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	●	●					
	See & Avoid	●	●					
Key:								
Provision	✓	●	✗	●				
Application	✓	●	✗	●				○
Effectiveness								

⁴ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).