

about 085° at an Alt of 2000ft (QNH 1017mb). The C150 squawking 7000 with no Mode C data displayed is initially tracking about 140° before turning right onto S initially then further right onto the centreline for RW26 at 1400:50 tracking towards the PA46. The CPA is at 1401:11 with the C150 less than 0.1nm N of the PA46, which is still indicating 2000ft amsl (as it does throughout the period). If the C150 was at 1300ft QFE as the pilot reported this equates to 1630ft amsl indicating the calculated vertical separation was of the order of 370ft.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available included reports from the pilots of both ac and radar recordings.

The Board noted that both ac had been in receipt of a BS from Elstree at least for part of the incident period but, in the absence of a timed RT transcript, they assumed that neither pilot was aware of each other's presence from hearing one another's transmissions on the RT. Further, it appeared that despite being on opposing tracks, neither pilot had been given information by the FISO regarding one another; although he was not required to do so, one civil controller Member suggested that, in these circumstances it would have been good practice to do so.

The incident took place in an area of slightly reduced VMC conditions in Class G airspace where 'see and avoid' pertains. Despite the conditions the C150 pilot had first seen the PA46's lighting 600m away. Notwithstanding that he was surprised by its presence, he opted not to take any avoidance, indicating to Members that despite having time to react he considered that no risk of collision existed. The Board thought that the PA46 (solo) pilot had not seen the C150 possibly because it was obscured slightly below the nose of his ac.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: Non-sighting by the PA46 pilot and a late sighting by the C150 pilot.

Degree of Risk: C.