
AIRPROX REPORT No 2010076



(1)).

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

THE Pik-20D PILOT reports that he had just released from an aerotow to 2000ft QNH (1000mb) for a competition flight, behind a Chipmunk; he had turned left as is normal procedure and joined another circling glider just to the E of the release position. After one turn of 360° at 50kt and again passing through E, a PA28 (Reg given) passed immediately behind him at 2600ft QNH traveling from S to N. The PA28 was not seen by the reporting pilot, or by the other glider pilot who was 100-150ft below him, until it passed very close to them when they both saw the ac. The white and blue PA28 did not deviate from its Northerly track and he also took no avoiding action as it was too late and the PA28 was then departing to the N. His ac was not ACAS or SSR equipped.

His starboard wing would have obscured the approach of the PA28 as he was in a 40° bank left turn so his glider would have presented a partial plan-form to the PA28. The event was NOTAMed as high glider activity and there were in excess of 40 gliders and up to 7 tug ac in the area. He considered transiting the area at 2500ft i.e. the normal aerotow release height so close to and upwind of the Airfield is not good airmanship.

He reported the Airprox to the Midland Regional Competition Director by Radio, assessing the risk as being high, and continued the flight. He attached a Data-Logger file of his ac and the glider below him.

THE PA28 PILOT reports flying a private VFR flight from Booker to Full Sutton, at the time in receipt of a BS from East Midlands, squawking as directed with Mode C, tracking 360° at 3000ft QNH and 100kt; ACAS was not fitted. While 10nm N of DTY he changed heading 20° to the W to avoid Husbands Bosworth, turned on his landing light and saw several gliders about 5nm ahead. His 2 passengers were both qualified pilots and were also keeping a good lookout and both were satisfied that their new track would keep them clear of Husband Bosworth airfield and all the gliders they saw.

However, just after this they became aware of a glider passing left to right about 200ft below them [probably the reporting ac]. He assessed the risk as being low.

UKAB Note (1): At 1139:00 the PA28 [identified by its elementary Mode S] can be seen on the recording of the Claxby radar, 7nm SSW of Husbands Bosworth, squawking 4550 (East Midlands) tracking N at FL025 (2650ft amsl). There are many primary only contacts to the S and SSE of the airfield but none directly on its track. At 1140:16, 4 primary contacts pop up in the PA28's 1030, the closest at ½ nm and the furthest at 1½ nm. At 1140:24 the PA28 at FL025 passes 0.1nm to the E of a primary contact 4nm SE of Husbands Bosworth, ¼nm SW of the reported position. That being the case there is little doubt that the primary contact is either the reporting ac or the one below.

UKAB Note (2): The gliding competition was NOTAMed as follows:

(H1993/10 NOTAMN

Q) EGTT/QWGLW/IV/M /W /000/055/5226N00103W005

A) EGTT B) 1006190000 C) 1006272359

D) SR-SS

E) MAJOR BRITISH GLIDING ASSOCIATION (BGA) GLIDING COMP INCLUDING X-COUNTRY ROUTES. MAIN ACTIVITY WI 5NM RADIUS PSN 5226N 00103W (HUSBANDS BOSWORTH AD, LEICESTERSHIRE). UP TO 50 GLIDERS AND 8 TUG ACFT MAY PARTICIPATE. GLIDERS WILL NORMALLY OPR BLW THE INVERSION LVL OR BTN THE TOPS OF ANY CU CLOUDS AND 500FT AGL. AFTER LAUNCH MOST ACFT MAY BE CONCENTRATED DOWNWIND OF THE SITE OR ON THE FIRST LEG OF THE X-COUNTRY RTE. FOR INFO ON ROUTES FOR THE DAY AND LIKELY ETD CONTACT GLIDER CONTEST CONTROL TEL 01858 881582. RTF CONTACT 127.575MHZ. AUS 10-06-0066/AS2.

F) SFC G) 5500FT AMSL)

ATSI reports that the Airprox occurred at 1140 in class G airspace, at a reported position of 3nm SW of Husbands Bosworth gliding site. The glider pilot's reported level was 2100ft QNH 1000mb, (2586ft on QNH 1018mb with 1mb equal to 27ft). The forecast Barnsley RPS for the period was 1012mb. The reason the glider pilot used a setting of 1000mb is not known.

The radar recordings for the period show a number of intermittent contacts manoeuvring in the vicinity of Husband Bosworth. The East Midlands Radar (Radar) controller was not aware that an Airprox had occurred; consequently no report was received from him or the unit. ATSI had access to RTF and radar recordings and the pilots' reports.

The East Midlands weather was:

METAR EGNX 271120Z 21006KT 170V250 9999 FEW042 25/12 Q1018=

At 1133:11 the PA28 pilot contacted East Midlands Radar and advised that he was en-route from Wycombe Air Park to Full Sutton in Yorkshire via the DTY and GAM at alt of 2800ft on the QNH of 1018mb and requested a BS and zone transit. Radar advised the PA28 to remain outside CAS until cleared and issued a squawk 4550 with QNH 1018mb. At 1133:59 the radar recording shows the PA28 transponder code change from 7000 to 4550, 38nm SSE of East Midlands Airport and 13.9nm to the SSW of Husband Bosworth gliding site. At 1135:37 Radar advised the PA28 that it was well S and outside the range of East Midlands radar. Radar agreed to provide a BS only, reminding the pilot to remain outside CAS until cleared.

At 1140:21, as the PA28 approached the reported Airprox position, radar recording shows the PA28 to be 3nm SW of Husband Bosworth gliding site, indicating FL025 (2635ft on QNH 1018mb with 1mb equal to 27ft). The recording also shows an unknown ac displaying a 7000 squawk, without mode C, 1.6nm NW of the PA28, tracking W. Also shown in the vicinity is a very weak and intermittent primary contact, but this very soon fades from radar coverage. At this point the Radar controller gives the PA28 clearance to transit the Eastern control area of East Midlands not above altitude 2500ft VFR; the pilot acknowledges the clearance but makes no mention of any other ac in the vicinity. The PA28 then continues N without further incident.

The PA28 was in receipt of a BS from East Midlands Radar. Manual of Air Traffic Services Part 1, Section 1, Chapter 11, page 4, paragraph 3, states:

'A Basic Service is an ATS provided for the purpose of giving advice and information useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flights. This may include weather information, changes of serviceability of facilities, conditions at aerodromes, general airspace activity information, and any other information likely to affect safety. The avoidance of other traffic is solely the pilot's responsibility'.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available included reports from the pilots of both ac, radar recordings, a report from the air traffic controller involved and a report from the appropriate ATC authority.

A GA specialist Board Member suggested that the PA28 pilot had not assimilated the intensity of the gliding traffic in the Husbands Bosworth area when he planned his flight. In his opinion, although planning to avoid a gliding site by 2nm is normally adequate, on the day of a major competition such as this one, it was not. On discussing why the PA28 pilot, although aware of the gliding activity, had not opted to avoid it by a larger margin, Members noted that the NOTAM could have portrayed the situation more clearly (the main glider concentration was upwind of the launch site not downwind as stated in the NOTAM). The gliding Member undertook to discuss standardised NOTAM text for competitions with the BGA.

The gliding Member also informed the Board that the glider pilot would have been in a busy phase of flight just before departing on his cross-country flight and also that while thermalling, his ability to lookout would have been restricted by his angle of bank.

Members pointed out that the PA28 pilot was completely entitled to fly in that area, was aware of the gliding activity at Husbands Bosworth and made provision for it; however, they agreed that it would have been wiser to avoid the area by a larger margin.

That being the case, and since the incident took place in Class G airspace, the Board agreed that both pilots had an equal and shared responsibility to see and avoid other ac. Members agreed that the glider pilot had not seen the PA28 until it was too late to take any avoiding action. When assessing the miss-distance they noted the significant disparity in the two pilots' estimates, one being very close and the other being 1nm. The most likely explanation, they agreed, was that the PA28 had seen another similar glider in the same area rather than the reporting glider. Therefore, since neither pilot had seen the other ac in time to take any avoiding action and the miss-distance had been of the order of that reported by the glider pilot, Members agreed unanimously that there had been a risk that the ac would have collided.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

<u>Cause</u>: Effectively non-sightings by the pilots of both ac.

Degree of Risk: A.