

AIRPROX REPORT No 2011043

Date/Time: 17 May 2011 1410Z

Position: 5408N 00031W
(25nm E LINTON)

Airspace: London FIR (Class: G)

Reporting Ac Reported Ac

Type: Hawk T Mk1 Untraced Light ac

Operator: HQ AIR (Ops) NK

Alt/FL: 2000ft NK
(RPS 1011mb)

Weather: VMC CLBC NK


Visibility: 20km NK

Reported Separation:

0ft V /1000ft H NK

Recorded Separation:

NK



PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

THE HAWK T MK1 PILOT reports flying a dual Forward Air Controller (FAC) training sortie in a NOTAMed area in the Yorkshire Wolds [see UKAB Note (2)] in a black ac with all lights switched on, squawking 7001 with Mode C; TCAS and Mode S were not fitted. Following the completion of a simulated ground-directed target attack profile at low level, the ac was repositioned overhead the target area in a steady level left turn at 2000ft amsl and 300kt in order to complete a high workload RT debrief for the student FAC. After one orbit the rear seat pilot made the captain aware of a white light ac with 'podded wingtips' and displaying white strobes, 1000ft away, co-altitude and maintaining a constant 'nose on' attitude towards them. He attempted to change the geometry between the two ac but it had no effect and he thought that the ac was deliberately following their flight profile.

In order to terminate the conflict he was forced to level the wings and accelerate his ac away from the following ac and, once safe separation between the two ac was established, the debrief was continued. The light ac was then seen to depart to the NW whereupon a waggle of the wings was observed.

He reported the incident by telephone and ASIMS on landing and assessed the risk as being medium.

THE HAWK UNIT station commander commented that the light ac pilot displayed poor airmanship, through apparently deliberate penetration of a correctly promulgated NOTAM.

UKAB Note (1): The Hawk shows on the radar throughout the incident manoeuvring aggressively in the target area. The light ac does not show at any time and could not be traced.

UKAB Note (2): The exercise was NOTAMed as follows:

H1637/11 NOTAMN

Q) EGTT/QWELW/IV/BO /W /000/190/5406N00035W005

A) EGTT B) 1105170800 C) 1105171530 E) FORWARD AIR CTL EXER. FAST JET ACFT WILL CONDUCT HIGH ENERGY MANOEUVRES WI 5NM RADIUS 5406N 00035W (YORK

WOLDS, N YORKS). MAJORITY OF ACTIVITY BLW 5000FT. NON-EXER MIL CREWS CTC JACKPOT CONTROL ON 297.725MHZ OR 137.075MHZ. CTC 01677 456161. 11-05-0462/AS 3 F) SFC G) 19000FT AMSL)

HQ AIR (OPS) comments that without input from the untraced aircraft it is difficult to assess its intentions. However, it would appear that it was visual throughout and there was no actual risk of collision. A warning about the activity and its location was issued and it is disappointing that this appears to have been deliberately ignored. The Hawk pilot was wise to use his superior performance to separate from the subject traffic.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available included reports from the Hawk pilot, radar recordings, and a report from the Hawk operating authorities.

It was unfortunate that the second ac (ac 2) could not be traced as a pilot's report would have facilitated a fuller investigation of this incident. Members opined that there are not many ac types (with tip tanks/pods and a bubble canopy) that fit the reported description of the untraced ac as amplified by the Hawk pilot by telephone to the UKAB; further in order to fly the profile reported the ac 2 must have been capable of fairly high performance. Members also noted that the ac had not been squawking, which most likely excluded military ac; also that it did not even show as a primary contact in an area where radar performance is fairly good, thus also probably excluding ac such as a (red and white) Jet Provost which is otherwise similar to the description. There is one fairly high performance light training ac on the UK register with a colour scheme that matches that reported but it is based well away from Yorkshire and it was established that it was not airborne on the day of the incident.

Members agreed that it was disappointing that the pilot of the ac 2 had apparently deliberately disregarded the military NOTAM; although the NOTAMed area was not an 'exclusion', Members considered that it would have been good airmanship to treat it as such.

Although the pilot of the ac 2 apparently considered his manoeuvres safe as he had probably deliberately 'tracked' the Hawk, Members again agreed that this had been most unwise although, not in contravention of the ANO [although probably in breach of military regulations if they applied]. Since the pilot of ac 2 had selected the separation and had the Hawk in sight throughout, most Members agreed that, while he had been unwise and probably too close, there had been no conflict and that this incident was a sighting report with no risk of the ac colliding; one pilot Member however, disagreed and suggested that there had been a conflict and that the Hawk pilot had resolved it.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: Sighting report.

Degree of Risk: E.