









A 3° visual glide slope would place approaching traffic at an altitude of about 700ft at that same position. Departing traffic turning towards the Broughty Castle VRP later in the downwind leg, or on a wider or tighter circuit pattern, would only marginally change the geometry and hence present a similar confliction risk. The Board felt that a more specific departure instruction such as “route to Broughty Castle VRP via the south of the road bridge” might have assisted, or perhaps even an instruction for the C152 pilot to depart to the west and then north in order to avoid routing against the incoming traffic flow at all. The Board agreed therefore to recommend that Dundee review their departure and arrival procedures and phraseology to ensure traffic deconfliction.



The PA28 pilot stated that he had maintained 1500ft until the road bridge, which would have placed him at about 800ft above the glide slope and 700ft clear of the C152 at that point. In the absence of a radar recording it was not possible for members to state the actual course of events but it was agreed most likely that the C152 and PA28 pilots flew into collision somewhere to the west of the road bridge, probably near the ATZ boundary.

The Board were not able to establish a requirement to follow the standard circuit pattern for a downwind departure, although it was accepted that this would be a sensible track to take. However, members agreed, as previously explained, that an easterly VFR departure procedure had a risk of confliction built into it as a result of the geometry imposed by departing traffic having to cross the runway centreline to track toward the Broughty Castle VRP and inbound traffic being brought in from the same VRP. Whilst it was self-evident that the controller did not intend the aircraft to be flown into confliction, members agreed that the C152 pilot had followed the instructions given to him by ATC, which he was obliged to follow, and that this had resulted in a confliction, however inadvertent. The Board also agreed that the controller had a duty to ensure adequate separation from the approach path with ‘straight-in’ traffic inbound and that this was causal to the Airprox. Notwithstanding, the Board also commented that the PA28 pilot also had a responsibility to avoid collisions and would have been better served by not descending until he had had the C152 visual, or abandoning his approach altogether. Although the PA28 was not apparent on radar recording, members agreed that the PA28 pilot’s description of the incident confirmed that it was apparent that separation was reduced to the minimum and that the controller had played a major role in the outcome.

**PART 138 ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK**

**Case:** Dundee ATIS gave instructions which resulted in the C152 pilot flying into confliction with the PA28.

**Causative Factor:** The C152 pilot did not ensure adequate separation from the approach path.

**Degree of Risk:** A.

**ERC Score:** 20.

**Recommendation:** Dundee review their departure and arrival procedures and phraseology to ensure traffic deconfliction.

<sup>5</sup> Although the Event Risk Classification (ERC) trial had been formally terminated for future development at the time of the Board, for data continuity and consistency purposes, Director UKAB and the UKAB Secretariat provided a shadow assessment of ERC.