AIRPROX REPORT No 2014076 Date/Time: 1 Jun 2014 1323Z (Sunday) L-410 Position: 5209N 00223W 4000ft alt EY ASP (IVO Great Malvern) LON FIR (Class: G) Airspace: Aircraft 2 Aircraft 1 CPA approx 1323 Type: Mini Nimbus L-410 UVP-E9 Separation NK Nimbus Sailplane Sailplane 4400ft alt Civ Pte CAT Operator. Alt/FL: 4400 4000 937 QNH (1020hPa) QNH (1022hPa) 150 BERRON Conditions: VMC IMC 155 37 DBUR Visibility: NR 20k 2 NM Reported Separation: 1 50ft V/20m H 0ft V/100m H Diagram based on radar data 0 and pilot reports Recorded Separation: NK

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

THE MINI NIMBUS PILOT reports flying a white and red FLARM-equipped glider with no SSR. He was flying cross-country on a leg between Great Malvern and Ludlow in company with two other gliders who were several hundred feet below him. In a strong and rough thermal, he was turning left and working quite hard when he heard, felt (as you would feel a fast car going by on a motorway) and then saw, a "Dornier" appear from behind his left shoulder. It was extremely close and travelling at high speed; once it had gone past, the other gliders also saw it heading south-east. He reported to them that he had just had an "airmiss" and the other pilots later reported that he sounded shocked. He believed that the other pilot did not see him as there was no change in heading following the incident. He reported that, as an experienced pilot with over 5000 hours, he is not easily frightened, but that he was rather shocked by the incident.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE L-410 PILOT reports flying a predominantly white aircraft with all lights illuminated and SSR Mode 3A, C and S selected. On initial contact with Gloster he was given a procedural service because they had no radar capability. He was at FL55 and was instructed to descend to 2800ft and report established on the 8 DME arc for RW27. At approximately 15nm to run to the GST NDB, and descending through 4000ft, the first officer spotted a glider, which was in a spiral climb counter-clockwise under a cumulus cloud, very close and facing him. He increased his rate of descent and veered to the left for a brief moment to avoid it.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

Factual Background

The Gloucester weather was reported as:

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METAR EGBJ 011320Z 19002KT 9999 20/09 Q1022=
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Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

The Gloster controller was providing a Procedural Service without the aid of surveillance equipment. A radar display is used for monitoring purposes but radar recordings did not show any returns in the immediate vicinity of the reported Airprox position.

At 1321:15 the L410 contacted Gloster Approach reporting at 24nm DME, passing FL056, descending to FL050, and in receipt of information PAPA with QNH 1022. The ATSU reported that the ATIS was broadcasting *"intense gliding activity"*. The controller agreed a Procedural Service and instructed the L410 to descend to an altitude of 2800ft on QNH 1022, which was acknowledged correctly. The controller advised the L410 to expect the NDB or ILS approach for runway 27, the pilot's reply was unclear and the controller advised *"readability 3 at the moment continue for the 8DME arc initially for the NDB or ILS approach and expect a visual approach for right-base runway 27 shortly"*. This was acknowledged correctly and the controller instructed the L410 to report reaching 2800ft and also to report established on the 8DME arc, which the L410 pilot acknowledged with *"Wilco (L410)c/s"*.

At 1323:18 the L410 was passing FL042, 0.4nm northwest of the reported Airprox position. No contacts were shown in this position but an intermittent contact was shown 1.8nm southwest of the L410. This was considered not to have been the Glider involved in the Airprox – Figure 1.




Figure 1 – Clee Hill single source at 1323:18

At 1323:26, the L410 passed just east of the reported Airprox position at FL040. It was not possible to determine the exact position or geometry of the encounter from radar recording. The Glider pilot reported the minimum distance as 50ft vertically and 20m horizontally. The L410 pilot reported horizontal distance as 100m, same level, with the glider in a spiral climb turning towards him. The L410 pilot increased his rate of descent and veered slightly to the left– Figure 2.




Figure 2 – Clee Hill single source at 1323:26

The L410 was in receipt of a Procedural Service and "intense gliding activity" had been broadcast on the ATIS, which the pilot had received. The controller was not aware of the location or levels of the gliders and was unable to provide specific traffic information.

UKAB Secretariat

Both pilots shared an equal responsibility to avoid a collision and not to fly into such proximity as to create a danger of collision.¹ Additionally, the L-410 was required to give way to the glider², which, at a late stage, he did.

Summary

An Airprox was reported on 1st June 2014 at 1323 between a Mini Nimbus Sailplane and a L-410 at approximately 4000ft. Both aircraft were operating in Class G airspace, the L-410 was receiving a Procedural Service from Gloucester; the Nimbus wasn't receiving an ATS.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available included reports from the pilots of both aircraft, radar photographs/video recordings and reports from the air traffic controllers involved.

The Board first considered the actions of the Mini Nimbus pilot. Because the L410 came from behind him at relatively high-speed, the Board opined that he could not have been realistically expected to see it and so there was little that he could have done to avoid the Airprox.

Turning to the L410 crew, the Board noted that the ATIS at Gloucester had broadcast information regarding intense glider activity in the area, and that the L410 crew knew that Gloucester didn't have radar capability so the onus was on them to keep a good lookout. This was probably instrumental in alerting the crew to the need to actively search the airspace and, although they saw the glider late, they probably did manage to take enough avoiding action to avert a collision.

The Board attributed the cause to a late sighting by the L410 pilot. Although avoiding action had been taken, they deemed that the glider pilot's report indicated that the situation had nevertheless only just stopped short of an actual collision where separation had been reduced to the minimum; they therefore categorised the risk as A.

¹ Rules of the Air 2007 (as amended), Rule 8 (avoiding Aerial Collisions).

² Ibid., Rule 9 (Converging)

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

<u>Cause</u>: A late sighting by the L410 pilot.

А

Degree of Risk:

ERC Score³: 502

³ Although the Event Risk Classification (ERC) trial had been formally terminated for future development at the time of the Board, for data continuity and consistency purposes, Director UKAB and the UKAB Secretariat provided a shadow assessment of ERC.