
## **AIRPROX REPORT No 2015210**

Date: 1 Dec 2015 Time: 1516Z Position: 5320N 00009W Location: ivo Belmont Mast

## PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

D	A * 64 A	A:
Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Tutor	GB1
Operator	HQ Air (Trg)	Civ Comm
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Basic	None
Provider	Humberside	N/A
Altitude/FL	FL009	NMC
Transponder	A, C, S	Off
Reported		
Colours	White	Dark green/lime
Lighting	HISL, nav	HISL, nav
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	20km	20km
Altitude/FL	500ft	1500ft
Altimeter	RPS (1008hPa)	QFE (NK hPa)
Heading	125°	180°
Speed	120kt	150kt
ACAS/TAS	TAS	Not fitted
Alert	None	N/A
Separation		
Reported	50ft V/50m H	0ft V/500m H
Recorded	NK	



THE TUTOR PILOT reports departing Humberside Airport to instruct a low-level navigation exercise when they were given Traffic Information on an aircraft manoeuvering at the same altitude in the area of their next turning point. As they progressed, Traffic Information was updated as 'southeast of the Belmont mast and moving away'. They were then told it was south of the mast, manoeuvering east-to-west. At that point, they became visual with an aircraft with a white strobe and another Tutor at a range of about 4nm, moving east-to-west at an estimated height of 1000ft. The 'strobing aircraft' then turned towards them and flew a descending turn 'at them'. Having just started a target run, the instructor asked the student whether he was visual with the approaching aircraft, to which he responded with surprise and an expletive. The other aircraft then passed along their right side, inverted, at a range of 50m, before performing a Canadian break and departing to the northwest. The Tutor pilot noted that no avoiding action was taken because he did not know the other pilot's intentions and did not want inadvertently to manoeuvre into collision.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

**THE GB1 PILOT** reports returning to his home airfield. Having climbed back to 2500ft on a northwesterly heading, he saw a Tutor at about 1500ft, heading south. As the GB1 pilot approached the Tutor from the west, the Tutor pilot executed a left-hand turn, and the GB1 pilot pulled up to at least 1500ft above it. The distance to the Tutor was never less than 500m and, from his point of view, there was never a situation which could be considered formation flight. At no point could any manoeuvring of the Tutor have caused a collision hazard.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

## **Factual Background**

The weather at Scampton was recorded as follows:

METAR EGXP 011450Z 23014KT 9999 FEW022 BKN044 13/11 Q1017 BLU=

## **Analysis and Investigation**

#### CAA ATSI

The Tutor pilot was in receipt of a Basic Service from Humberside Approach. Traffic information was passed on the GB1 enabling them to acquire visual contact in good time. There were no apparent ATM implications.

## **UKAB Secretariat**

The Tutor and GB1 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard<sup>1</sup>. Aircraft shall not be flown in formation except by pre-arrangement among the pilots-in-command of the aircraft taking part in the flight<sup>2</sup>.

#### Comments

#### **HQ Air Command**

This incident occurred shortly after a comparable incident detailed at Airprox Report 2015209. Without a greater understanding of the intentions of the GB1 pilot, it is difficult to determine why he chose to close into proximity with the Tutor aircraft without the express permission of the pilot-in-command. Additionally, the disparity in the pilot's narratives presents difficulties in determining the actual sequence of events and the suitability of both pilots actions.

In this instance, the Tutor pilot remained visual with the GB1 as it approached his aircraft; as a result, there was minimal chance of collision. However, without the ability to converse with the GB1 pilot on an appropriate radio frequency and, given the differing performance between the Tutor and the GB1, it is entirely understandable that the Tutor pilot chose to maintain a predictable flight path to avoid the potential for collision during the GB1 pilot's manoeuvres. The decision of the GB1 pilot selected his transponder off denied other airspace users situational awareness through collision warning systems or air traffic services.

### Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Tutor and a Game Composites GB1 flew into proximity at about 1511 on Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> December 2015. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, neither in receipt of a FIS.

# PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings and a report from the appropriate operating authority. It was noted that this was the second of 2 Airprox involving the GB1 pilot, the first of which (Airprox 2015209) occurred 5min earlier.

The Board spent some time considering the pilots' actions but the widely differing reports and the lack of a radar track from the GB1 meant that members were not able to come to a conclusion about what

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> SERA.3205 Proximity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> SERA.3135 Formation flights

had actually happened or to reach a meaningful finding of risk. However, members did consider this Airprox in light of that reported 5 minutes earlier, where the GB1 pilot had admitted to flying in formation without prior agreement and conducting aerobatics around another Tutor. Notwithstanding, without positive information, it was not the Board's place to challenge pilots' reported actions and so, in the absence of recorded data, it could only be agreed that the Tutor pilot had been concerned by the proximity of the GB1.

## PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

<u>Cause</u>: The Tutor pilot was concerned by the proximity of the GB1.

Degree of Risk: D.