


**AIRPROX REPORT No 2016134**

Date: 16 Jul 2016 Time: 1117Z Position: 5344N 00106W Location: Burn

**PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB**

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	ASK13	TB20
Operator	Civ Pte	Unknown
Airspace	Lon FIR	
Class	G	
Rules	VFR	
Service	None	
Provider		
Altitude/FL		1200ft
Transponder	Not Fitted	
<b>Reported</b>		
Colours	Red, White	Maroon, white
Lighting	None	
Conditions	VMC	
Visibility	30km	
Altitude/FL	1400ft	
Altimeter	QNH (1024hPa)	
Heading	250°	
Speed	50kt	
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	
Alert	N/A	
<b>Separation</b>		
Reported	200ft V/200m H	
Recorded		N/K



**THE ASK13 PILOT** reports that he had just winch-launched to 1500ft on RW25 and was heading 250° in a slow descent. He was just over the A19 at the village of Burn when a maroon and white, low-wing light-aircraft was observed below and to his right, heading south. It passed in front and just below his position, moving quickly from right to left. It was clear that, due to its speed, it would pass in front and so no avoiding action was necessary. He was concerned that having just released the winch cable, the aircraft was close to the wire launching area (which is marked on the relevant maps). Observers on the ground at the launch point reported that the aircraft appeared to descend as it approached the glider, although it had not been seen or heard before the launch commenced.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

**THE TB20 PILOT** chose not to file a report.

**Factual Background**

The weather at Leeds/Bradford was recorded as follows:

METAR EGNM 161050Z 24009KT 210V270 9999 BKN015 16/14 Q1022=  
 METAR EGNM 161120Z 25011KT 220V290 9999 FEW014 BKN015 16/13 Q1022=

## Analysis and Investigation

### UKAB Secretariat

The ASK13 and TB20 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard<sup>1</sup>. The TB20 pilot was required to give way to the glider.<sup>2</sup>

### Comments

#### BGA

As the Board has repeatedly noted, tracking close to the overhead of an active winch-launching glider site below the promulgated maximum winching altitude is fraught with danger.

### Summary

An Airprox was reported when a ASK13 glider and a TB20 flew into proximity at 1117 on Saturday 16<sup>th</sup> July 2016. The glider pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and was not receipt of an ATS. The TB20 pilot chose not to file a report.

### **PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS**

Information available consisted of a report from the ASK13 pilot and radar photographs/video recordings.

The Board first looked at the actions of the ASK13 pilot. Members noted that he had just released from the winch and departed the site boundary and, unsurprisingly, was not expecting to see traffic so close. However, the Board noted that the circle depicting a glider site on the VFR chart was there purely as an annotation to highlight its presence, and was not an avoid per se. As such, once over the glider site boundary (“...just over the A19”), the glider was technically in Class G airspace in which see-and-avoid was the main mitigation against mid-air collision. Notwithstanding, the glider pilot had some justification for expecting the TB20 to avoid this area given that the TB20 pilot was also required to conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation<sup>3</sup> and therefore good airmanship dictated that he should have allowed sufficient margin for aircraft operating from the glider site. Noting that the TB20 had his transponder switched on, the Board opined that had the glider been fitted with P-FLARM, PilotAware or similar, the glider pilot would likely have been given an earlier indication that there was traffic in the area and may have been able to react accordingly. Notwithstanding, members noted that, ultimately, his look-out had been successful, in that he had seen the TB20 with enough time to assess that avoiding action was not necessary.

The Board noted that the TB20 was foreign registered and, despite the secretariat contacting his landing airfield, the pilot had chosen not to file a report to date. The Board reiterated the value of receiving such reports to assist in understanding the perception of the other pilot and thereby enhancing air safety for all. Without it the Board could not be sure of the pilot’s intentions, whether he knew that Burn gliding site was there, or whether he saw the glider or not. Some members speculated that with the weather being broken cloud at 1500ft, and with masts to the south of his track, this may have been the reason the pilot turned towards the glider site and climbed when he did if he was not familiar with the local geography. However, others countered that the glider site was clearly marked on the chart, and to fly so close below the promulgated winch-launch height demonstrated either a lack of pre-flight planning or questionable situational awareness and airmanship. Glider members reminded the Board that not only had this incident posed a hazard of mid-air collision between the aircraft, but also with the winch cable that had just been released.

<sup>1</sup> SERA.3205 Proximity.

<sup>2</sup> SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

<sup>3</sup> SERA.3225 Operation on and in the vicinity of an aerodrome (b).

In looking at the cause and risk of the Airprox, the Board noted that the glider pilot had seen the TB20 with enough time to assimilate the geometry and decide not to react. They therefore discounted a late sighting as being the cause and agreed that the best description of the incident was as a conflict in Class G, resolved by the ASK13 pilot; members were also unanimous in agreeing that a contributory factor was that the TB20 pilot had flown adjacent to a promulgated and active glider site below the maximum winch-launch altitude. Turning to the risk, and noting that the glider pilot had seen the TB20 early enough to assess that avoiding action was not necessary, the Board determined that there was no risk of collision because timely and effective (in)action had been possible.

### **PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK**

<u>Cause:</u>	A conflict in Class G resolved by the ASK13 pilot.
<u>Contributory Factor:</u>	The TB20 pilot flew adjacent to a promulgated and active glider site, below the maximum winch launch altitude.
<u>Degree of Risk:</u>	C.