
# **AIRPROX REPORT No 2017108**

Date: 03 Jun 2017 Time: 1052Z Position: 5230N 00112W Location: ivo Bruntingthorpe

### PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	C152	Untraced Glider
Operator	Civ Club	Unknown
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	
Service	None <sup>1</sup>	
Provider	(East Midlands)	
Altitude/FL	3100ft	
Transponder	A, C	
Reported		Not Reported
Colours	White	
Lighting	Strobe, beacon	
Conditions	VMC	
Visibility	>10km	
Altitude/FL	3000ft	
Altimeter	QNH (1014hPa)	
Heading	345°	
Speed	90kt	
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Unknown
Alert	N/A	Unknown
Separation		
Reported	200ft V/500m H	NK
Recorded	NK	



THE C152 PILOT reports conducting a navigation exercise when he saw a white glider as it flew directly above and infront of the cockpit, passing from right to left. It then carried out a steep descending 180° left turn to put the glider on a direct course towards the C152. The C152 pilot turned slightly but steeply to the right and put the aircraft into a descent to place distance between the glider and himself. The glider pilot apparently sighted the C152 after his 180° turn and turned away steeply to his right. The C152 pilot reported the glider passing overhead and the controller advised him that Husbands Bosworth was active. He estimated he was about 8 miles north-northwest of Husbands Bosworth. The C152 pilot commented that the combination of the high-wing Cessna and low-wing glider meant the glider was unsighted to him until it was overhead the aircraft and he was sure the low-wing glider pilot didn't spot the Cessna until he had executed a steep left-turn to head eastwards directly towards the C152.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

**THE GLIDER PILOT**: Despite extensive tracing action, the glider pilot could not be found.

THE EAST MIDLANDS CONTROLLER did not submit a report to the UKAB.

## **Factual Background**

The weather at Coventry and East Midlands was recorded as follows:

METAR EGBE 031050Z 25008KT 210V300 9999 FEW022 SCT035 16/10 Q1014= METAR EGNX 031050Z 25012KT 230V290 9999 SCT033 16/08 Q1014=

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The C152 pilot was in the process of obtaining a Basic Service from East Midlands when the Airprox occurred. At the time of the Airprox, no service had been agreed.

# **Analysis and Investigation**

#### **CAA ATSI**

The C152 pilot had contacted East Midlands Radar at 1049:30 requesting a Basic Service, and had been initially allocated a conspicuity transponder code by the controller; a Basic Service was agreed. The controller then became involved with dealing with an aircraft which had just infringed controlled airspace. The pilot reported having been overflown by a glider at 1052:30. The C152 was indicating an altitude of 3000ft at the time. It was not possible to observe any other contact in the vicinity of the C152.

### **UKAB Secretariat**

The C152 and glider pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard<sup>2</sup>. If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the C152 pilot was required to give way to the glider<sup>3</sup>.

### Comments

#### **BGA**

This area is busy with many forms of GA. Fortunately; in this case, the pilots saw each other and took appropriate avoiding action.

## **Summary**

An Airprox was reported when a C152 and an unknown glider flew into proximity at about 1052 on Saturday 3<sup>rd</sup> June 2017. Both pilots were operating in VMC, the C152 pilot under VFR and in the process of obtaining a Basic Service from East Midlands, and the glider pilot most likely under VFR and not in receipt of a service.

### PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of a report from the C152 pilot, radar photographs/video recordings and a report from the appropriate ATC authority.

The Board agreed that this occurrence was unfortunate in that the glider would most likely have been obscured initially by the high-wing of the C152. Nonetheless, the C152 pilot saw the glider, albeit at a late stage, as it passed ahead and above and was able to take avoiding action when the glider pilot turned left, back towards the C152. Members felt that the glider pilot would likely not have turned back towards a powered aircraft in close proximity had he or she been aware of its presence, and that the left turn had probably been taken to enter a thermal. Glider pilot members expressed the opinion that the glider pilot would undoubtedly have heard the C152 at that range and all agreed that although the possibility existed of being completely unsighted to the C152, it appeared that the glider pilot saw the C152 at some point during the left turn, albeit at a late stage, and turned away. Given the 500m estimated separation by the C152 pilot, the glider member opined that the glider pilot may not have thought the incident was particularly close, and that may have been why they had not reported the encounter themselves.

The Board concluded that the Airprox had occurred as a result of the late sightings by both pilots and that effective avoiding action had been taken to prevent collision.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> SERA.3205 Proximity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

## PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE, RISK AND SAFETY BARRIERS

<u>Cause</u>: A late sighting by the C152 pilot and probably a late sighting by the

glider pilot.

Degree of Risk: C.


# Safety Barrier Assessment<sup>4</sup>

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

### Flight Crew:

**Situational Awareness and Action** were assessed as **ineffective** because no off-board or on-board SA was available.

**See and Avoid** were assessed as **partially effective** because the C152 pilot saw the glider at a late stage, and the glider pilot probably also did not see the C152 until a late stage.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.