AIRPROX REPORT No 2018207

Date: 20 Jun 2018 Time: 1420Z Position: 5206N 00023E Location: 10nm E Duxford

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2	Colvilla	7
Aircraft	Wildcat	T61	Diagram b	ased on radar data
Operator	RN	Civ FW	West	In In In
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR		leston WRAT
Class	G	G		COM
Rules	VFR	VFR		19:18
Service	None	None		9.10
Provider	N/A	N/A		19:30
Altitude/FL	1600ft	NK		19.30
Transponder	A, C, S	Not fitted		. No Arrahada
Reported				19:42
Colours	Dark/light grey	Blue, white		
_ighting	NK	Strobe		*
Conditions	VMC	VMC		W A H
/isibility	25km	20km	T61	VRP
Altitude/FL	1520ft	1700ft	PSR only	AVERHILL
Altimeter	RPS (NK hPa)	QNH (NK hPa)		MATINITE
Heading	260°	NK	and Tudy	
Speed	NK	70kt	Camps	(C) 777
ACAS/TAS	TAS	Not fitted	4045	2
Alert	None	N/A		NM
	Separation			Lamps
Reported	'200yds'	Not seen		7 11 2
Recorded	corded NK V/0.2nm H			

THE WILDCAT PILOT reports being in transit when the handling pilot in the right-hand seat saw a blue and white motor-glider in straight-and-level flight, on the nose, at the same height and on a reciprocal bearing at a range of less than 1nm. He immediately altered course to the right using 30° AOB and the other aircraft, a motor glider, passed the left side by approximately 200 yards. An Airprox was filed immediately with Duxford.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE T61 PILOT reports that he was advised of the Airprox by letter. Neither he nor the co-pilot saw any helicopter during the flight. The pilot noted that they 'were in good comms with Duxford ATZ' and did not hear any other aircraft saying they were near them in that area.

THE DUXFORD AFISO reports that both pilots had left the frequency prior to the Airprox but that the Wildcat pilot returned to frequency to inform him of the Airprox. The AFISO noted that both pilots had previously been in receipt of a Basic Service but that without surveillance equipment he was not able to detect their proximity to each other.

Factual Background

The weather at Luton was recorded as follows:

METAR EGGW 201420Z AUTO 27015KT 9999 SCT023 OVC039 23/16 Q1019=

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

The Wildcat and T61 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard¹. If the incident geometry is considered as head-on or nearly so then both pilots were required to turn to the right², which the Wildcat pilot did.

The Wildcat Occurrence Investigation

The Wildcat Occurrence Investigation Narrative Description of Cause stated as follows:

Late spot of conflicting traffic. Notably on the date in question at that time of day the sun would have been on a bearing of approximately 240 Degrees at that location reducing the effectiveness of lookout in the direction the motor-glider was approaching from.

The Investigation also made a recommendation that the cost of FLARM integration be investigated, which was accepted.

Comments

Navy HQ

A limited investigation into the Airprox was conducted due to lack of information from the motor glider pilot. The investigation cited the cause as a late sighting of conflicting traffic, and the outcome as 'actions by the Wildcat aircrew prevented mid-air collision'. The conflicting motor glider did not display on TCAS and a resulting recommendation is to investigate the use of FLARM for Wildcat. Under the circumstances of this Airprox, the aircrew, on sighting the conflicting traffic on a reciprocal heading, followed the rules of the air by altering course to the right and in doing so avoided a further reduced CPA or possible mid-air collision.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Wildcat and a T61 TMG flew into proximity at 1420 on Wednesday 20th June 2018. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, neither in receipt of a FIS.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings and a verbal report from the AFISO involved.

The Board members first discussed the degree of service applied to each pilot and noted that there had initially been some confusion as to whether the pilots were in receipt of a Basic Service or not. A subsequent phone call to Duxford ATSU established that both pilots had left the Duxford frequency prior to the Airprox and therefore neither pilot was in receipt of a service at the time. Members felt that the Wildcat pilot had seen the T61 as early as was feasible and that he had taken appropriate action by turning right. It was unfortunate that the neither pilot in the T61 saw the Wildcat, and members noted that this highlighted the imperfect nature of see-and-avoid as a barrier to mid-air collision and were heartened to learn that the use of FLARM on Wildcat was being investigated. Members also commented that both pilots may have been better served by contacting Farnborough LARS North for a service in that area, albeit at the limit of their coverage.

¹ SERA.3205 Proximity.

² SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(1) Approaching head-on. MAA RA 2307 paragraph 13.

Turning to the Airprox itself, members agreed that it was best characterised as a conflict in Class G, which the Wildcat pilot had resolved by his timely sighting of the T61. Members also agreed that his timely avoiding action had resulted in a situation where there was no risk of collision.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

<u>Cause</u>: A conflict in Class G resolved by the Wildcat pilot.

Degree of Risk: C.


Safety Barrier Assessment³

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Crew:

Situational Awareness and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had any awareness of the other aircraft.

Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective**, although both aircraft were equipped with collision warning systems they were incompatible, and the Wildcat TAS couldn't detect the non-transponding glider.



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³ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.