


## AIRPROX REPORT No 2020147

Date: 18 Oct 2020 Time: 1304Z Position: 5109N 00134W Location: Middle Wallop – elev 297ft

### PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	ASK21	PA28
Operator	Civ Gl'd	Civ FW
Airspace	Middle Wallop ATZ	Middle Wallop ATZ
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	AGCS	Listening Out
Provider	Wallop Radio	Boscombe
Altitude/FL	~1400ft	NK
Transponder	Not fitted	A only, no Mode C
<b>Reported</b>		
Colours	White	Cream/brown
Lighting	Not fitted	Beacon
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	1200ft	2200ft
Altimeter	QFE (NK hPa)	QNH (1025hPa)
Heading	270°	264°
Speed	45kt	115kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Not fitted
<b>Separation</b>		
Reported	50-200ft V/50m H	300ft V/0.5NM H
Recorded	NK V/0.1NM H	



**THE ASK21 PILOT** reports operating in the visual circuit, in straight descending cruise having just winch-launched to 1250ft aal, when a red and white, low-wing light aircraft passed close by on the right side. The ASK21 pilot noted the last 2 letters of the other aircraft's registration and that they were on parallel tracks but turned to the left anyway to increase separation. The radio was selected on and was serviceable but no radio calls were heard from the pilot of the other aircraft.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

**THE PA28 PILOT** reports using both the Southern England 1/2 million scale CAA VFR chart and a GPS device for navigation. They contacted Boscombe whilst still east of Middle Wallop but did not receive a reply and continued to the west (over Middle Wallop). A single white glider was observed below and to the left, sufficiently clear that avoiding action was not required.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

### **Factual Background**

The weather at Middle Wallop was recorded as follows:

METAR EGVP 181250Z AUTO 17001KT 9999 0VC050/// 12/07 Q1023=

The Middle Wallop ATZ is active H24. NOTAM H3331 was promulgated as follows:

Q) EGTT/QWGLW/IV/M /AW/000/035/5109N00134W007  
 A) EGVP B) 2009050526 C) 2011011640  
 D) SAT-SUN SR-SS  
 E) GLIDING. INTENSE ACT WI 6NM RADIUS 510900N 0013407W (MIDDLE WALLOP, HAMPSHIRE). FOR DAILY ROUTE INFO WWW.BGALADDER.CO.UK/SHOWTASK.ASP OR 07921 894885 AND 118.6MHZ.

2020-08-0375/AS3  
F) SFC G) 3500FT AMSL)

## Analysis and Investigation

### UKAB Secretariat

The ASK21 and PA28 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.<sup>1</sup> If the incident geometry is considered as overtaking then the ASK21 pilot had right of way and the PA28 pilot was required to keep out of the way of the other aircraft by altering course to the right.<sup>2</sup> An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.<sup>3</sup>

Article 92(2)(a)(ii) of the Air Navigation Order 2016 requires that CAA permission is obtained if a glider is to be winch-launched to a height greater than 60m agl. The gliding operation at Middle Wallop did not have such a permission in place on the date of the Airprox.

## Comments

### BGA

It is unfortunate that gliding activity at Middle Wallop is not yet shown on aeronautical charts. However, by the PA28 pilot's own account, they flew through an active ATZ where gliding activity was NOTAM'd, despite having a paper map and a GPS device available. As we have repeatedly emphasised, this creates significant risks for all parties. As at February 2021, the BGA have recorded 188 overflight incidents in the previous two years. A small diversion to avoid the ATZ, or a radio call on the Middle Wallop frequency, would most likely have averted this encounter.

## Summary

An Airprox was reported when an ASK21 and a PA28 flew into proximity near the Middle Wallop overhead at about 1304Z on Sunday 18<sup>th</sup> October 2020. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, the ASK21 pilot in receipt of an AGCS from Wallop Radio and the PA28 pilot listening out on the Boscombe Down Zone frequency but not in receipt of an ATS.

## **PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS**

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

Due to the exceptional circumstances presented by the coronavirus pandemic, this incident was assessed as part of a 'virtual' UK Airprox Board meeting where members provided a combination of written contributions and dial-in/VTC comments.

Members discussed the PA28 pilot's actions but were presented with conflicting information regarding the altitude of the PA28, reported as 2200ft by the PA28 pilot but as passing by on the right side by the ASK21 pilot at 1400ft. Whilst this presented a conundrum, the Board were able to note that the PA28 pilot seemed not to have planned the flight with sufficient rigour (**CF2**), in that they did not appear to have been aware of the gliding NOTAM or the extent of the ATZ at Middle Wallop. Members noted that a simple radio call to Wallop Radio could have resolved the situation (**CF4**) by creating improved SA and possibly an earlier resolution to the issue. In the event, the ASK21 pilot had no SA on the

<sup>1</sup> SERA.3205 Proximity.

<sup>2</sup> SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(3) Overtaking.

<sup>3</sup> SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

approaching PA28 and the PA28 pilot had only generic SA of aircraft possibly more likely to be operating in the vicinity of an airfield (CF5). The Board discussed the probable altitude of the PA28 and were persuaded that if the ASK21 pilot could report part of its registration, it was most likely at least within a few hundred feet of the ASK21, which was at 1400ft, and therefore inside the Middle Wallop ATZ (CF3) and without clearance (CF1). However, members also noted that the gliding club did not have a valid permission to winch-launch above 60m agl on the day of the Airprox (CF1) and that the glider should therefore not have been airborne. Members agreed that it would be absurd to describe the glider being airborne as the cause of the Airprox but noted that if the winch-launch maximum altitude regulation had been observed there would not have been a glider present with which the PA28 pilot could fly into proximity. The PA28 pilot reported seeing a glider clear below and members were informed that another glider had been airborne in the vicinity at the time. It was thought likely that the PA28 pilot had seen this other glider and had not seen the closer ASK21 (CF7). The ASK21 pilot saw the PA28 as it flew past and at such a late stage that separation at CPA could not be increased, effectively a non-sighting (CF6). Considering the risk, members felt that although neither pilot had seen the other aircraft in time to take action, the vertical separation at CPA was such that although safety had been degraded, there was no risk of collision. Finally, members commented that this Airprox was entirely avoidable. On the one hand, time should be spent before departure consulting appropriate planning material and aviation information for the intended flight, on the other, every operation must ensure they are complying with the relevant permissions, each activity significantly increasing the likelihood of a safe and enjoyable flight for all concerned.

### **PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK**

#### Contributory Factors:

	2020147		
CF	Factor	Description	Amplification
	<b>Flight Elements</b>		
x	<b>• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance</b>		
1	Human Factors	• Flight Operations Documentation and Publications	Regulations and/or procedures not fully complied with
x	<b>• Tactical Planning and Execution</b>		
2	Human Factors	• Flight Planning and Preparation	
3	Human Factors	• Aircraft Navigation	Flew through promulgated and active airspace
4	Human Factors	• Communications by Flight Crew with ANS	Pilot did not communicate with appropriate ATS provider
x	<b>• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action</b>		
5	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	The pilot had generic, late or no Situational Awareness
x	<b>• See and Avoid</b>		
6	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots

Degree of Risk: C.

Recommendation: Nil.

### Safety Barrier Assessment<sup>4</sup>

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

#### Flight Elements:

**Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance** were assessed as **ineffective** because it appeared the PA28 flew through the promulgated and active ATZ without clearance and the glider was winch-launched above 60m agl without the relevant CAA permission being in place.

**Tactical Planning and Execution** was assessed as **ineffective** because the PA28 pilot did not plan the route such that it maintained an appropriate distance from the gliding site circuit and did not communicate with Wallop Radio.

**Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action** were assessed as **partially effective** because the available SA was only partially acted upon.

**See and Avoid** were assessed as **ineffective** because the ASK21 pilot did not see the PA28 until it was passing and the PA28 pilot did not see a glider in close proximity.

Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2020147		Outside Controlled Airspace		Effectiveness				
Barrier		Provision	Application	Barrier Weighting				
				0%	5%	10%	15%	20%
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓					
	Manning & Equipment	✓	✓					
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicion & Action	⊖	⊖					
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	⊖	⊖					
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✗					
	Tactical Planning and Execution	✓	✗					
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action	⚠	⚠					
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	⊖	⊖					
	See & Avoid	✗	✗					
<b>Key:</b>		Full	Partial	None	Not Present/Not Assessable	Not Used		
Provision	✓	⚠	✗	⊖				
Application	✓	⚠	✗	⊖	⊖			
Effectiveness								

<sup>4</sup> The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).