


**AIRPROX REPORT No 2020041**

Date: 25 May 2020 Time: 0915Z Position: 5252N 00054E Location: Little Snoring

**PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB**

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	QuikR	Untraced Tiger Moth
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	None	
Provider		
Altitude/FL	NK	
Transponder	A, C, S	
<b>Reported</b>		
Colours	Blue, White, Yellow	
Lighting	Nil	
Conditions	VMC	
Visibility	25km	
Altitude/FL	50ft	
Altimeter	QFE (1028hPa)	
Heading	250°	
Speed	50kt	
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	
Alert	N/A	
<b>Separation</b>		
Reported	250ft V/0m H	
Recorded	NK	



**THE QUIKR PILOT** reports they were on a check flight of a QuikR to revalidate the permit to fly and were making blind calls on Little Snoring Radio. They had called short final for RW25 and were at approximately 200ft when they spotted a biplane above and ahead who appeared to be descending on a reciprocal heading. It appeared to be a Tiger Moth type. They were prepared to take avoiding action had its descent continued, but the pilot levelled out and flew overhead as they landed. They called and asked the Tiger Moth pilot if they had seen the microlight on short final, but heard nothing on frequency before, during, or after the incident. On taxiing-in they asked the aircraft’s owners if they had seen the incident and they reported that the pilot was flying along the runway, waving from the cockpit. The aircraft then departed at low-level to the North/North East. Their main concern was that if they had needed to perform a go-around without having seen the other aircraft, they could easily have climbed straight into the Tiger Moth; the QuikR can comfortably achieve 1500fpm and climbs steeply.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as ‘Medium’.

**THE TIGER MOTH PILOT** could not be traced.

**Factual Background**

The weather at Norwich was recorded as follows:

METAR COR EGSB 250850Z VRB03KT 9999 FEW031 18/10 Q1035 NOSIG=

## Analysis and Investigation

### UKAB Secretariat

Although the QuikR could be seen descending into Little Snoring on the NATS radar, the radar coverage in the area was SSR only, and the Tiger Moth could not be seen and could not be traced.



Figure 1: 0912 QuikR squawking 7000  
(Little Snoring marked by the white cross)

The QuikR and Tiger Moth pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.<sup>1</sup> An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.<sup>2</sup>

### Summary

An Airprox was reported when a QuikR and a Tiger Moth flew into proximity in the Little Snoring circuit at 0915Z on Monday 25<sup>th</sup> May 2020. The QuikR pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and listening out on the Little Snoring frequency, the Tiger Moth pilot could not be traced.

### PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of a report from the QuikR pilots and radar photographs/video recordings. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

Due to the exceptional circumstances presented by the coronavirus pandemic, this incident was assessed as part of a 'virtual' UK Airprox Board meeting where members contributed via dial-in/VTC comments. Although not all Board members were present for the entirety of the meeting and, as a result, the usual wide-ranging discussions involving all Board members were more limited, sufficient engagement was achieved to enable a formal assessment to be agreed along with the following associated comments.

The Board first looked at the actions of the QuikR pilot. They had been flying in the visual circuit at Little Snoring and making radio calls on the frequency (which was not manned) and could rightfully have expected that they would not come into conflict with anything heading in the other direction. Without any prior situational awareness about the Tiger Moth (**CF6**), it was fortunate that, although the pilot saw the other aircraft late (**CF7**), there was still enough time to take alternative avoiding action. However, in the event, once it became clear that the Tiger Moth had levelled off, it was judged that maintaining course to land was the best form of action.

Without a report from the Tiger Moth pilot, the Board were unable to ascertain what their intentions were, or whether they were even aware of the QuikR in the circuit. Some members opined that the

<sup>1</sup> SERA.3205 Proximity..

<sup>2</sup> SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

pilot's airmanship was somewhat questionable as it appeared that they had joined a visual circuit without knowing the circuit direction, whether it was active or not, and without integrating with the QuikR which was already established in the circuit (**CF1, CF3, CF4**). The Board considered that the Tiger Moth may not have been fitted with a radio, particularly because the QuikR pilot did not receive an answer to the challenge over the RT. However, if this was the case, members thought that the Tiger Moth pilot could have contacted Little Snoring prior to getting airborne to give prior notification of their intention to fly through (**CF2, CF5**). In any event, the pilot should have made certain that they were fully aware of any circuit traffic prior to joining, and if not radio equipped, joined via the overhead.

When assessing the risk, some members initially thought that without the Tiger Moth pilot's report there was not enough information to make a considered judgement. Others felt that because the QuikR pilot had spotted the Tiger Moth with enough time to take avoiding action, but felt it not necessary, that it was possible to assess that safety had been degraded, but there had been no risk of collision. After some discussion the latter view prevailed; Risk Category C.

## **PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK**

### Contributory Factors:

	2020041		
CF	Factor	Description	Amplification
	<b>Flight Elements</b>		
	<b>• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance</b>		
1	Human Factors	• Flight Operations Documentation and Publications	Regulations and/or procedures not complied with
	<b>• Tactical Planning and Execution</b>		
2	Human Factors	• Pre-flight briefing and flight preparation	
3	Human Factors	• Insufficient Decision/Plan	Inadequate plan adaption
4	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Did not avoid/conform with the pattern of traffic already formed
5	Human Factors	• Accuracy of Communication	Ineffective communication of intentions
	<b>• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action</b>		
6	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Pilot had no, late or only generic, Situational Awareness
	<b>• See and Avoid</b>		
7	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Late-sighting by one or both pilots

Degree of Risk: C.

### Safety Barrier Assessment<sup>3</sup>

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

#### **Flight Elements:**

**Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance** were assessed as **ineffective** because the Tiger Moth pilot did not conform with the pattern of traffic formed by the QuikR.

**Tactical Planning and Execution** was assessed as **ineffective** because the Tiger Moth pilot flew low-level along the reciprocal runway without ensuring that there was no traffic to affect.

<sup>3</sup> The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

**Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action** were assessed as **ineffective** because the QuikR pilot had no situational awareness about the Tiger Moth prior to becoming visual with it.

		Barrier		Effectiveness				
		Provision	Application	Barrier Weighting				
				0%	5%	10%	15%	20%
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	○	○					
	Manning & Equipment	○	○					
	Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action	○	○					
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	○	○					
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✗					
	Tactical Planning and Execution	✓	✗					
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action	✓	✗					
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	○	○					
	See & Avoid	✓	✓					
<b>Key:</b>		Full	Partial	None	Not Present/Not Assessable	Not Used		
Provision	✓	⚠	✗	○				
Application	✓	⚠	✗	○				
Effectiveness	■	■	■	■	□			