


**Avoiding collisions** – a monthly update from Director UK Airprox Board giving some learning themes for recreational pilots.

The Airprox Board reviewed 20 incidents in the July 2016 meeting, of which 9 were assessed as risk bearing (Category A or Category B); 5 of these risk-bearing events involved drones. The remaining 4 risk-bearing events involved a C152 flying through Chatteris DZ and into conflict with 8 parachutists; a Chinook and a Ventus glider that came into proximity near Wantage due to late-/non- sightings; a PA31 and an M20 that came close in IMC without appropriate ATS; and an Extra conducting an overhead join that did not integrate effectively with an EV97 already in the visual circuit (more detail below). Common themes this month included poor airmanship decisions in 6 incidents; 6 Airprox involving late- and non-sightings; and 4 examples of poor integration within, or lack of avoidance of, ATZ/DZ. This month, 2 incidents stood out as having particularly questionable airmanship aspects; one where both pilots were flying in IMC (one of the pilots being IMC under a non-radar Basic Service and the other being IMC under a Traffic Service but hadn't informed ATC that he was IMC), and the incident were the C152 pilot flew over the promulgated and active Chatteris parachuting site and into conflict with the 8 parachutists.

My **Airprox of the month** this month was a Category B event at Conington between an Extra and an EV97. The background to Airprox 2016083 was that the Extra pilot is registered as hard-of-hearing and had pre-notified Conington that he would effectively be carrying out a radio-failure overhead join at a predetermined time. Unfortunately, the message did not get through to the A/G operator and so there was a certain amount of confusion when the Extra pilot 'transmitted blind' his intentions, which were unfortunately either stepped on or distorted by interference of some sort. The Extra pilot went on to conduct a text-book overhead join according to Conington's procedures, but unfortunately didn't see the EV97 that was downwind. For his part, the EV97 pilot saw the Extra late, and thought it was in an inappropriate position because he didn't think its pilot had followed the correct overhead join. Apart from the unfortunate fact that the Extra pilot didn't see the EV97, the key learning points were: the Extra pilot



to prefix his calls with 'transmitting blind, receiver failure' to make it clear that he wouldn't hear any transmissions; review procedures at Conington to ensure effective and timely passing of messages; pilots to be clear about their airfield joining procedures so that they know the expected tracks; and be aware of any likely conflict points in the circuit just in case other aircraft are joining 'radio-failure' for real and may not see you already established in the circuit. The full report can be found on the UKAB website at ([www.airproxboard.org.uk](http://www.airproxboard.org.uk)) in the 'Airprox Reports and Analysis' section within the appropriate year in the 'Individual Airprox reports' tab.