
AIRPROX REPORT No 2017110

Date: 03 Jun 2017 Time: 1245Z Position: 5524N 00433W Location: 5nm S Prestwick



PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

THE AW189 PILOT reports that he was returning from a training flight and had asked to join CAS VFR to self-position on the ILS RW30 at Prestwick. The weather was fine with no clouds to affect. ATC cleared him into their airspace VFR below 3000ft and warned him of southbound departing traffic. A TCAS contact was seen at 3nm, -200ft and climbing. The target was searched for visually by both pilots, the winchman and on FLIR by the winch operator. ATC gave a further warning of traffic at the same height in the same area. The aircraft was sighted just as TCAS called 'TRAFFIC TRAFFIC', head on at the same height. The handling pilot lowered the collective lever to descend and shortly afterwards TCAS called 'DESCEND DESCEND'. The contact passed approximately 300ft above and 1/4 nm behind.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

THE PA28 PILOT reports that he heard Prestwick pass TI on his aircraft to another aircraft; the distance mentioned was 6nm. He looked to his right but there were a line of clouds about 2nm away which obscured the traffic. Prestwick passed him TI on the helicopter at 2000ft, the same altitude as he was. He requested clearance to climb to 3000ft, which was approved. As he passed 2400ft he saw the helicopter about a mile away descending. The helicopter passed down his right-hand side and disappeared under his nose. He continued his flight and only remembers the helicopter saying they had an RA, which the controller acknowledged. As far as he was concerned that was the end of the matter. ATC said there was no Airprox and he spoke to one of the AW189's company Senior pilots and the Ops Officer who said they had not filed an Airprox.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

THE PRESTWICK CONTROLLER reports that the AW189 pilot called at 2000ft VFR approximately 10nm SSW of Prestwick wishing to self-position VFR for an ILS to RW30 for a 10nm final. The Prestwick QNH, conspicuity code and clearance to enter CAS not above 3000ft on track was given. The PA28 had departed RW21 to the SW with a clearance to leave CAS not above 2000ft VFR on track. Therefore as he had an arrival from, and a departure to, the SW relevant TI was given and updated until the AW189 reported the PA28 in sight. The PA28 pilot was then advised of this. Shortly afterwards the AW189 pilot advised of a TCAS TA and reported the PA28 in sight. The PA28 was then advised of this. Shortly afterwards the AW189 pilot advised clear, which he also acknowledged.

Factual Background

The weather at Prestwick was recorded as follows:

METAR EGPK 031220Z 29009KT 9999 FEW012 SCT025CB 16/10 Q1010 METAR EGPK 031250Z 27009KT 9999 FEW020 FEW025CB 16/09 Q1010

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

The AW189 and PA28 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard¹. If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the PA28 pilot was required to give way to the AW189².

Both aircraft were provided with TI on the other aircraft by Prestwick. The radar replay shows the PA28 starting to climb shortly before the AW189 turns and descends. Figure 1 shows the point when the AW189 has descended 200ft, in accordance with the TCAS RA, and starts to turn; at this point the PA28 has already started to climb. Prior to the PA28 climbing and the AW189 descending, the separation was 100ft vertically and 1.1nm horizontally, when the AW189 passed through the PA28's 12 o'clock the aircraft were separated by 1000ft vertically and 0.7nm horizontally.




Figure 1: 12:44:11

¹ SERA.3205 Proximity.

² SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when an AW189 and a PA28 flew into proximity at 1245 on Saturday 3rd June 2017. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, both pilots in receipt of a Basic Service from Prestwick.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the pilots of both aircraft, transcripts of the relevant RT frequencies, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

The Board first began by discussing the actions of the Prestwick radar controller. Both aircraft were under only a Basic Service but he continued to pass TI to the aircraft until the AW189 pilot reported the PA28 in sight. The Board commended him for his pro-active controlling on becoming aware of a potential conflict, although they cautioned pilots not to rely on such information being passed unless they opted for an appropriate level of service.

The Board then turned to the actions of the AW189 pilot. They agreed that, although he was selfpositioning for an ILS approach, it would probably have been more pertinent to have asked for a Traffic Service, rather than a Basic Service, especially as he would shortly be under a Radar Control Service once he entered the Prestwick Class D airspace. Some members also opined that, with the TI that the AW189 pilot received, and notwithstanding that the PA28 was required to give way to him, he could have done more, earlier, to alter his route or altitude and avoid the PA28 that he knew was converging at a similar height, rather than simply increase his lookout. In this respect, the Board opined that TCAS indications enhanced pilots' situational awareness and, outside Controlled Airspace, afforded them the opportunity to autonomously change their tactical plan rather than carrying on and flying into confliction.

The Board then looked at the actions of the PA28 pilot. They noted that the PA28 was inside the Prestwick Class D airspace when the TI was originally passed, and therefore technically separated from the AW189 outside controlled airspace. Notwithstanding, the Board noted that, under the rules of the air, the PA28 pilot was required to give way to the AW189, which he did by climbing as he was leaving controlled airspace. The Board agreed that the PA28 pilot had been sufficiently proactive to ensure that sufficient separation was achieved by CPA.

The Board then considered the cause and risk of the incident. Members noted that the PA28 pilot had appropriately climbed to ensure sufficient separation from the AW189, and that the AW189 pilot had manoeuvred as soon as he had sighted the PA28 at about 1nm. The Board agreed that this reflected normal procedures, safety standards and parameters in Class G airspace, and that the incident was therefore probably best described as simply a conflict in Class G airspace. Accordingly, the Board assessed the risk as Category E.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: A conflict in Class G.

Degree of Risk: E.

Safety Barrier Assessment³

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

³ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the <u>UKAB Website</u>.

Flight Crew

Situational Awareness & Action was assessed as **partially effective** because although both aircraft were passed TI on each other, which resulted in the PA28 pilot climbing, the AW189 pilot could have acted earlier to increase the separation given his greater level of SA with the addition of his TCAS information.

Warning System Operation and Compliance was assessed as **partially effective** because only the AW189 was fitted with TCAS, and the AW189 pilot did not act until closer than desirable.

