
### **AIRPROX REPORT No 2019151**

Date: 25 May 2019 Time: 1115Z Position: 5106N 00254W Location: Westonzoyland

# PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Mainair Blade 912	Auster, Piper Cub,
		Aeronca Chief
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Listening Out	Listening Out
Provider	Westonzoyland	Middlezoy
Altitude/FL		
Transponder	Not Fitted	Not fitted
Reported		
Colours	Blue, White	Military colours
Lighting		NR
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	10km
Altitude/FL	450ft	NR
Altimeter	QFE	NK
Heading	330°	
Speed	50kt	
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Not fitted
	Separation	
Reported	150-200ft V/250ft	Not Seen
	Н	
Recorded	NK	



**THE MAINAIR BLADE PILOT** reports he was flying normal approaches to Westonzoyland and first overflew the airstrip to check the windsock. He used the radio to report approaching overhead and then downwind RH for RW33, which had been in use all day. He was flying the downwind leg wide enough to remain clear of a NOTAM which was in place for fast model jets, when he saw 3 aircraft flying from the south-east at low-level. He continued his approach, called 'final' and one of the 3 aircraft crossed his path below and ahead of him. No calls were heard from the other aircraft and there was no time to take avoiding action.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

**THE AUSTER, PIPER CUB and AERONCA PILOTS** report that they were flying to Middlezoy, they did not see the other aircraft in question.

THE MIDDLEZOY FLIGHT SAFETY OFFICER reports that on the day in question it was planned that 3 aircraft would fly into Middlezoy Aerodrome for an event that was taking place on adjoining farmland. As the Flight Safety Officer, he ensured that all pilots had received and understood the procedures plus a map and aerial photograph. For the time of their arrival he was monitoring 'Zoyland Microbase' frequency (129.830) and two other competent observers were monitoring the circuit airspace throughout. At no time was any other aircraft observed in the vicinity, he was therefore very surprised when he heard an Airprox had been reported, and it was his opinion that it had not occurred.

# **Factual Background**

The weather at Bristol was recorded as follows:

METAR EGGD 251050Z AUTO 27007KT 240V320 9999 SCT025 BKN029 BKN039 18/10 Q1020=

# **Analysis and Investigation**

#### **UKAB Secretariat**

Figure 1 illustrates the positioning of the two airfields and the model aircraft club. The UKAB Secretariat were provided with correspondence suggesting that co-operation and liaison between the two airstrips had been somewhat strained in the months preceding the Airprox.




Figure 1

All pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard<sup>1</sup>. An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation<sup>2</sup>.

### Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Blade flex-wing microlight and a formation of Auster, Piper Cub and Aeronca Chief aircraft flew into proximity overhead Westonzoyland at 1115hrs on Saturday 25<sup>th</sup> May 2019. All pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, none were in receipt of an ATS.

### PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the pilots of all aircraft.

The incident was not visible on radar recordings and, given the vastly differing accounts from those involved, the Board reluctantly agreed that they could not draw any conclusions as to what actually happened without appearing to disbelieve one pilot or the other. Notwithstanding, it was clear to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> SERA.3205 Proximity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

Board from the correspondence received by the Secretariat that relationships between the 2 airfields were fragile, and that this was not conducive to robust, effective or even efficient air operations given their close proximity to each other. Therefore, irrespective of the reported nature and outcome of the Airprox, in the interests of air safety the Board resolved to make a recommendation that the Westonzoyland and Middlezoy airfield managers develop a mutually acceptable letter of agreement regarding the harmonisation and integration of their respective operations.

# PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors: The Board thought that there was insufficient information to assess the

Contributory Factors.

Degree of Risk: D.

Recommendation: Westonzoyland and Middlezoy airfield managers develop a letter of

agreement regarding integration of their operations.

Safety Barrier Assessment<sup>3</sup>

The Board were unable to assess the safety barriers.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the <u>UKAB Website</u>.